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INTRODUCTION
Late in the election campaign of 1972, People's Party presidential candidate
Benjamin Spock and his running mate, Julius Hobson, notified the commander of Fort
Dix Military Reservation in New Jersey that they intended to hold a campaign event
on the post.' Fort Dix was an "open post," and civilians were permitted to drive or
walk freely throughout the unrestricted areas of the post.2 Spock expressed an interest
in talking to servicemembers "about the issues that concern them,"3 which, at the time,
* Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. J.D., University of
Texas, 1988. Captain, United States Air Force, 1979-83. Huong Thien Nguyen, a 2001
graduate of the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, provided insightful
research assistance, questions, and comments. I thank the University of Florida Levin College
of Law for their generous summer research assistance. The University of California, Hastings
College of the Law also contributed to my research efforts throughout my 2000-01 visiting
professorship. The Hastings librarians, particularly Linda Weir, were unfailing in their support.
1. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 832-33 (1976).
2. Id. at 830.
3. Id. at 858 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (providing pertinent parts of Spock's letter to
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certainly would have included the role of the United States in the ongoing Vietnam
War. The Fort Dix commander initially denied the candidates access to the post, but
a campaign event was eventually held, just a few days before the election, under a
preliminary injunction issued by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. Spock's rally
took place in a Fort Dix parking lot on post property customarily open to the public.4
In Greer v. Spock,5 the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
military had appropriately exercised its discretion in barring partisan political activity
within the confines of Fort Dix.6 Despite the military's general grant of access to
civilians-the opinion contains a fuzzy photograph of the Fort Dix "Visitors
Welcome" sign 7 -the post remained fuindamentally a military training installation and
was not intended to be a public forum open to First Amendment activity.8 The
reasoning underlying the result in Greer, however, was the most significant aspect of
the opinion. It represented a perspective of civilian-military relations under the
Constitution that was destined to dissolve within the next generation. That perspective
would dissolve so thoroughly that a reader in the year 2002 might find the language
of Greer odd, laughable, or perhaps simply obsolete in the modem political age.
In the Court's view, the military's choice to prohibit all politically partisan speech
on post was justified by the military's corresponding obligation to remain politically
neutral. The military had a unique responsibility to avoid "both the reality and the
appearance of acting as a handmaiden for partisan political causes or candidates,"9 a
constitutional mandate different -from, and perhaps higher than, the mandate of the
First Amendment. It had imposed restrictions on political speech for the stated
purpose of maintaining political neutrality, and this was a purpose the Court found
"wholly consistent with the American constitutional tradition of a politically neutral
military establishment under civilian control."'" Under Greer, therefore, the obligation
of political neutrality imposed on members of the military was grounded in more than
just a traditional understanding of military ethics, which had always expected a
neutral-and distant-stance with respect to political matters." More important,
political neutrality was now understood as a constitutional obligation of the military,
the Fort Dix commander).
4. See id. at 833-34.
5. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
6. Id. at 839-40.
7. Id. at 871 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
8. See id. at 838 (stating that "it is consequently the business of a military installation like
Fort Dix to train soldiers, not to provide a public forum"); see also Int'l Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) (holding that there is no right to face-to-face
solicitation in an airport terminal under thepublic forum doctrine).
9. Greer, 424 U.S. at 839.
10. Id. See generally Donald N. Zillman & Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Legacy ofGreer
v. Spock: The Public Forum Doctrine and the Principle of the Military's Political Neutrality,
65 GEO. L.J. 773 (1977) (arguing that Greer v. Spock may not have gone far enough in banning
partisan political activities from military installations).
11. See MORRs JANOwrTz, THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER: A SociAL AND POuTICAL
PORTRAIT 233 (1971). "According to the definitions of military honor, the professional soldier
is 'above politics' in domestic affairs .... [G]enerals and admirals do not attach themselves to
political parties or overtly display partisanship." Id.
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one mandated by the constitutional understanding of civilian control of the military. 2
The idea of a politically neutral military now seems somewhat out of place, two
years after a presidential election in which the military was portrayed to be-and
tended to portray itself as-a political force in clear alignment with the Republican
Party's candidate.' 3 The 2000 election capped a decade in which the exercise of
military discretion increasingly dovetailed with the interests of social conservatism,
particularly with respect to issues concerning sexual morality and the advancement of
women. Significantly, these questions have been treated as political questions, subject
to the judgment of the military or of Congress on the military's behalf, but not as
judicial questions. Courts have increasingly deferred to assertions of military
necessity, adjusting constitutional expectations as necessary to meet military
expectations. The bedrock premise underlying this judicial deference to the military
has been that the military's purpose to fight and win wars was so singular and so
fundamentally important to the nation's security that standard judicial review of
military-based decisions imposed unacceptable risk. The military was simply a
different constitutional animal, an institution that, by necessity, required a generous
deference to discretionary choice. There now seems to be an accepted understanding
that the military is not bound by constitutional requirements in the same way that other
governmental institutions are bound, and the principle itself, if not its application, is
relatively uncontroversial. 4 Consequently, legal scholarship on military issues, a
12. See Greer, 424 U.S. at 841 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (military's political neutrality is
"a tradition that in my view is a constitutional corollary to the express provision for civilian
control of the military in Art. II, § 2, of the Constitution").
13. See Steven Lee Myers, When the Military (Ret.) Marches to Its Own Drummer, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1,2000, § 4, at 4. The military was treated as a "friendly force" for the Republican
Party during the controversy concerning Florida overseas absentee ballots cast during the 2000
presidential election. See David Barstow & Don Van Natta, Jr., How Bush Took Florida:
Mining the Overseas Absentee Vote, N.Y. TIMEs, July 15, 2001, § 1, at I. The Pentagon
provided email addresses of overseas military personnel to representatives of the Republican
Party as part of a public relations effort to persuade Florida officials to count nonconforming
absentee ballots in Bush-identified counties. See C.J. Chivers, House Republicans Pressed
Pentagon for E-Mail Addresses of Sailors, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, § 1, at 19.
Coincidentally, the only Supreme Court case other than Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000),
to apply federal equal protection principles to state regulation of voting rights concerned the
voting rights of military personnel. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (invalidating
a provision of the Texas Constitution that prohibited out-of-state military personnel who were
assigned to a military installation in Texas from ever acquiring voting residency).
14. For contemporary analyses ofjudicial deference to the military, see C. Thomas Dienes,
When the First Amendment Is Not Preferred: The Military and Other "Special Contexts", 56
U. CIN. L. REv. 779 (1988) (criticizing deference). See also Kirstin S. Dodge, Countenancing
Corruption: A Civic Republican Case Against Judicial Deference to the Military, 5 YALE J.L.
&FEMNISM 1 (1992) (criticizing deference); James M. Hirschhorn, The Separate Community:
Military Uniqueness and Servicemen's Constitutional Rights, 62 N.C. L. REv. 177 (1984)
(generally approving of the practice of judicial deference to the military); Kenneth L. Karst,
The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499,
563-81 (1991) (criticizing deference); Stephanie A. Levin, The Deference That Is Due:
Rethinking the Jurisprudence of Judicial Deference to the Military, 35 Via. L. Rv. 1009,
1057 (1990) (criticizing deference); John F. O'Connor, The Origins and Application of the
2002]
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strong component of all the best law reviews a generation ago,'5 has dwindled in
quantity and quality. That loss of academic focus should be no surprise, as law
professors will quickly lose interest when courts no longer see themselves as playing
much of a role in evaluating the constitutionality of military decisions.' 6
This Article argues that judicial deference to the military, at least as the principle
is understood in contemporary decisions of the Court, is surprisingly recent and not
at all constitutionally established. In fact, this deference departs from constitutional
text and from a line of Supreme Court precedent concerning civilian-military relations
extending back before the Civil War. Broad judicial deference to military discretion
is only a creation of the post-Vietnam, all-volunteer military and, more specifically,
only a creation of one single Justice of the Supreme Court, William H. Rehnquist.
Rehnquist enlisted the military as a combatant in the culture wars of the Vietnam
era, engineering a convergence of military culture and social conservatism that would
reach its peak in the decade following the Persian Gulf War. He dismantled a well-
established constitutional understanding of civilian control of the military by disabling
the judiciary from substantive review of military policy, even under circumstances in
Military Deference Doctrine, 35 GA. L. REV. 161 (2000) (approving, without reservation, the
practice of judicial deference to the military); Ellen Oberwetter, Note, Rethinking Military
Deference: Male-Only Draft Registration and the Intersection of Military Need with Civilian
Rights, 78 TEx. L. REV. 173 (1999) (criticizing deference).
15. See, e.g., Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Military-Civilian
Hybrids: Retired Regulars, Reservists, and Discharged Prisoners, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 317
(1964); Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Civilian Judges and Military Justice: Collateral Review of
Court-Martial Convictions, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 40 (1961) [hereinafter Bishop, Collateral
Review]; Richard E. Blair, Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Retired Regulars: An Unwanted
Extension of Military Power, 50 GEO. L.J. 79 (1961); Robinson 0. Everett, Military
Jurisdiction Over Civilians, 1960 DUKE L.J. 366; Robert Girard, The Constitution and Court-
Martial of Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces-A Preliminary Analysis, 13 STAN. L.
REV. 461 (1961); Grant S. Nelson & James E. Westbrook, Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over
Servicemen for "Civilian" Offenses: An Analysis ofO'Callahan v. Parker, 54 MINN. L. REV.
1 (1969); Edward F. Sherman,JudicialReviewofMilitaryDeterminations andthe Exhaustion
ofRemedies Requirements, 55 VA. L. REV. 483 (1969); Earl Warren, The Bill ofRights and the
Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181 (1962).
16. The primary exception would be the large body of scholarship critical of the policy
excluding gay citizens from military service. For a representative list (as of 1996), see Diane
H. Mazur, The Unknown Soldier: A Critique of "Gays in the Military" Scholarship and
Litigation, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 223, 223-24 nn.l-2 (1996). See also JANET E. HALLEY,
DON'T: A READER'S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY'S ANTI-GAY POLIcY (1999) (criticizing, in part,
the "don't ask, don't tell" policy as being worse for heterosexuals and homosexuals due to its
arbitrary nature). This scholarship, however, focuses on the policy in isolation and not in the
more general context of military law or civilian-military relations under the Constitution. Even
under circumstances in which academic context would seem to require some discussion of
civilian-military relations, the subject nevr appears. In 1988, The Yale LawJournal published
a very celebrated and much-cited symposium issue on emerging legal theories of civic
republicanism, a principle based in large part on a citizen's obligation in defense of country.
See Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988). Nonetheless, only
one article in the issue mentioned military service at all, and then, only tangentially. See
Richard A. Epstein, Modern Republicanism-Or the Flight from Substance, 97 YALE L.J.
1633, 1635-36 (1988).
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which military policy imposed significant, collateral effects on civilians and on
civilian society. Under Rehnquist's leadership on military issues, the Court became
increasingly comfortable with a military that was constitutionally separate and
constitutionally immune. Judicial deference to matters ofmilitary concern has allowed
Congress to use claims of military necessity-whether rational or irrational-as a
means of resistance to evolving constitutional expectation. It has allowed Congress
to use its power to govern the military as a way of influencing social policy within
civilian America-and without the limitations otherwise imposed by the Constitution.
A generation ago, the reality of the draft made our constitutional understanding of
civilian-military relations acutely relevant. Today, in an all-volunteer era, our attention
to the subject has diminished. The relevance of civilian-military relations under the
Constitution, however, has only grown; its effects are just more stealth.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS
When President Nixon nominated William H. Rehnquist to the United States
Supreme Court on October 21, 1971," a resolution to the conflict in Vietnam was still
not in sight. In the last twelve months, the United States had invaded Laos and
intensified its bombing raids throughout North Vietnam.' Twelve thousand antiwar
protesters were arrested during 'May Day" protests in Washington, D.C., as Assistant
Attorney General Rehnquist advised the President on the potential deployment of
military personnel to protect the city. 9 Although ground combat troops were gradually
being withdrawn from Vietnam throughout 1972, aerial offensives continued with
renewed B-52 strikes against Hanoi and Haiphong.2° President Nixon vowed that
"[t]he bastards have never been bombed like they're going to be bombed this time."'
Student antiwar protests-often violent-spread across the country, shutting down a
number of campuses in April 1972.' The military feared that morale and discipline
among servicemembers were deteriorating to dangerous levels, and problems related
to race, drugs, and mutiny were growing concerns.'
These events forged the context in which Rehnquist joined the Court, and the
context in which he approached issues concerning the constitutional relationship
between the military and civilian society. The legal context in which Rehnquistjoined
the Court was also a significant factor in explaining the transformation of
constitutional precedent soon to come. An instructive place to begin is O'Callahan
v. Parker,24 a 1969 Supreme Court decision that represents the height of judicial
17. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS &
DEVELOPMENTS 327 (2d ed. 1996) (describing Senate action on Supreme Court nominees).
Rehnquist served as an enlisted man in the Army Air Force during World War II. See id. at
282.
18. See TOM WELLS, THE WAkWITHIN: AMERICA'S BATTLE OVER VIETNAM 476-77,531 -
32 (1994).
19. Seeid. at 486, 512.
20. See id. at 533, 536-37.
21. Id. at 536.
22. See id. at 537-41, 542-43.
23. See id. at 474-76, 556-57.
24. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
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willingness to test the constitutionality of decisions made in the exercise of military
discretion. O'Callahan also illustrates the careful line the Court once attempted to
draw in defining the scope of military powers granted to Congress and to the
Commander-in-Chief under the Constitution. This is the careful line that Rehnquist
would later cross in recasting the constitutional relationship between the military and
the civilian society it serves.
Although O'Callahan was decided in 1969, during the height of the Vietnam
conflict, the case concerned an incident that occurred in the post-Korean, Cold War
world of 19560 James O'Callahan was an Army sergeant stationed in the then
Territory of Hawaii.26 While authorized to be off-duty, off-post, and out of uniform,
Sergeant O'Callahan assaulted a civilian female at a local hotel." Civilian authorities
apprehended a fleeing O'Callahan, but apparently released him to military control
once they verified he was a servicemember.' O'Callahan was tried by court-martial
on charges of attempted rape, housebreaking, and assault with intent to rape. He was
convicted on all counts, and both the Army Board of Review and the United States
Court of Military Appeals upheld his conviction on appeal.2 9
On a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the civilian setting of a federal
district court, O'Callahan alleged that the court-martial was without jurisdiction to try
him for the offenses charged." Similar petitions for collateral review of court-martial
determinations have had a long and largely unsuccessful history, at least when the
defendant was a member of the armed forces. Why, then, did the military's exercise
of court-martial jurisdiction over O'Callahan raise particular concern, prompting the
Court to caution that "expansion of military discipline beyond its proper domain
carries with it a threat to liberty"? 31 Understanding why O'Callahan's collateral
challenge was distinguishable from the line of deferential decisions preceding
O'Callahan requires an understanding of the Court's historical treatment of civilian-
military relations under the Constitution.
25. Id. at 259.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 259-60.
28. Id. at 260. Servicemembers are subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of military
criminal law and the criminal law ofthe various states. See Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509,
513-15 (1878). Under the specific facts of Coleman, however, the Court held that the military
had exclusive jurisdiction over a servicemember charged with the 1874 murder of a civilian
while in military service within Tennessee, an "insurgent" state still under military occupation
by the United States. Id. at 515, 517. "[T]here would be something incongruous and absurd in
permitting an officer or soldier of an invading army to be tried by his enemy, whose country
he had invaded." Id. at 516. Compare Coleman with Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333,
354-55 (1907) (holding that acquittal by court-martial provides constitutional protection
against double jeopardy arising from subsequent civil prosecution under the authority of the
United States; defendant servicemember could not be re-tried in courts of the United States-
controlled Philippine Islands).
29. O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 260-61.
30. Id. at 261.
31. Id. at 265.
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A. Constitutional Text and the Uniform Code of Military Justice
Although the President of the United States serves as the Commander in Chief of
the armed forces,32 the Constitution delegates to Congress much of the routine, day-to-
day responsibility for raising, equipping, supporting, disciplining, and governing
military forces. Under Article I, section 8, Congress exercises the following military
powers:
L."To raise and support Armies"; 33
2."To provide and maintain a Navy";' and
3.' To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces." 35
The Bill of Rights also makes one important reference concerning the rights of
servicemembers under the Constitution. The Fifth Amendment seems to acknowledge
and enlarge congressional power to make rles for the government and regulation of
the armed forces when it excepts military prosecutions from its requirement for grand
jury indictment or presentation. The military exception is specifically worded (and
punctuated) to apply only to the grand jury requirement and not to the other trial
rights-protections against double jeopardy, self-incrimination, and deprivation of
due process-enumerated within the Fifth Amendment.36 Under the traditional
32. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (including the restriction that "no Appropriations of
Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years').
34. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
36. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment states:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War
or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case td be
a witness against himself, not be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
Id. (emphasis added). The phrase "when in actual service in time of War or public danger"
modifies "[m]ilitia" and not "land or naval forces," which permits peacetime court-martial of
members of the active duty armed forces. See Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109, 114-15 (1895)
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend V.).
Given the careful drafting of the Fifth Amendment to provide a military exception to the
grand jury clause, and to that clause only, it would seem clear that the remaining protections
of the amendment were intended to apply to prosecutions ofservicemembers. "What reason is
there for making one specific exception for cases arising in the land or naval forces or in the
militia if none of the Fifth Amendment is applicable to military trials?" Bums v. Wilson, 346
U.S. 137, 153 (1953) (Douglas, J., dissenting). That conclusion, however, has been less than
clear in practice. Compare Frederick Bernays Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill ofRights:
The Original Practice 1, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1958) [hereinafter Wiener, Original Practice 1]
and Frederick Bemays Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill ofRights: The Original Practice
2002]
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practice in place at the time, military defendants were prosecuted by court-martial
within the military and not by civilian courts,37 so it would have made sense to exempt
the military from the only command of the Fifth Amendment that required the
involvement of an arm of the civilian legal system, the grand jury. Rights of
servicemembers under the Sixth Amendment have been measured by the- same
principle. Although the Sixth Amendment contains no military exception, and in fact
fails to mention the military at all, the Court has assumed by implication that a
defendant subject to trial by court-martial has, by definition, no right to a civilian trial
"by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed."'38
Congressional power under Article I to raise and support, to provide and maintain,
and to govern and regulate the armed forces is at the heart of civilian-military relations
under the Constitution. The manner in which Congress has historically exercised these
powers-particularly its power to govern and regulate-provides a necessary context
for evaluating questions of constitutional structure underlying civilian control of the
military. This section offers a short description of the manner in which the military
administers its internal system ofjustice. A sense ofthe distinctiveness of military law,
in comparison to its civilian counterpart, is essential to understanding the limited
constitutional role that military justice is designed to play.
The Uniform Code of Military Justice39 ("UCMJ") is the statutory product of
congressional power to make rules for the government and regulation of the armed
forces.4" The UCMJ, enacted in 1950 in an effort to modernize military law, is a
criminal and procedural code that applies to all military personnel serving in the
Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard."' It provides
a comprehensive code of conduct for military life, with a scope far broader than that
of state criminal codes. Although the UCMJ does punish instances of misconduct that
would constitute criminal offenses under civilian law, it also regulates conduct that
II, 72 HARv. L. REv. 266 (1958) (arguing that the Bill Of Rights was not intended to apply to
trials by court-martial), with Gordon D. Henderson, Courts-Martialand the Constitution: The
Original Understanding, 71 HARV. L. REv. 293 (1957) (arguing that the Bill of Rights was
intended to apply to trials by court-martial).
37. See Robert D. Duke & Howard S. Vogel, The Constitution and the Standing Army:
Another Problem of Court-Martial Jurisdiction, 13 VAND. L. REv. 435, 440-49 (1960)
(explaining the constitutional basis for court-martial jurisdiction).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; seeExParte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866) (stating
that the Framers intended to limit the right of trial by jury under the Sixth Amendment "to
those persons who were subject to indictment or presentment in the [F]ifth").
39. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2000).
40. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 166-69 (1994) (describing the structure of
the military justice system; distinguishing the military's various trial and appellate courts; and
explaining the duties ofmilitaryjudges); FRANcisA. GILLIGAN &FREDRIC I. LEDERER, COURT-
MARTIAL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1999) (discussing military criminal law and procedure as
codified in the UCMJ); Michael I. Spak & Jonathan P. Tomes, Courts-Martial: Time to Play
Taps?, 28 Sw. U. L. REv. 481 (1999) (containing an extensive discussion of court-martial
procedure).
41. See 10 U.S.C. § 802. Before enactment of the UCMJ in 1950, military criminal codes
were service-specific. The UCMJ applies to all military personnel and is therefore "uniform."
See Spak & Tomes, supra note 40, at 482-83.
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would otherwise not be subject to criminal sanction in civilian society.42 Despite their
comprehensive reach, however, military rules of discipline are not quite as draconian
and intrusive, in comparison to civilian laws, as they may initially appear to be.43 The
nature of the consequences for improper conduct tends to differ more than either the
severity of the consequences or the standard of behavior expected. Misbehavior that
would be "disciplined" in the civilian world by the filing of a lawsuit or by an
unfavorable employment action-firing or demotion, for example-is instead
disciplined in the military by means of a criminal code, the UCMJ. Most minor
offenses under the UCMJ, however, are resolved without prosecution through
nonjudicial forms of discipline." The range of criminal sanction available within the
military criminal justice system is extremely flexible, designed for purposes of
discipline and education to a much greater degree than civilian rules of criminal
sanction.
The flexibility of the military justice system is its most distinctive feature. Although
by necessity it addresses serious criminal offenses committed by servicemembers, the
vast majority of its function relates to the maintenance of good order and discipline.
When used most effectively, the military justice system teaches and corrects as much
as it punishes, with the goal of returning the offender to duty as a better
servicemember.45 Violators of the UCMJ are subject to trial by court-martial, an
42. Compare 10 U.S.C. § 918 (murder) and id. § 919 (manslaughter), with id. § 889
(disrespect toward a superior commissioned officer) and id. § 915 (malingering).
43. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,749 (1974) (stating that the UCMJ "regulate[s]
aspects of the conduct of members of the military which in the civilian sphere are left
unregulated"). Those who emphasize the greater reach of the military's criminal justice system
inevitably fail to note the reduced scope of civil remedies available to servicemembers. For
example, a servicemember who commits an act of sexual harassment against a colleague is
subject to criminal punishment, but his employer, the United States government, is immune
from a civil suit for that conduct. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (barring suit
under the Federal Tort Claims Act for servicemember's injury sustained incident to military
service).
44. See 10 U.S.C. § 815. Military commanders have authority to impose a minor,
nonjudicial form of punishment in lieu of court-martial, with the servicemember's consent
(nonjudicial punishment is commonly termed an "Article 15" for the controlling UCMJ section
number). The commander determines guilt summarily without formal trial, but punishment is
limited in severity and no record of conviction attaches. Eligible forms of punishment include
short detentions, small reductions in pay or rank, extra duties, and restrictions. See id.
45. One of the instances in which the UCMJ may not have been used very effectively
concerned the court-martial of Sergeant Major Gene McKinney by the United States Army.
Sergeant Major McKinney, the highest-ranking enlisted person in the Army, was charged with
a series of offenses arising out of several relatively minor acts of sex-related assault, such as
unwelcome kissing, hugging, and sexual remarks. Rather than seeking a form ofdiscipline that
fit the severity of the offense, the Army sought convictions on charges punishable by up to
fifty-five years in prison. McKinney was acquitted on all charges except one relating to an
attempt to influence the testimony of a witness, and the unintended legacy of the failed
prosecution was the public impression that (1) the Army did not take sexual harassment
seriously; (2) that servicewomen were not credible; or (3) both. See generally Lara A. Ballard,
The Trial of Sergeant Major McKinney: An After Action Report, 3 GEO. . GENDER & L. 1
(2001) (describing in detail the McKinney prosecution and arguing that a nonjudicial
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Article I proceeding that is completely unrelated to the concept of a federal court
contemplated by Article I of the Constitution.46 A court-martial is not a permanent
trial court, but is, instead, an ad hoc military tribunal convened as necessary by the
order ofmilitary authorities. Military judges and militarydefense counsel are similarly
detailed to courts-martial as necessary, although they report to superior officers
through a legal chain of command, not through the operational chain of military
command responsible for the initial decision to prosecute the defendant." Military
judges and military defense counsel were separated from the usual military hierarchy
as a small acknowledgment of a larger issue: the danger of inappropriate "command
influence" in the administration of military justice.48 Nonprosecutorial officers of the
court will never have the degree of independence taken for granted in civilian courts,
because military judges and defense counsel will eventually rotate through a variety
of legal duties and are ultimately dependent upon command approval for promotion
and assignment. Military trial judges do not have life tenure; they do not even serve
for a fixed term of years.49
Court-martial procedures vary inboth formality and adversariness, depending upon
the severity of the offense charged and the level of punishment that can be imposed.
First, a summary court-martial is the least formal, designed for minor offenses and
limited forms of punishment.' Its presiding officer, who need not even be a lawyer,
proceeds in the fashion of an inquisitorial tribunal and "acts as judge, factfinder,
resolution would have strengthened the Army community and provided more effective relief
to the victims).
46. See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258,261 (1969) (commenting on "a special system
of military courts in which not all of the specific procedural protections deemed essential in
Art. III trials need apply").
47. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 826-27 (2000) (requiring the Secretary of each service to prescribe
regulations for the assignment of counsel and placing militaryjudges under the authority of the
individual service's Judge Advocates General); Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 175-76,
180 (1994) (noting that military judges are temporarily "detailed" to judicial functions).
48. See 10 U.S.C. § 837 (2000) (prohibiting any person from attempting to influence a
court-martial or its members); I GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 40, §§ 8-16.00, 14-80.00
(discussing command influence issues); 2 GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 40, § 15-90.00
(same); Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence J. Morris, "ThisBetterBe Good": The Courts Continue
to Tighten the Burden in Unlawful Command Influence Cases, ARMY LAW., May 1998, at 49.
49. See Weiss, 510 U.S. at 170, 176, 181 (holding that due process did not require military
trial judges to have a fixed term of office, and that the Appointments Clause did not require
separate appointment as a military judge in addition to appointment as a commissioned military
officer). An independent commission that reviewed the Uniform Code of Military Justice on
the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary recently recommended several reforms designed to
strengthen the independence of military judges within the court-martial system. The
commission recommended (1) the creation of standing judicial circuits to replace ad hoc
tribunals; (2) fixed terms of office-for military judges; and (3) a system of random selection of
court-martial members (jurors), rather than selection of members by the same convening
authority (military commander) who initiated the investigation and prosecution. See REPORT
OF THE COX COMMISSION ON THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY
JUSTICE §§ IIL.B-C (May 2001), http://www.nimj.org.
50. See 10 U.S.C. § § 816(3), 820 (limiting sentences of confinement to a maximum of one
month).
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prosecutor, and defense counsel."'" Second, a special court-martial, an intermediate
proceeding, usually consists of a military judge and a jury ("members," in military
parlance) of at least three, although the defendant can choose to proceed before a
judge alone.52 Unlike a summary court-martial, the defendant in a special court-martial
is entitled to appointed counsel." In comparison to civilian state and federal courts,
however, the severity of punishment that a special court-martial can impose is
minimal.s' Third and finally, a general court-martial is the proceeding most equivalent
in formality to a civilian criminal trial. It can impose any lawful sentence, including
the death penalty. The minimum jury size increases to five, and the court-martial must
be conducted under the supervision of a military judge.5
Appeals from court-martial convictions are heard by the military's own two-tier
system of appellate courts.' Four Courts of Criminal Appeals-one each for the
Army, Air Force, Coast Guard, and the Navy/Marine Corps-review all cases in
which the defendant received a "bad" discharge from the military or was sentenced
to at least one year of confinement." Judges of the Courts of Criminal Appeals
("CCA") are normally senior, active-duty military lawyers or retired military lawyers,
and they are selected for the court by each service's lead lawyer, the Judge Advocate
General." The CCA's review of court-martial findings is much more searching and
intrusive than that of a civilian appellate court, allowing the judges to "weigh the
evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and determine controverted questions of
fact" in addition to the usual questions of law reviewed on appeal. 9
The highest court in the military justice system is the United States Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces ("USCAAF"), which generally accepts cases on a
discretionary basis.' The USCAAF is the most "civilianized" and independent
51. Middendorfv. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 31,32 (1976).
52. See 10 U.S.C. § 816(2) (2000).
53. See id. §827(a).
54. See id. § 819 (limiting sentences of confinement to a maximum of one year).
55. See id. §§ 816(1), 826(a).
56. Before entering the military appellate process, court-martial findings are reviewed by
the military commander who convened the court-martial-with the advice of legal counsel for
the command-and by the appropriate Judge Advocate General, the most senior lawyer in each
of the service branches. See id. §§ 860, 864.
57. See id. § 866(a), (b); see also 2 GILuIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 40, § 25-51.00, at
529.
58. See 10 U.S.C. § 866(a); see also 2 GiLUGAN & LEDERER, supra note 40, § 25-5 1.00,
at 530 n.111.
59. 10 U.S.C. § 866(c).
60. See id. § 867(a). The USCAAF reviews all death penalty cases automatically. See id.
The most extensive treatment of the military's highest court can be found in a two-volume
history authored by Jonathan Lurie. See generally JONATHAN LURIE, ARMING MILITARY
JUSTICE: THE ORIGINS OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MIUTARY APPEALS, 1775-1950
(1992); JONATHAN LURIE, PURSUING MILITARY JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OFAPPEALS FORTHE ARMED FORCES, 1951-1980 (1998). See also Jonathan Lurie, The
Role of the Federal Judiciary in the Governance of the American Military: The United States
Supreme Court and "Civil Rights and Supervision" Over the Armed Forces, in THE UNITED
STATES MILTARY UNDERTHE CONSTITUTION OFTHE UNITED STATES, 1789-1989 (Richard H.
Kohn ed., 1991).
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component of the military justice system, composed entirely of civilian judges
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for fixed terms of fifteen
years." In practice, however, judges of the USCAAF will most often be nominated on
the basis of their prior experience as lawyers and judges within the military justice
system, so they are likely to have a substantial military pedigree. USCAAF judges
are not Article III judges and do not have lifetime tenure; the civilian influence that
the USCAAF brings to military justice, such that it is, arises only from the fact that its
judges are not subject to military evaluation, promotion, and assignment. From top to
bottom, the military appellate system is completely separate and apart fromthe federal
appellate system, just as courts-martial operate independently from federal district
courts and state trial courts.63 As a result, military discipline is governed in its entirety
outside the bounds of the civilian legal system. Civilian courts have no appellate
jurisdiction to supervise the administration of military criminal justice, except in the
rare circumstance in which the United States Supreme Court reviews a decision of the
USCAAF by writ of certiorari." Congress's choice on that matter was a deliberate
one.
65
B. Collateral Challenges to Court-Martial Rulings
The Supreme Court has issued a remarkable number of decisions ruling on petitions
for habeas corpus (or other avenues of collateral relief) filed by servicemembers who
have been convicted of various offenses by court-martial. The number is remarkable
primarily because the rulings in these cases have been so uniformly unfriendly to
military petitioners. Dynes v. Hoover" established the deferential posture assumed by
civilian courts in relation to their military counterparts before the beginning of the
Civil War.67 Naval seaman Frank Dynes first argued that his court-martial conviction
for "attempting to desert" was voidbecause Congress had enumerated a specific naval
offense only for the completed act of desertion, but not for its mere attempt." The
61. See 10 U.S.C. § 942(b).
62. Cf. 2 GILLIGAN & LEDERER, supra note 40, § 25-61.00, at 543 n.202. Persons who
retire after twenty or more years of active duty in the military, however, do not qualify as
"civilians" and are not eligible for appointment to the USCAAF. See 10 U.S.C. § 942(b)(4).
63. See Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.), 65, 79 (1857) (stating that Congress's
constitutional power to provide for trial and punishment of military offenses "is given without
any connection between it and the 3d article of the Constitution defining the judicial power of
the United States; indeed, that the two powers are entirely independent of each other").
64. See 10 U.S.C. § 867a(a). The Supreme Court may not review the USCAAF's refusal
to grant a petition for review. Id.
65. See Noyd v. Boyd, 395 U.S. 683 (1969). The Court stated:
When after the Second World War, Congress became convinced of the need to
assure direct civilian review over militaryjustice, it deliberately chose to confide
this power to a specialized Court of Military Appeals, so that disinterested
civilian judges could gain over time a fully developed understanding of the
distinctive problems and legal traditions of the Armed Forces. •
Id. at 694.
66. 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 65.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 70.
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seaman's second, and more specious, contention was that his offense and subsequent
six-month incarceration also failed to fall within a more general article governing
naval personnel, one mandating that "crimes committed by persons belonging to the
navy, which are not specified in the foregoing articles, shall be punished according to
the laws and customs at sea."
The Court wanted no part of Dynes's challenge to his confinement. By virtue of
legislative power to "make [r]ules for the [g]ovemment and [r]egulation of the land
and naval [florces,"' 0 Congress had the authority to provide for trial and punishment
of military offenses by court-martial. That power arose under Article I of the
Constitution, not under the judicial function of Article I; the two powers were
"entirely independent of each another."7 ' Congress had designated the Secretary ofthe
Navy as Dynes's sole source of appeal from conviction by court-martial, and,
therefore "civil courts have nothing to do, nor are [court-martial convictions] in any
way alterable by them."7 "[No appeal or jurisdiction of any kind has been given to
the civil magistrate or civil courts."'73 Only when the court-martial itself was convened
without jurisdiction could civilian courts interfere. The Court stated:
When confirmed [within the military chain of command], it is altogether
beyond thejurisdiction or inquiry ofany civil tribunal whatever, unless it shall
be in a case in which the court had not jurisdiction over the subject-matter or
charge, or one in which, having jurisdiction over the subject-matter, it has
failed to observe the rules prescribed by the.statute for its exercise.'
The Court's choice to defer to an exercise of military discretion in Dynes made
sense, not only with respect to the text of the Constitution, but also in terms of more
pragmatic considerations. Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 authorizes Congress to
"make [r]ules for the [g]overnment and [r]egulation of the land and naval [f]orces,"
expressly intending the military to be controlled by a system of discipline that is
separate and distinct from the criminal prohibitions that control conduct in civilian
society. The military may criminally prosecute acts of desertion, for example, based
on the military's particular need to compel performance of duty under the most
arduous circumstances, even though civilian criminal law fails to prohibit any
analogous offense.' Furthermore, civilian courts enjoy no special expertise in
69. Id. at 70-71. It is difficult to imagine the reasoning behind the petitioner's belief that
an attempted act of desertion would not violate some fairly well-established naval custom. Id.
at 74. "Notwithstanding the apparent indeterminateness of such a provision, it is not liable to
abuse; for what those crimes are, and how they are to be punished, is well known by practical
men in the navy and army'... ." Id. at 82. "Absence" offenses-desertion, absence without
leave ("AWOL"), or missing movement-are uniquely military offenses that remain subject
to criminal sanctions under the present-day Uniform Code of Military Justice. See 10 U.S.C.
§§ 885-87 (2000).
70. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
71. Dynes, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 79.
72. Id. at 82.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 81 (emphasis in original).
75. See id. at 82-83.
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evaluating whether, under what circumstances, or to what degree, an instance of
desertion affects military discipline. Neither do they have any practical means of
determining the degree or the method of punishment necessary to compel attention to
military duty. The Court recognized there was little to gain in condoning a practice of
judicial review under which "the civil courts would virtually administer the rules and
articles of war."'76
Subsequent decisions by the Court followed the same standard of deference to
military discretion. Typically, these cases declined to 'review specific factual
determinations related to court-martial or other military administrative procedure,
weight of the evidence, severity of punishment, or the quality and worthiness of an
individual's record of military service. Over the next century the Court upheld,
without any substantive review, the following military determinations: fraudulent
manipulation of naval contracts constituted "scandalous conduct, tending to the
destruction of good morals";"' a conviction for desertion was warranted despite an
allegation of invalid enlistment;' nonpayment of indebtedness constituted conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman;79 a naval paymaster's clerk had been served
76. Id. at 82.
77. See Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 186 (1886).
78. See In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 156-57 (1890). Grimley was forty years old, but had
represented himself to be twenty-eight. Only "effective and able-bodied men ... between the
ages of sixteen and thirty-five years" were permitted by law to enlist. Id. at 150. The Court,
nonetheless, held his enlistment valid in accordance with the law of contract, finding that
Grimley had undertaken a voluntary obligation. Id. at 151. Grimley's military career was a
short one; he apparently changed his mind within minutes after taking an oath of allegiance.
He had time to put on a military cap, but not the rest of the uniform. Id. at 154.
Interestingly, the Court offered the analogy of a individual who falsely represents that he
is of Anglo-Saxon descent in order to obtain the benefit of a contract which was limited to
individuals of that race. See id. at 151. It seems unlikely that the Court would have considered
misrepresentation of race to be merely "incidental" (as it described Grimley's misrepresentation
of age), if the consequence of finding a valid enlistment was to compel integrated military
service. In Grimley, the government's only purpose was to preserve Grimley's military status
and, therefore, maintain court-martial jurisdiction.
As a more modem example, consider gay servicemembers who have misrepresented sexual
orientation in order to enlist. The military would most likely rely on that misrepresentation for
the purpose of assessing punishment or determining the character of discharge; it would not
argue the contractual immateriality of the misrepresentation for the purpose of compelling
continued service. One often overlooked benefit of the failed "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy
is that it eliminated the possibility of fraudulent enlistment prosecutions against gay
servicemembers, because they are no longer asked to declare sexual orientation or recite their
sexual histories upon enlistment. See U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 1304.26,
QUALIFICATION STANDARDS FOR ENLISTMENT, APPOINTMENT, AND INDUCTION El.2.8.1 (Dec.
21, 1993), http:llwww.dtic.millwhs/directivescorres/htmll130426.htm ("Applicants for
enlistment, appointment, or induction shall not be asked or required to reveal whether they are
heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual."). A servicemember who "procures his own enlistment
or appointment in the armed forces by knowingly false representation or deliberate concealment
as to his qualifications for that enlistment or appointment" is subject to criminal prosecution
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. See 10 U.S.C. § 883 (2000) (prohibiting
fraudulent enlistment, appointment, or separation).
79. See United States v. Fletcher, 148 U.S. 84, 91-92 (1893).
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with a copy of the charge and specification against him in a timely fashion;"
additional or alternate jurors in a court-martial could not have been appointed
"without manifest injury to the service"; evidence of fraud and embezzlement was
sufficient to support a verdict;' an artillery officer was not entitled to medical
retirement pay for nervous exhaustion; 3 an infantry captain was in fact a member of
the armed services, although that fact did not appear in the original trial record;"
certain officers were eligible to sit as members of a court-martial jury;- and a
particular servicemember should be discharged as part of the peacetime reduction in
force following World War .6
The common factor in this mass of seemingly trivial detail is the Court's
tremendous reluctance to manage the infinite number of individualized decisions
necessary to govern and regulate military personnel. The Constitution provides for
rules of military discipline that operate independently of the laws that "discipline"
civilian life, and Article I courts have not been granted any direct supervisory or
appellate role concerning this exercise of military discretion. The Court has
consistently declined to second-guess the intensely factual and contextual
determinations that inevitably arise in the administration of these separate rules of
military discipline:
Thus we have lawfully constituted military tribunals, withjurisdiction over the
person and subject-matter involved unquestioned and unquestionable, and
action by them within the scope of the power with which they are invested by
law. It is settled beyond controversy that under such conditions decisions by
military tribunals, constituted by act of Congress, cannot be reviewed or set
aside by civil courts in a mandamus proceeding or otherwise.8"
The willingness of Article HI courts to second-guess the actions and decisions of
courts-martial is no greater when the challenge seems based in a more fundamental
80. See Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1895).
81. Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553,559 (1897). For those who assume that general
officers would never face trial by court-martial, Swaim demonstrates an early exception to the
rule. Not only was Brigadier General Lone star] David G. Swaim a general, he was also the
Judge Advocate General, the most senior lawyer in the entire United States Army. Id. at 554.
General Swaim was convicted on the basis of conduct "to the prejudice of good order and
military discipline" that remained unspecified throughout the Court's opinion. Id. at 561.
Over half of the officers who sat in judgment of General Swaim were colonels, one grade
lower in rank than the defendant. The applicable article of war provided that "no officer shall,
when it can be avoided, be tried by officers inferior to him in rank." Id. at 559. General Swaim
also objected to the failure to strike one allegedly biased court-martial member. Other errors
in the admission of evidence were alleged as well. Id. at 560-61.
82. See Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365,394 (1902).
83. See Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296, 299-300 (1911).
84. See Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U.S. 11, 19-20 (1921).
85. See Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1, 6 (1921).
86. See United States ex rel. Creary v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 336,342 (1922); see also United
States ex rel. French v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 326, 327 (1922).
87. French, 259 U.S. at 335.
2002]
INDIANA LAWJOURNAL
unfairness or lack of due process. Some collateral challenges allege that a court-
martial proceeding was nothing more than a sham-a military "railroading" of a
defendant without regard to justice or impartiality. In these cases, the Supreme Court
has maintained its deferential stance concerning administration of the military's
separate and distinctive system ofjustice under the Constitution. In the Court's view,
military rules for the regulation of the armed forces are not Article III rules, and the
civilian courts have no constitutional business in telling the military how to conduct
a court-martial.
In Burns v. Wilson,88 a 1953 decision still cited in support ofjudicial deference to
military discretion,89 servicemembers argued they had been subjected to court-martial
in an atmosphere of hysteria following commission of a brutal crime. Petitioners were
convicted of rape and murder and sentenced to death. Their collateral challenge in
federal district court raised issues of coerced confessions, inadequate representation,
fabricated evidence, and intimidation of witnesses by the prosecution." The
seriousness of the allegations, however, did not change the fact that military appeals
start and end within the military, as a matter of congressional choice. "This grant to
set up military courts is as distinct as the grant to set up civil courts. Congress has
acted to implement both grants. Each hierarchy of courts is distinct from the other."'"
As long as the military gives its servicemembers an opportunity to be heard and to
establish their claims, civil courts cannot reevaluate a court-martial's determination.'
The military concept of due process is, in the Court's view, a simple one. "To those
in the military or naval service of the United States the military law is due process."9
The underlying interest that explains and justifies this distinctive set of rules to
govern and regulate military personnel-rules "separate and apart from!'" civilian
law-is the military's distinctive need for discipline. Burns v. Wilson emphasized that
constitutional rights must "be conditioned to meet certain overriding demands of
discipline and duty, and the civil courts are not the agencies which must determine the
precise balance to be struck."9" It would be easy to assume this same deferential
88. 346 U.S. 137, 137 (1953) (plurality opinion).
89. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435,440 (1987); see also Chappell v. Wallace, 462
U.S. 296, 300 (1983); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67 (1981).
90. Burns, 346 U.S. at 138. Future Justice Thurgood Marshall participated on the briefs.
Id. at 137.
9 1. Id. at 147 (Minton, J., concurring).
92. See id. at 144-45. Civil courts had power to review only if "military courts manifestly
refused to consider those claims." Id. at 142; see also Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 110-11
(1950) (affirming without substantive review a court-martial proceeding in which the "law
member" appointed was a "Colonel from the Field Artillery," not an officer from the "Judge
Advocate General's Department"; assignment was within the discretion of the appointing
authority).
93. Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296, 304 (1911). But see Bishop, Collateral Review,
supra note 15, at 70-71 (favoring civilian collateral review of court-martial determinations).
"Congress may have made the Court of Military Appeals [(today's Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces)] the final arbiter of the meaning of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but
the Supreme Court of the United States is the final arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution
of the United States." Id. at 58.
94. Burns, 346 U.S. at 140.
95. Id.
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judicial posture would apply with respect to all matters of military discretion
undertaken with a view toward maintaining military discipline, but such an assumption
would be inaccurate, at least prior to the Rehnquist era.
The most distinctive and noteworthy aspect of the Court's traditional view of
civilian-military relations under the Constitution was the bright line drawn between
military-related decisions that were deserving ofjudicial deference and those that were
not. Military decisions were not worthy of deference simply because they were
military. Military decisions were worthy of deference only when those decisions fell
uniquely within the particular grants ofpower awarded to Congress and delegated to
the military under the Constitution, and when substantive judicial review would be
destructive of the effective exercise of that power. Collateral judicial review of the
individualized determinations of military tribunals was unnecessary and even
inappropriate when those individualized determinations were made under a separate
and distinctive means of disciplining and regulating members of the armed forces.
The Court's reliance on disciplinary necessity as a basis for judicial deference to
military choice has also extended to circumstances outside the narrow parameters of
court-martial jurisdiction. The most prominent example of deference to the
disciplinary needs of the military appears in the Feres line of cases. Feres v. United
States9 barred servicemembers from filing suit against the government for injuries
incurred if "the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to
service."97 Waiver of sovereign immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act
("FTCA") did not permit a private cause ofaction-for servicemembers because, in the
Court's view, servicemembers have never had a private cause of action for harms
suffered within the scope of military duty.9 The Court was unaware of any law
allowing "a soldier to recover for negligence, either against his superior officers or the
Government he is serving." The relationship of a civilian to a government actor
under the FTCA was inapposite to the relationship of a servicemember to the
sovereign, because "no private individual has power to conscript or mobilize a private
army with such authorities over persons as the Government vests in echelons of
96. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
97. Id. at 146. The circumstances leading to the servicemembers' injuries in the three cases
consolidated for review were not particularly related to military duty except for the fact that
each servicemember suffered harm as the result of a fellow servicemember's culpable act. Id.
at 138. Two of the cases involved alleged medical malpractice by a military physician; in the
third case, a servicemember was killed in a barracks fire allegedly caused by the military's
negligent maintenance and supervision. Id. at 137. The injuries were "incident to service" not
because the military considers mistreatment by colleagues to beanatural component ofmilitary
service, but because the mistreatment occurred in the course of activity that was otherwise
related to military service, such as receiving medical treatment or sleeping in the barracks.
Compare Feres, 340 U.S. at 146, with Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 51 (1949)
(permitting recovery, by servicemembers who were on leave, away from their place of
assignment, and driving on a public highway, for injuries caused by negligent operation of
government-owned and government-operated vehicle), and United States v. Brown, 348 U.S.
110, 112 (1954) (permitting recovery by veteran injured by postdischarge medical malpractice,
although medical treatment related to injury suffered while on active duty).
98. Feres, 340 U.S. at 142-43.
99. Id. at 134.
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command.'91 °°
Much of the reasoning behind Feres appeared (or, in Justice Scalia's view, was
invented'0° ) in later cases. The Court's denial of a cause of action under the FTCA
was grounded in the military's particular need to maintain good order and discipline,
the same reason earlier cases had denied jurisdiction over court-martial determinations
to Article Im courts. 02 Feres rests on the military's interest in identifying and
correcting misconduct by methods that may differ from those used in civilian society.
It expresses a reluctance to enforce discipline by lawsuit, which is, in essence, the
ultimate way in which civilian society enforces expectations of appropriate conduct.
In contrast, the military's interest in the maintenance of effective command
relationships between superiors and subordinates counsels an "in-house" means of
correcting misconduct that does not rely on the filing of lawsuits:
The peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the effects
of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that
might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for negligent
orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military duty, led the
Court to read that Act as excluding claims of that character." 3
Although the Feres cases are not constitutional in nature, they are consistent with
100. Id. at 141-42.
101. See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 694-98 (1987) (5-4 decision) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (contending that concerns for military discipline were a "later-conceived-of'
rationale for Feres).
102. See id. at 691 (stating that servicemember lawsuits would "necessarily implicateo the
military judgments and decisions that are inextricably intertwined with the conduct of the
military mission" and might undermine "duty and loyalty to one's service and to one's
country"). Academic commentary, including academic commentary by military lawyers, has
generally been critical of the idea that the Feres bar enhances military discipline. See id. at 701
n.* (Scalia, Brennan, Marshall, & Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (compiling authority critical of the
Feres doctrine). As currently formulated, Feres sweeps within its holding a broad range of
activities that have only the most indirect effect on command relationships, although they
involve military personnel. See, e.g., id. at 681 (denying recovery for negligence of civilian air
traffic controllers employed by the Federal Aviation Administration); Feres, 340 U.S. at 137
(denying recovery for medical malpractice).
103. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 10,112 (1954). It would be possible to misinterpret
the shorthand "incident to service" phrase of the Feres holding as indicating that mistreatment
by friendly forces is simply part of what it means to be in the military. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.
The criticism is particularly acute in the case of sexual misconduct against female
servicemembers, raising the concern that Feres transforms sexual assault into an expected
component ofmilitary life, a harm that women are expected to endure simply because they have
chosen to serve in the military.
This particular characterization of Feres would be inaccurate. Feres does not bar suit by
servicemembers because sexual assault is a traditional expectation of military life any more
than it bars suit because medical malpractice is a traditional expectation of military life. See id.
at 145. Feres bars suit by servicemembers under the assumption that discipline by lawsuit is
not the most effective way to maintain discipline in a military environment. See id. at 141-43;
see also Brown, 348 U.S at 112.
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the constitutional core that underlies the Court's analysis of judicial deference to
exercises of Article I military powers. That constitutional core rests in the internal
disciplinary and managerial needs of the military institution, and the Court's task has
been to define those military-related decisions that properly fall within that singular
purpose.
C. Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Civilians
A principal example of careful line-drawing between military choices that are
deserving of deference and military choices that are not so deserving is found in the
Court's opinions limiting the jurisdiction of military courts over civilians.'°4 When the
exercise of Article I power to govern and regulate the armed forces has an effect on
civilians, the Court historically (again, before the Rehnquist era) has acted decisively
to confine military discretion to its proper, constitutional scope.' 01
The Civil War and World War I raised distinctive legal questions involving
civilian-military relations because both those wars were fought, at least in part in the
case of World War II, on American territory. Under those circumstances, military
authorities have sought to regulate and criminally prosecute the activities of civilians
when their conduct interfered with military effectiveness. Such blurring of the
jurisdictional lines between civilian and military authority is often termed "martial
law," an obscure description of an extraordinary set of circumstances. Under martial
law in time of war, a military commander theoretically has the discretion, if exigencies
require, "to suspend all civil rights and their remedies, and subject citizens as well as
soldiers to the rule of his will."'" The gravity of a military attempt to enforce martial
law cannot be underestimated. If martial law is truly warranted, then "republican
government is a failure, and there is an end of liberty regulatedby law."' e7 Martial law
"destroys every guarantee of the Constitution, and effectually renders the 'military
independent of and superior to the civil power." ' s
In the Civil War-era Exparte Milligan,"9 a civilian citizen of the state of Indiana
104. See e.g., Kinsella v. Unites States, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); McElroy v. United States, 361
U.S. 281 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
105. See e.g., Kinsella, 361 U.S. 234; McElroy, 361 U.S. 281; Reid, 354 U.S. 1.
106. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2,124 (1866). Subsequent to World War II the
Court was still attempting to refine various definitions of the state of affairs that constituted
"martial law":
[T]he term "martial law" carries no precise meaning. The Constitution does not
refer to 'martial law' at all and no Act of Congress has defined the term. It has
been employed in various ways by different people and at different times. By
some it has been identified as "military law" limited to members of, and those
connected with, the armed forces. Others have said that the term does not imply
a system of established rules but denotes simply some kind of day to day
expression of a general's will dictated by what he considers the imperious
necessity of the moment.
Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 315 (1946).
107. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 124.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2.
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was arrested, tried, and sentenced to death by a "military commission," a military
tribunal convened by the military commandant of the military district encompassing
Indiana."o The charges filed against Milligan involved conduct alleged to be a direct
threat to the effectiveness of the United States Army: conspiracy against the
government of the United States; affording aid and comfort to rebels; inciting
insurrection; disloyalty; and violation of the laws of war."' More specifically,
Milligan was considered a Confederate collaborator who conspired to "seize
munitions of war," "liberate prisoners of war," and "resist[] the draft.."".2 His alleged
crimes were without doubt injurious to military effectiveness.
Despite the intense and understandable interest of the military in controlling
Milligan's conduct and deterring others from following his lead, the Court held that
the military commission had no jurisdiction over a civilian offender. The argument
that some form of "martial law" permitted the military to bypass civilian judicial
authority was found to be completely without merit:
It can serve no useful purpose to inquire what those laws and usages [of
martial law] are, whence they originated, where found, and on whom they
operate; they can never be applied to citizens in states which have upheld the
authority of the government, and where the courts are open and their process
unobstructed. This court has judicial knowledge that in Indiana the Federal
authority was always unopposed, and its courts always open to hear criminal
accusations and redress grievances; and no usage of war could sanction a
military trial there for any offense whatever of a citizen in civil life, in nowise
connected with the military service.I"
The Court did note that the Constitution provides for a legislative grant of
jurisdiction to military tribunals over the criminal offenses ofservicemembers. "4 This
limited grant ofjurisdiction was rooted in military exigency, acknowledging that the
"discipline necessary to the efficiency of the army and navy required other and swifter
modes of trial than are furnished by the common law courts.""' The fact, however,
110. Id. at 107.
111. !d. at6.
112. Id. at 5.
113. Id. at 121-22. Neither can the military impose.martial law in anticipation of potential
civil discord, even when its actions are based on militaryjudgment and expertise. "Martial law
cannot arise from a threatened invasion. The necessity must be actual and present; the invasion
real, such as effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil administration." Id. at 127.
114. Id. at 123.
115. Id. at 123. The Fifth Amendment expressly exempts "cases arising in the land or naval
forces" from the requirement that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment-of a Grand Jury." Id. at 119.
The exception is consistent with the power of Congress to "make rules for the government and
regulation of the land and naval forces." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. A separate system of
discipline for servicemembers would not be possible if the military was required to initiate
proceedings through the civilian courts. The Supreme Court has also interpreted the Sixth
Amendment consistently with the Fifth Amendment, assuming that "the framers of the
Constitution, doubtless, meant to limit the right of trial by jury, in the sixth amendment, to
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that a particular matter affects military discipline does not transform it into a matter
solely within the military's discretion to decide. The fundamental lesson of Milligan
is that if the exercise of military discretion affects civilians, the military has exceeded
the limits of any constitutional inmmunity from judicial review." 6 This lesson is so
important that Eugene Rostow once termed Milligan "a monument in the democratic
tradition," a decision that should be "the animating force of this branch of our law."' "
Almost a century later, the Court similarly invalidated the convictions of civilians
who had been tried and sentenced by military tribunals convened in Hawaii in the
months and years following the attack on Pearl Harbor."' Unlike Milligan, the
offenses at issue had only the most tenuous connection to military preparedness;" 9
however, the offenses were committed in a territory that remained, in the military's
judgment, "an active battle field"'20 in imminent danger of further invasion by the
enemy. Nonetheless, the Court found the military was without power to supplant
civilian judicial authority and impose martial law.' The only reason civilian courts
were not open and functioning was because the military had ordered them closed."u
those persons who were subject to indictment or presentment in the fifth." Milligan, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) at 123.
116. The Court had previously denied the military discretionary power over civilian
property, absent immediate danger. In Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851), an
American merchant was compelled by the military to accompany its forces on a march into
hostile Mexican territory, resulting in the loss of the merchant's goods. Id. at 116. Although
the military believed its commander had acted in the best interests of the military operation, the
Court affirmed the judgment of trespass. Id. at 137. The military did not have the discretion to
commandeer private propertyjust because it was the military, or because the taking wasjudged
to be a military necessity. Id. at 135. The Court described the limits ofmilitary discretion in this
way:
Our duty is to determine underwhat circumstances private property may be taken
from the owner by a military officer in a time of war. And the question here is,
whether the law permits it to be taken to insure the success of any enterprise
against a public enemy which the commanding officer may deem it advisable to
undertake. And we think it very clear that the law does not permit it.
Id. at 135.
117. Eugene V. Rostow, TheJapaneseAmerican Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489,524
(1945).
118. See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 305 (1946) (plurality opinion).
119. One of the civilian defendants, a stockbroker, was convicted of embezzling stock from
another civilian. He was arrested eight months after the Pearl Harbor attack. Id. at 309. The
other, a shipfitter, had brawled with military guards at his ship yard more than two years after
the attack. Id. at 310.
120. Id. at 342 (Burton, I., dissenting). In addition to protestations of military necessity,
senior military officials argued that military prosecution of civilian offenders was necessary
because military tribunals, unlike civilian courts, would not be required to impanel juries.
Juries in Hawaii would have included citizens of Japanese ancestry. See id. at 333 (Murphy,
J., concurring). "The Government adds that many of the military personnel stationed in Hawaii
were unaccustomed to living in such a [mixed-race] community and that 'potential problems'
created in Hawaii by racially mixed juries in criminal cases have heretofore been recognized
.." Id.
121. See id. at 324.
122. Id. at311.
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In Duncan v. Kahanamoku, the concurrence of Justice Murphy, who provided the
necessary fifth vote to release the defendants from military custody, emphasized the
constitutional core that controls civilian-military relations. " Relying on Milligan, he
wrote that the "supremacy of the civil over the military is one of our great
heritages."'" Claims of military necessity were simply immaterial when offered as
reasons to disregard that proper constitutional order, absent foreign invasion or civil
war that "actually closes the courts and renders it impossible for them to administer
criminal justice."'" While the military may have had a good faith belief that
compliance with constitutional expectations would interfere with good order and
discipline and disadvantage the war effort, the military deserved no special deference
when its judgment carried consequences for civilian citizens."2 6 "Constitutional rights
are rooted deeper than the wishes and desires of the military."'27
The years bracketed by the Korean and Vietnam conflicts saw a judicial trend to
curb the scope of constitutional power to govern and regulate the armed forces under
circumstances in which the use of that power had significant consequences for
civilians.' It is important to note that the Court continued to chip away at the
military's authority (or Congress's authority on the military's behalf) to make
decisions affecting civilians despite the military's continued insistence that its actions
were motivated by military necessity.' The Court limited the military's exercise of
discretion although, in the judgment of the military or in the judgment of Congress,
those limitations would degrade military readiness.' Military necessity alone never
carried the day.
This trend was seen most clearly in the Court's limitation ofpersons who would be
subject to court-martial prosecution under the UCMJ. United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles,' a product of the near-universal mobilization ofmale citizens during World
War II, represented the most significant postwar statement by the Court. Robert Toth
was held for court-martial on a charge of murder committed while Toth was a member
of the Air Force stationed in Korea.3 2 He was not arrested on that offense, however,
until five months after his discharge from the military.' The question for the Court
was whether Toth would be considered a civilian or a servicemember for purposes of
Congress's constitutional power to govern and regulate the armed forces." If
considered a civilian for constitutional purposes, he could not be subjected to trial by
court-martial and could only be prosecuted in an Article III venue, which in practical
.terms meant that Toth could not be prosecuted at all. 35
123. See id. at 324-35 (Murphy, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 325.
125. Id. at 326.
126. See id. at 330-31.
127. Id. at 332.
128. See Lurie, supra note 60, at 419-21.
129. See, e.g., id. at 418-19.
130. See e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. I (1957).
131. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
132. Id. at 11.
133. Id. at 13.
134. Id. at 11.
135. The Court seemed unmoved by the argument that Toth might escape prosecution for
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Congress had expressly provided for court-martial jurisdiction over ex-
servicemembers for certain crimes committed while in service.'36 The government
argued that this was Congress's choice to make, based on a reasonable belief that
military discipline would be enhanced ifservicemembers understood that misconduct
would always be judged by a single standard, whether discovered before or after
separation from service.' It seems plain that Congress's judgment in this instance
was reasonable or rational in constitutional terms."' Reasonable or rational judgment
alone, however, was not sufficient, even though the judgment at issue was one of
military discretion. The power of Congress to regulate the armed forces did not extend
so far as to permit denial of constitutional rights to civilians, even if those civilians
were once servicemembers and even if their offenses were connected to their military
service. "Consequently considerations of discipline provide no excuse for new
expansion of court-martial jurisdiction at the expense of the normal and
constitutionally preferable system of trial by jury."'39
In subsequent cases the Court continued to refine what would become, at least for
a few short years, a bright-line rule prohibiting Congress and the military from
exercising military power under the Constitution in ways that impacted civilians.
While Milligan and Duncan v. Kahanamoku prohibited court-martial jurisdiction over
civilians who were unaffiliated with the armed services, certain civilians with an active
relationship to the armed forces remained subject to court-martial by congressional
enactment of the UCMJ.'" For example, family members who accompanied
servicemembers to military installations overseas were at one time subject to court-
martial for criminal offenses.' 4 1 In Reid v. Covert,"2 a civilian wife was tried and
convicted by court-martial for the murder of her Air Force husband at an airbase in
England." 3 In defending the military's exercise ofjurisdiction, the government argued
that the Constitution's assignment ofpower to Congress to make rules for governing
and regulating the armed forces, in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper
Clause)" enabled the military to court-martialpersons accompanying servicemembers
murder. Id. at 20-21. When Congress considered the legislation subjecting ex-servicemembers
to trial by court-martial, the Judge Advocate General of the Army asked Congress to provide
jurisdiction in civilian federal court instead. Id. at 21. He testified, "If you expressly confer
jurisdiction on the Federal courts to try such cases, you preserve the constitutional separation
of military and civil courts, you save the military from a lot of unmerited grief, and you provide
for a clean, constitutional method for disposing of such cases." Id. at 21. Congress rejected his
advice. Id. Ifex-servicemembers were able to walk away from their crimes, therefore, the Court
concluded it was only because "Congress has not seen fit to subject them to trial in federal
district courts." Id.
136. Id. at 13 n.2.
137. See id. at 28 (Reed, J., dissenting).
138. See Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949).
139. Toth, 350 U.S. at 22-23.
140. See e.g. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
141. See id. at 3-4 (plurality opinion) (subjecting to court-martial under the UCMJ "all
persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces without the continental
limits of the United States").
142. 354 U.S. at 1.
143. Id. at3.
144. "[The Congress shall have Power] To make all Laws which shall be necessary and
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when necessary to the maintenance of military discipline. 45
The government's position was not unreasonable. Criminal or disruptive conduct
by family members, particularly when committed on a military installation in a foreign
nation, could be extremely damaging to military discipline and morale, not to mention
the political relations between the United States and a military ally." As a concurring
Justice noted, "these civilian dependents are part of the military community overseas,
are so regarded by the host country, and must be subjected to the same discipline if
the military commander is to have the power to prevent activities which would
jeopardize the security and effectiveness of his command."' 4 Application of a double
standard within a small, closely-knit community, with servicemembers subject to one
code of conduct but their spouses to another, could interfere with a commander's
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18;
see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) ("Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.").
145. Reid, 354 U.S. at 20.
146. Servicemembers have traditionally been held responsible for the behavior of their
familymembers, whether stationed within the United States or overseas.While a servicemember
is not normally criminally liable for the misconduct of his or her military dependents, such
misconduct would make promotion and retention much less likely. Military commanders have
traditionally insisted that their subordinates "control their dependents." See Lieutenant Colonel
Arthur A. Murphy, The Soldier's Right to a Private Life, 24 MIL. L. REV. 97, 106-07 (1964)
(outlining the traditional view of a servicemeniber's responsibility for the behavior of his
family); see also Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 234 (1960):
It points out that such dependents affect the military community as a whole; that
they have, in fact, been permitted to enjoy their residence in such communities
on the representation that they are subject to militaiy control; and that realistically
they are a part of the military establishment. It argues that, from a morale
standpoint, the present need for dependents to accompany American forces
maintained abroad is a pressing one; that their special status as integral parts of
the military community requires disciplinary control over them by the military
commander, that the effectiveness of this control depends upon a readily
available machinery affording a prompt sanction and resulting deterrent present
only in court-martial jurisdiction ....
Id. at 238-39.
Although the offenses in Reid v. Covert were committed against a servicemember, even
more serious concerns may arise when a civilian family member of a servicemember stationed
overseas harms a foreign national. In 2000, three teenage sons of American servicemembers
killed two German residents and injured four others by hurling small boulders from a bridge
at passing cars. Edmund L. Andrews, Germans Convict 3 U.S. Youths of Murder in Highway
Stonings, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 23, 2000, at A8. The boys were tried in German courts and
convicted of murder. See id.
147. Reid, 354 U.S. at 72 (Harlan, J., concuring). Furthermore, denial of court-martial
jurisdiction over civilian dependents leaves the question of a practical alternative. Prosecution
of offenders in an Article III court within the United States raises issues of expense, availability
of witnesses, and disruption of military personnel. If the last alternative is trial in the courts of
the host country, a defendant may in some cases prefer a court-martial. See id. at 87-89 (Clark,
J., dissenting).
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ability to maintain good order and discipline within the military community.'48 These
concerns were more than just judicial speculation; officers in charge of the major
overseas commands all filed statements to the same effect.1
49
The facts were favorable to a decision giving the benefit of the doubt to the military,
allowing it to exercise jurisdiction over civilians only in the narrowest circumstances
and only when necessary to military preparedness. That would not, however, be the
resultinReidv. Covert. The Court reversed the court-martial conviction, holding that
the above-described line of cases going back to the time of the Civil War prevented
the military, and Congress, fromusing the Constitution's militarypowers tojustify the
denial of constitutional protections to civilians. "Such a latitudinarian interpretation
of these clauses would be at war with the well-established purpose of the Founders to
keep the military strictly within its proper sphere, subordinate to civil authority."'50
"We should not break faith with this Nation's tradition of keeping military power
subservient to civilian authority, a tradition which we believe is firmly embodied in
the Constitution..''
Within just a few years the Court had extended the holding of Reid v. Covert,
incrementally invalidating each ofthe remaining circumstances in which court-martial
jurisdiction had been brought to bear on civilians. Military dependents who had
committed noncapital offenses would no longer be subject to prosecution by military
tribunals (answering any question potentially left open in the capital case of Reid v.
Covert); and civilian employees accompanying military forces were also removed
from the jurisdiction of courts-martial.'53
D. Constitutional Power to Draft Citizens into Military Service
While the pre-Rehnquist Court had strictly policed the boundaries of the
constitutional power to govern andregulate the armed forces, ensuring that this power
could not be used to impose consequences on civilians, other constitutional powers
inevitably join the military and the citizenry in a common venture. The Constitution
delegates to Congress the power to raise and support armies, and obviously armies
cannotbe raised without transformation of some civilians into servicemembers. Under
the "raise and support armies" clause," the military will have an unavoidable and
direct impact on the lives of civilians, whether the military involuntarily conscripts
148. Interestingly, similar concerns ofa double standard affecting servicemembers and their
civilian spouses may have arisen during the much-publicized court-martial proceeding against
Lt. Kelly'Flinn on a charge of adultery, among other charges. See generally Major William T.
Barto, The Scarlet Letter and the Military Justice System, ARMY LAW., Aug. 1997, at 3; Diane
H. Mazur, Book Review, 26 ARMED FORCES & Soc'Y 670 (2000) (reviewing KELLY FLiNN,
PROUDTOBE (1997)). While married servicemembers wouldbe subject to criminal prosecution
under the UCMJ for adultery, their civilian spouses would not.
149. Reid, 354 U.S. at 86. (Clark, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at30.
151. Id. at40.
152. See Kinsella v. United States, 361 U.S. 234,249 (1960).
153. See McElroyv. United States exrel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281,287 (1960) (noncapital
offenses); see also Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278, 280 (1960) (capital offenses).
154. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.12.
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civilians into service or accepts their voluntary enlistment. The Court has
characterized the transformation of citizen into soldier as a fundamental change in that
individual's status: "By enlistment the citizen becomes a soldier. His relations to the
State and the public are changed."'55
-The military, therefore, has the constitutional latitude to affect the lives of civilians
under the "raise and support armies" clause that it lacks under the "govern and
regulate the military" clause.'56 The fact that the military has the power to act,
however, does not mean that it has the power to act with an unlimited discretion that
is shielded from judicial review. Neither does it allow the military to disregard
constitutional limitations merely because it is the military, or because particular
decisions are made in the interests of military necessity or discipline. In raising
armies, the military is still acting outside the carefully circumscribed core function
distinguishable by the special deference it receives from civilian courts. The military
is not merely governing and regulating its own in the interests of internal good order
and discipline; it is reaching outside the military and engaging in activity that broadly
affects the civilian citizenry. The military has, never had a "weekend pass" from
judicial review and constitutional observance when filling its own ranks, at least not
before Rehnquist's appointment to the Court.
Mandatory national service in the military-the draft-was first held constitutional
during the First World War. In the Selective Draft Law Cases,"f the Court disposed
of arguments that the military draft violated the First Amendment's establishment and
free exercise protections or the Thirteenth Amendment's right to be free of
involuntary servitude.5 " It not only disposed of them, but also disposed of them
brutally and with a fair amount of ridicule for those who raised them. '" No response
was offered to the contention that mandatory military service either established or
155. United States v. Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 152(1890); see also Kinsella, 361 U.S. at 243
(defining military jurisdiction in terms of defendant's status as a servicemember).
156. The best student note written on the subject ofjudicial deference to military judgment
centers its analysis on the distinction between the "raise and support Arnies" clause and the
"govern and regulate the military" clause. See Oberwetter, supra note 14, at 196-97.
Oberwetter persuasively argues that judicial deference is appropriate only with respect to the
latter clause, under the assumption thatjudgments made to govern and regulate the military will
affect only servicemembers. Id. In contrast, judgments made in the interests of raising and
supporting armies, such as the sex-based selective service policy at issue in Rosiker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), inevitably have their greatest impact on civilians. See
Oberwetter, supra note 14, at 204-08. I would agree with her general emphasis on the
importance of assessing collateral effects on civilians, but would disagree thatjudgments made
under the "govern and regulate the military" clause affect only servicemembers. As will be
discussed later in this article, congressional power to govern and regulate the military not only
can affect, but is sometimes used for the purpose of affecting, civilian social policy. See
discussion infra Parts II.C.2, III.B.
157. 245 U.S. 366 (1918). See generally Forrest Revere Black, The Selective Draft
Cases-A Judicial Milepost on the Road to Absolutism, I I B.U. L. REv. 37, 37-53 (1931);
Harrup A. Freeman, The Constitutionality of Peacetime Conscription, 31 VA. L. REv. 40,56-
59 (1944); Leon Friedman, Conscription and the Constitution: The Original Understanding,
67 MICH. L. REv. 1493, 1494-1507 (1969).
158. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. at 390.
159. Id.
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interfered with religious practice; "its unsoundness is too apparent to require us to do
more.""Iw The Court was "unable to conceive upon what theory" military obligation
might constitute involuntary servitude, given a citizen's "supreme and noble duty of
contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the nation."'6' Finally, it termed
"frivolous" the plaintiffs' contention that the constitutional power to raise and support
armies contemplated only a voluntary force and not a conscripted one, declaring that
"the mind cannot conceive an army without the men to compose it."'"
The Selective Draft Law Cases might be viewed as declaring a healthy judicial
deference toward matters of the military's draft and recruitment of the armed forces.
The opinion's scope, however, is much narrower, affirming the constitutional power
to draft but not necessarily ceding discretion to the military to exercise that power in
any manner deemed necessary to military effectiveness. With respect to matters that
impose direct or even collateral consequences on civilians, the exercise of military
discretion is a judicial question, not a military question. 63 Subsequent cases
demonstrated that the Supreme Court had no intention of creating a protected zone of
military discretion related to the draft in the same way it had acquiesced in the
military's administration of its own rules of internal discipline.
Resistance to the draft, naturally, is what creates draft-related law. United States v.
Macintosh'" concerned draft resistance that was more theoretical than real, but the
distinction held little significance for the Court.'65 When Douglas Clyde Macintosh,
a citizen of Canada, applied for naturalization as a United States citizen, he was asked
to affirn that he was "willing to take up arms in defense of this country."' Rather
than answering with the simple "yes" sought by the federal district court, Macintosh
wrote a statement reflecting the apparently considerable amount of thought he gave
the question:
I am willing to do what I judge to be in the best interests of my country, but
only in so far as I can believe that this is not going to be against the best
interests of humanity in the long run. I do not undertake to support "my
country, right or wrong" in any dispute which may arise, and I am not willing
to promise beforehand, and without knowing the cause for which my country
may go to war, either that I will or that I will not "take up arms in defense of
this country," however necessary the war may seem to be to the Government
of the day. 67
The Supreme Court upheld the denial of his petition for naturalization, finding his
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 377.
163. See Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 404 (1932) (holding that the governor of
Texas could not call state militia into service to restrict complainants' production ofoil, absent
immediate danger). "What are the allowable limits of military discretion, and whether or not
they have been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial questions." Id. at 401.
164. 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 617.
167. Id. at 618.
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pledge to support and defend the Constitution insufficient without an unqualified
promise to bear arms in the country's defense. 68 The holding is unsurprising, given
that the Court had already endorsed criminal prosecution of draft protest activities
under the Espionage Act of 1917.169 The Court's more general discussion of
constitutional power to compel military service, however, offers a small elaboration
on the historical relationship between civil and military concerns. By virtue of
Congress's constitutional authority to raise and support armies, it has plenary power,
in the Court's language, "to say who shall serve in them and in what way."' 70 This
statement is extraordinarily broad and, to a modern reader aware of controversies
concerning military service by gay and female citizens, seems to award Congress an
equally extraordinary degree of discretion in deciding any issue related to the
recruitment or draft of military personnel. The Court's opinion fails to extend that far.
The power to raise armies, while plenary in the sense of Congress's general authority
to act, is subject to certain specific limitations- in, the same way all constitutionally
delegated powers are subject to specific limitation. As the Court concluded, "[f]rom
its very nature, the war power, when necessity calls for its exercise, tolerates no
qualifications or limitations, unless found in the Constitution or in applicable
principles of international law."'
7
'
At most, the Court's observation can be considered only a small nugget of concern
for the appropriate order of civilian-military relations. At the same time it recognized
that Congress's constitutional power to compel military service cannot be employed
in a manner that subverts constitutional protections, it embraced the idea that speech
critical of the military can be restricted "so that the morale of the people and the spirit
of the army may not be broken by seditious utterances."'' Nevertheless, the nugget
was still there, and the Court would continue to build a consistent approach to
defining the constitutional limits of exercises of military-based discretion. The
debilitating fear of war protest that prevailed in the first third of the twentieth century
resulted in a rocky start for the First Amendment; that same fear initially prevented the
168. Id. at 624-25. Interestingly, the Court previously denied a female applicant's petition
for naturalization for the same reason. Despite the fact that the military never would have
permitted a woman to actually bear arms in defense of the nation, she was denied citizenship
because, as a conscientious objector, she would not pledge to do so. See United States v.
Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 653 (1929), overruled by Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61,
69-70 (1946). The Macintosh Court described this petitioner with derision: "She was an
uncompromising pacifist, with no sense of nationalism, and only a cosmic sense of belonging
to the human family." Macintosh, 283 U.S. at 620.
169. Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. I, § 3,40 Stat. 219 (1917) (making it a crime, in time
of war, to "obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States"); see also Debs
v. United States, 249 U.S. 211,214 (1919) (upholding conviction based on speech stating that
draftees were "fit for something better than slavery and cannon fodder"); Frohwerk v. United
States, 249 U.S. 204,,204-10 (1919) (upholding conviction for publishing newspaper article
critical of the draft); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (upholding conviction
for sending leaflet to draftees arguing that conscription violated the Thirteenth Amendment;
leaflet constituted a "clear and present danger," akin to "falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic").
170. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. at 622.
171. Id. (emphasis added).
172. Id.
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Court from seeing the need to impose limitations on the "raise and support armies"
power" in the same way that it imposed limitations on the "govern and regulate the
military" power."7 ' When governing and regulating the military, congressional or
military power ends at the point at which the exercise of military discretion affects
civilians. Under both constitutional clauses, certainly anybenefit ofjudicial deference
should end at the same point.
Trop v. Dulles.7 examined the reverse of the question raised in Maclntosh: can a
citizen of the United States be stripped of his citizenship and rendered stateless as
punishment for inadequate performance of a military obligation? The defendant had
been convicted by court-martial of desertion during World War II while serving in
French Morocco. 76 He served three years at hard labor and received a dishonorable
discharge, but discovered years later, when he applied for a passport, that he had lost
his United States citizenship as well.'" Congress had enacted a statute imposing loss
of citizenship on servicemembers convicted of desertion in time of war and
dishonorably discharged, although the militaryhad discretion to offer reenlistment and
prevent loss of citizenship.'s
To no surprise, Congress justified this citizenship penalty in terms of "the needs of
the military in maintaining discipline in the armed forces."'79 An act of desertion was
"plainly destructive, ' "s and the military believed serious measures were necessary in
order to control serious misconduct. Under the Court's general practice of deference
to congressional choice in governing and regulating the military, the military's word
on maintaining good order and discipline would have been the last word. In this case,
however, the Court gave no deference whatsoever to the military's judgment on a
disciplinaryissue. The military had crossed the line in choosing its methods of internal
discipline, imposing consequences on servicemembers that reached well beyond the
military's proper sphere. Forfeiture of citizenship for military misconduct was beyond
the power of government to accomplish."' If the military could exercise discretion in
ways that affected the citizenship of citizens of the United States, it would raise
"important questions bearing on the proper relationship between civilian and military
173. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
174. .U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cI. 14.
175. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
176. Id. at 87. The Court's description of the facts suggests that the charge of "desertion"
may have been excessive. The defendant escaped from military detention, but then boarded
military transportation and returned to the post. He had been absent less than a day. See id. at
87-88.
177. Id. at 88.
178. In the Court's view, giving the military discretion to choose whether convicted
servicemembers would lose their citizenship created an even larger problem. "By deciding
whether to issue and execute a dishonorable discharge and whether to allow a deserter to re-
enter the armed forces, the military becomes the arbiter of citizenship." Id. at 90.
179. Id. at 107 (Brennan, J., concurring).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 92-93. The Court also offered an alternate basis for its ruling. Even if punishment
by forfeiture ofcitizenship was within the government's power, it constituted cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 101.
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authority in this country."' 82 "Nothing in the Constitution or its history lends the
slightest support for such military control over the right to be an American citizen."' 83
The Court has been sensitive to the concern that constitutional power to decide who
shall serve in the military might be used to "brand" some individuals as unworthy or
undesirable citizens. For example, the military cannot issue a servicemember a less-
than-honorable discharge from military service when the poor character of discharge
is based on the individual's preinduction, civilian conduct.M Limitations on the scope
of military discretion under these circumstances-even when based on the needs of
military discipline-are consistent with the Court's historical understanding of
civilian-military relations under the Constitution. The military departs from its core
constitutional function when it imposes its official disapproval upon matters of
civilian concern which are unrelated to a servicemember's record of military service.
E. O'Callahan v. Parker: The Last Word Before Rehnquist's Vietnam
O'Callahan v. Parker,'"5 decided in 1969, was the natural progression of the
Supreme Court's efforts to define the scope of constitutional powers concerning the
military: the power to govern and regulate, and the power to raise and support. This
Part opened with a discssion of this case and fittingly closes with it as well, because
O'Callahan represents the height of the Court's sensitivity to the issue of civilian
supremacy over the military under the Constitution. As discussed earlier, O'Callahan
had been convicted by court-martial of offenses related to an attempted sexual assault.
182. Id. at 91. The three concurring Justices, whose -votes were necessary to the result, all
emphasized the importance of civilian control of the military under the Constitution. Justices
Black and Douglas believed the military should never have the power to denationalize, even
if other governmental authorities did have that power. See id. at 104-05 (Black & Douglas, JJ.,
concurring). Justice Brennan concluded that Congress had failed to establish any rational basis
grounded in rehabilitation, deterrence, or retribution for the forfeiture of citizenship under these
circumstances.
I simply cannot accept aju.dgment that Congress is free to adopt any measure at
all to demonstrate its displeasure and exact its penalty from the offender against
its laws. It seems to me that nothing is solved by the uncritical reference to
service in the armed forces as the "ultimate duty of American citizenship."
Id. at 113 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Brennan's opinion is the more remarkable of the concurrences. It is one thing to find that
the military is without constitutional power to employ a particular means of maintaining
discipline. It is another to say that the military fails to realize it is acting irrationally. Brennan's
opinion also includes language evocative of a controversy still decades away. He seems to
understand the tremendous power of the military to shape issues of inclusion and exclusion
within our society, a central factor in the debate concerning military service by gay citizens.
"The uncertainty, and the consequent psychological hurt, which must accompany one who
becomes an outcast in his own land must be reckoned a substantial factor in the ultimate
judgment." Id. at Ill (Brennan, J., concurring).
183. Id. at 105 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring).
184. See Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958). The servicemember had been discharged
as a security risk on the basis of preinduction associations with "Communist sympathizers."
See Harmon v. Brucker, 243 F.2d 613, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd, 355 U.S. 579 (1958).
185. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
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Although the military argued that court-martial jurisdiction over O'Callahan was
necessary to the maintenance of military discipline, O'Callahan's conduct had only
a tangential connection to the military. The only military connection was by virtue of
O'Callahan's status as a servicemember; the circumstances surrounding his offenses
were completely unrelated to military activities. He committed a crime while off-base,
off-duty, and wearing civilian clothes, and was apparently unidentifiable as a member
of the armed forces. His offense tookplace in a time ofpeace and within the territorial
limits of the United States. His victim was a civilian who was targeted for reasons
having no connection to O'Callahan's military duties.""
Under these factual circumstances, the Court held, in an opinion authored by Justice
Douglas, that Congress had exceeded its constitutional power to make rules for the
government and regulation of the armed forces."8 7 If the need for military discipline
was the justification for permitting a constitutionally separate system ofjustice, then
that distinctive system of justice should apply only when matters affecting military
discipline are at issue. The Court noted that "the justification for such a system rests
on the special needs of the military, and history teaches that expansion of military
discipline beyond its proper domain carries with it a threat to liberty."'" Without
some "service connection," or articulated relationship to military discipline, a case
cannot be one "arising in the land or naval forces" under the military exception to the
Fifth Amendment.' The defendant, therefore, was entitled to prosecution by
indictment and trial by a civilian jury, rather than prosecution by order of military
authority and trial by military members of a court-martial."9
Douglas's opinion was controversial because, in addition to curbing the military's
constitutional discretion to prosecute servicemembers, it sharply questioned the
military's expertise to consider constitutional issues. Its pointed criticism included the
comment that "courts-martial as an institution are singularly inept in dealing with the
nice subtleties ofconstitutional law." "' Its holding, however, consolidated the Court's
progressive approach over the previous century in defining the scope ofmilitary-based
discretionunder the Constitution. Several clear principles concerning military powers
appear. The power to govern and regulate the armed forces cannot be used in ways
that carry significant collateral consequences for civilians, even if it would be helpful,
186. Compare O'Callahan, 395 U.S. 258 with Relford v. United States Disciplinary
Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971) (finding service-connection sufficient to support court-
martial jurisdiction; defendant servicemember committed offenses of kidnaping and rape within
military enclave and victims were kin ofservicemembers and engaged in post-related activities
when attacked).
187. See O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 273.
188. Id. at 265.
189. Id. at272-73; cf Duke & Vogel, supra note 37, at457 (supporting aservice-connection
requirement for court-martial jurisdiction, but basing the argument in lack of constitutional
power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 rather than the "arising under" exception of the
Fifth Amendment).
190. O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 274.
191. Id. at 265; see also id. at 266 n.7 (referring to "so-called military justice"); Nelson &
Westbrook, supra note 15, at 3,57 (noting that the Douglas opinion is "full of troublesome and
often gratuitous comments on military justice" and that "its tone is consistently hostile and
condescending").
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even necessary, to do so in the interests of military discipline.'92 The asserted need for
good order and discipline within the military is never sufficient, standing alone, to
immunize Congress or the military from compliance with constitutional requirements
or the scrutiny of judicial review. The military acts within the limits of its
constitutional. discretion only when making decisions that affect the lives of
servicemembers, and even with respect to servicemembers, only when those decisions
are related to the maintenance of good order and discipline.' Such was the state of
the Court's jurisprudence of civilian-military relations under the Constitution before
President Nixon nominated Justice William H. Rehnquist to the Supreme Court in
1971."4
II. How REHNQUIST FOUGHT THE VIETNAM WAR
Rehnquist joined the Court in the midst of protest against the Vietnam War.'9" Just
three years earlier, resistance to the draft had generated one of the most notable
decisions to arise out of the war, United States v. O'Brien.' O'Brien was the
infamous "draft card" case, in which a potenial inductee burned his Selective Service
registration certificate on the steps of a Boston courthouse before a sizable (and
unfriendly) crowd.'" The defendant was convicted of knowingly destroying or
mutilating his draft card in violation of a federal statute apparently adopted--even on
the majority's presentation of the facts-for the very purpose of eliminating a popular
form of draft protest.9 ' In dismissing his claim for protection of "symbolic speech"
192. See O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 267.
193. See id. at 272-73.
194. Cf Major Stanley Levine, The Doctrine of Military Necessity in the Federal Courts,
89 MiL L. REv. 3, 6 (1980) (noting that while O'Callahan "marked a high point in judicial
intervention with military law," the Court would "reversef. itself completely within the short
span of five years").
195. See WELLS, supra note 18, at 522-41 (chronicling protest activities against the Vietnam
War during fall of 1971 and spring of 1972).
196. 391 U.S. 367 (1968); see also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971) (per curiam) (denying the government's motion for an injunction against publication
of the "Pentagon Papers," a classified history of the Vietnam War); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (upholding the right of high school students to
wear black armbands in school in protest of the United States' involvement in Vietnam).
197. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369.
198. By a 1965 amendment to the Selective Service Act of 1948, Congress added the
additional offense of knowing destruction or mutilation of certificates. See Pub. L. No. 89-152,
79 Stat. 586 (1965) (codified at 50 App. U.S.C. § 462 (1994)). Before the amendment, the
statute prohibited various fraudulent uses of the certificate for the purpose of false
identification. See Selective Service Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-759, § 12(b)(l)-(6), 62 Stat.
604, 622-23. Applicable regulations promulgated under the Act also prohibited a failure to
possess the certificate. Selective Service System, 32 CFR § 1617.1 (1962). The majority noted
that the reports of both the Senate and the House Armed Services Committees demonstrated
a concern with the "defiant" destruction of draft cards and the "apprehension that unrestrained
destruction of cards would disrupt the smooth functioning of the Selective Service System."
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 385-86. The opinion quoted from the Senate Report as follows: "The
committee has taken notice of the defiant destruction and mutilation of draft cards by dissident
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under the First Amendment, the Court relied substantially on the government's
assertion that it needed to prohibit destruction or mutilation for reasons of military
necessity, not the suppression of speech." One might agree or disagree with (or roll
one's eyes at) some of the factual assertions offered by the government and accepted
by the Court,2" but there likely was a minimal rationality to preservation of the cards
under the Court's standard of review.20 1
What was most important, in the context of civilian-military relations, was that the
Court formulated a test for First Amendmentprotection of expressive conduct that was
designed to apply generally, whether in or out of a military context. There would have
been room for the Court to take the decision in a deferential direction. While O'Brien
was still a civilian at the time of his offense and could not have been tried by court-
martial, his draft registration gave him a quasimilitary status. The Court remarked, in
fact, on the possibility of "immediate induction" in explaining why it was so important
not to destroy the draft card.2' The opinion, however, contains no mention of a need
for judicial deference to military choice, despite the necessity of the draft to the
constitutional power to raise and support armies. It applied a standard, even if
factually questionable, form of First Amendment review.
The absence of any statement of special deference to military concerns was
perfectly consistent with the limits the Court had placed on exercises of military
discretion under the Constitution. O'Brien's conduct was outside the narrow band of
military affairs to which civilian courts should defer without substantive review. Not
only was he a civilian, but the statute, by definition, could affect only civilian draft
registrants. The destruction or mutilation of draft cards held by civilians did not
directly affect good order and discipline within the military, and therefore could not
fall within the constitutional power to govern and regulate the armed-forces. O'Brien
did not question Congress's power to draft under its power to raise and support
armies;2 3 he only questioned its power to punish draft protest under the First
Amendment. All this is not to say, of course, that the Court could not find in the
government's favor. What it means is that the Court did so in accordance with a
standard it presumably would have applied to any other government entity. It did not
find in the government's favor based on some judicial obligation to defer to
persons who disapprove ofnational policy. Ifallowed to continue unchecked this contumacious
conduct represents a potential threat to the exercise of the power to raise and support armies."
Id. at 387. Defiance, of course, only disrupts smooth functioning because it offends those who
are defied.
199. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 378-80.
200. For example, does a draft card become a militarynecessity because it helps a registrant
remember the address of his local draft board? See id. at 379.
201. It is important to remember that O'Brien was decided in a largely computer-free world.
The government argued that draft cards served as a portable, always accessible, record of an
individual's Selective Service information. See id. at 378-80. But see Dean Alfange, Jr., Free
Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-Card Burning Case; 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 23
(characterizing the government's factual contentions as "dispensable convenience").
202. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 379.
203. Justice Douglas, however, did. He unsuccessfully sought reargument on the issue of
whether conscription was constitutional in the absence of a declaration of war. See id. at 389-
91 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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congressional or to military choice on matters of military concern2 °4
A. Expanding the Scope of the Military's Discretion
If a Justice of the Supreme Court were to embark on a mission to broaden the scope
of military powers granted to Congress under the Constitution, the logical place to
begin would be at the constitutional core of military discretion. The discretion to
manage and discipline military personnel has always been exercised within the
separate system of militaryjustice contemplated by the Article I power to govern and
regulate the military. Decisions related to internal military discipline have received at
the very least a generous degree ofjudicial deference, and with respect to individual
determinations of courts-martial, a blanket immunity from review based on the
constitutional separateness of Article III courts. Therefore, if a particular
determination, decision, or exercise of discretion related to military affairs can be
classified as part of this constitutional latitude necessary for the maintenance of
military discipline, then it effectively can be shielded from judicial review. The task,
then, would be to define the scope of this constitutional core in conclusory terms, as
broadly and as generally as possible, with the objective of incorporating almost any
decision made for military purposes within its protection.
If the objective were to enhance the influence of the military within civilian society,
it would be helpful to avoid specific reference to or reliance on more recent decisions
of the Court concerning civilian-military relations. Throughout the twentieth century,
the Court has progressively curbed the scope of military powers under the
Constitution, limiting the degree to which military choice can carry consequences for
civilian society. The most effective strategy might be to build on a prior decision
written without extensive reference to controlling authority. The best candidate would
be a brief, conclusory opinion, perhaps written in that fashion because the matter at
hand was so clearly an appropriate exercise of military discretion and one that the
204. Six months after the decision in O'Brien, the Court made clear that the power of
Congress to raise and support armies was subject to judicial review; special deference to the
needs of the military was unnecessary. Despite a federal statute that barred judicial review of
draft classifications (except as a defense to criminal prosecution for draft avoidance), the Court
construed the statute as inapplicable to the retaliatory reclassification ofa theology student who
engaged in draft protest, permitting his judicial challenge to go forward. See Oestereich v.
Selective Serv. Bd., 393 U.S. 233 (1968). The concurrence distinguished facial challenges to
the unconstitutionality of a regulatory scheme, which should be subject tojudicial review, from
the "discretionary, factual, and mixed law-fact determinations" the Selective Service inevitably
makes in classifying draft registrants. See id. at 240 (Harlan, J., concurring).
First Amendment challenges to draft-related legislation were sometimes successful and
sometimes unsuccessful, but in all cases the Court evaluated the plaintiff's claim under the
assumption that military powers were subject to the specific restraints of the Bill of Rights.
Compare Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (197 1) (upholding Congress's choice to deny
conscientious objection to those who opposed a particularwar, butnot all wars; the distinction
did not burden free exercise or establish religion), with Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58
(1970) (overturning a conviction for the unauthorized wearing of a military uniform as part of
a "street skit" intended to protest the Vietnam War; federal statute permitting actors to wear
uniforms in theatrical productions, but only if the portrayal did not "discredit" the military,
violated the First Amendment).
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Court had no practical means to review. It would provide a blank slate, a means of
constructing a new line of authority unconnected to the prevailing jurisprudence of
civilian-military relations. Such a case might be the 1953 decision in Orloff v.
Willoughby."'
Orloff v. Willoughby has never been the subject of a law student's note or a
professional scholar's analysis. In the most stealth fashion, however, it formed the
basis for fundamental change in the constitutional law of civilian-military relations.
The case concerned a dissatisfied draftee during the Korean War era, an individual
conscripted into the Army not for his potential as a combat soldier, but for his skills
as aphysician.2° Members of the Medical Corps customarily served as commissioned
officers, but Orloffand the Army soon arrived at a point of irreconcilable conflict over
commissioning requirements.'07 Orloffdisclosed some, but not all, of the information
the Army requested concerning his association with organizations identified as
"subversive." ' 8 Because of his disposition, in the Court's language, to "haggle about
questions concerning his loyalty,"2' the Army denied Orloffan officer's commission.
Rather than discharge him, however, the Army put him to work in the
noncommissioned, enlisted position of medical lab technician. Orloff contended that
if the Army was not going to commission him as an officer and assign him to a
doctor's duties, he should be relieved ofhis military obligation and discharged.2"' The
Army countered with its belief that it had the discretion to assign an otherwise
lawfully inducted individual to any military duties that it desired.2"
Not surprisingly, the Court had little interest in stepping into the middle of what was
essentially an argument about individual duty assignments within a military
environment. The commission was not the issue, because the commissioning of
military officers was within the appointing power of the President as Commander-in-
Chief.212 In the majority's words, "[w]hether Orloff deserves appointment is not for
205. 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
206. Id. at 84.
207. Id. at 84-86.
208. See id. at 89-90.
209. Id. at 90-9 1. The Court rejected the claim that Orloff had been punished for claiming
the protection of the First Amendment. While he had the right to withhold information
concerning his associations, he did not have the right to withhold information and then insist
that the President "appoint him to a post of honor and trust." Id. at 91. But see id. at 97 (Black,
Frankfurter & Douglas, JJ., dissenting) ("Dr. Orloff is being held in the Army not to be used
as a medical practitioner, but to be treated as a kind of pariah in order to punish him for having
claimed a privilege which the Constitution guarantees.").
210. Seeid. at 86.
211. See id. at 85.
212. In the Court's view, there was no "right" to a military commission:
It is obvious that the commissioning of officers in the Army is a matter of
discretion within the province ofthe President as Commander in Chief. Whatever
control courts have exerted over tenure or compensation under an appointment,
they have never assumed by any process to control the appointing power either
in civilian or military positions.
Id. at 90; see also U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (appointment of officers); Weiss v. United
States, 510 U.S. 163, 170 & n.5 (1994) (stating that military officers are appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate). Advice and consent of the Senate is
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judges to say." ' The question at hand was whether the military could assign duties
to a draftee as it wished, even if the draftee considered himselfoverqualified for them.
These circumstances were so clearly within the Article I power to govern and regulate
the military that the Court cited but a single authority (and one off the point)'" in
ruling against Orloff. The Court repeatedly shared its belief that it did not want to be
involved in intramilitary disputes such as the choice of an appropriate work detail for
one individual draftee, especially a draftee it considered surly, uncooperative, and
ungrateful as well. 5 Orloff would have to bend, not the military, because "the very
essence of compulsory service is the subordination of the desires and interests of the
individual to the needs of the service."2 ' It awarded complete discretion to the
military, stating that "judges are not given the task of running the Army."2 "7 Individual
duty assignments are "affairs peculiarly within the jurisdiction of the military
authorities.""2 '
The Court alluded to the constitutional basis for its deference to military discretion,
noting that the military operates under a system of governance separate from the rules
necessarily accomplished en masse for the tens of thousands of military officers requiring
appointment as inferior officers of the United States. See Weiss, 510 U.S. at 182 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
Although I agree in general terms that there is no "right" to receive an officer's commission,
I am uncomfortable with the manner in which that phrase is sometimes used. The statutory
codification of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy refers to a congressional "finding" that there
is "no constitutional right to serve in the armed forces." 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2) (2000). In the
minds of the drafters, lack of a "right" to serve meant that citizens could be excluded from the
military for any reason, including those that would otherwise violate the Constitution. In my
mind, lack of any "right" to serve should entitle the military to make discretionary decisions
to exclude some individual citizens from service, provided it exercises rational and nonarbitrary
discretion in accordance with the Constitution.
213. Orloff, 345 U.S. at 92.
214. See id. at 90 (citing United States v. Mouat, 124 U.S. 303 (1888), for the proposition
that one cannot be an officer of the Army without a commission from the President).
215. Orloff received medical training during World War II at government expense. Under
the priority system established by the draft laws, he would be called for induction before any
doctors who had already served at least ninety days in the military. See id. at 84. It was
apparent that the majority was annoyed with Orloff's intransigence. "Presumably, some doctor
willing to tell whether he was a member of the Communist Party has been required to go to the
Far East in his place." Id. at 94.
The military's effort to compel service in exchange for funding Orloffs medical education
is parallel in some respects to current efforts to compel gay citizens to repay the costs of their
military-funded education following discharge. Of course, in Orloff the military sought to
compel service; in the modem recoupment cases, the military resists service by gay citizens but
demands repayment of educational costs incurred. In most cases, the individual wants to fulfill
his or her service obligation, and the only barrier to compliance is the military's policybanning
gay servicemembers. In rare circumstances, a gay citizen accepts military-funded education but
then violates "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" for the purpose of avoiding a contractual service
obligation. See Hensala v. Dep't of the Air Force, 148 F. Supp. 2d 988 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
216. Orloff, 345 U.S. at 92.
217. Id. at 93.
218. Id. at 95.
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that control in Article I courts. 2' 9 It referred to this constitutionally separate system
of discipline in observing that the military "constitutes a specialized community
governed by a separate discipline from that of the civilian."' 0 The military constitutes
a "specialized community" in the sense that it is the only community in our society
subject to an express constitutional grant ofauthority for its governance. Its distinctive
set of internal rules for the maintenanbe of good order and discipline warrant a
generous judicial deference, and the circumstances of Orlofffell squarely within the
military's constitutional core of discretion. The Court's opinion was as conclusory as
its result was uricontroversial. Twenty years later, however, the Court would rely on
Orloffs casual generality to alter fundamentally the direction of civilian-military
relations in this country.
When Justice Robert Jackson wrote the majority opinion in Orloffv. Willoughby in
1953, William Rebnquist was his law clerk."' Whether or not Rehnquist drafted the
opinion himself, he would have had close familiarity with a decision that would
otherwise have been completely unremarkable. Frank Michelman once described
Rehnquist as "preoccupied with the question ofthejudiciary's proper posture towards
the military, '22  and that characterization is a fair one, given Rehnquist's focused
effort to reconstitute civilian-military relations as a member of the Court. Before
Rehnquist's appointment, the question ofjudicial deference to military discretion was
unrelated to social conservatism. Deference to the military was a question of
constitutional structure and separation of powers, not a means of resisting cultural
change. Today, in contrast, judicial deference to the military serves only as a vehicle
for social conservatism, and nothing more.
During his first two terms on the Court Rehnquist's influence on the balance of
power between military discretion and civilian oversight was relatively small. He
joined the majority in one decision related to military affairs, Gilligan v. Morgan'
in 1973, and dissented intwo others, Flowerv. United States"4 in 1972 and Frontiero
219. See id. at 93-94.
220. Id. at 94.
221. See Karst, supra note 14, at 565.
222. Frank I. Michelman, Forward: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8
(1986). Professor C. Thomas Dienes noted Rehnquist's "insensitivity" or "lack of attention to
and concern with" individual constitutional rights in a military context. Dienes, supra note 14,
at 808. Dienes's observation is somewhat ironic, because "attention to detail" is one of the
hallmarks of military discipline. See Diane H. Mazur, A Callto Arms, 22 HARV. WOMEN's L.J.
39, 74-75 (1999) (asserting that military training teaches a "'Zen-like fetish for minor details'
because "the smallest failure to observe detail can have immediately catastrophic consequences
in a military environment") (quoting THOMAS E. RicKs, MAKING THE CoRPs 63 (1997)).
223. 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
224. 407 U.S. 197 (1972) (per curiam). Flower overturned the conviction of a civilian
arrested by military police for distributing leaflets on a public avenue within the limits of the
Army's Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio, Texas. Fort Sam Houston was an "open" post,
which meant that civilians could enter and leave the post without approval by a gate sentry. The
public avenue on which the leafleteer was arrested was used as a traffic artery through San
Antonio by both civilians and military personnel. Over 15,000 vehicles a day used the avenue.
See id. at 197-98. The Court held that the military had no interest in regulating speech activity
along that public corridor; its arrest of the petitioner violated the First Amendment. See id. at
198-99.
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v. Richardson' in 1973. Gilligan v. Morgan was by far the most significant decision,
and it was no coincidence that the case arose out of one of the defining events of the
Vietnam era, the fatal shooting of four Kent State University students by the Ohio
National Guard in May 1 9 7 0 ."6 The petitioners, acting on behalf of all Kent State
students, sought a comprehensive and structural form of injunctive relief against the
Guard. 7 They asked the federal district coirt to evaluate "the appropriateness of the
'training, weaponry and orders' of the Ohio National Guard"; to "establish standards
for the training, kind of weapons and scope and kind of orders to control the actions
of the National Guard"; and to "assume and exercise a continuing judicial surveillance
over the Guard to assure compliance with whatever training and operations procedures
may be approved by that court."'
Not one of the Justices would have awarded any part of the remedy sought. The
decision turned on whether the controversy was now moot and the claim should
simply be dismissed. Four Justices dissented on that basis, noting that the Ohio
National Guard had already adopted new methods of training and "use of force" rules
in response to the incident. 9 Two additional Justices seemed to concede that the
controversy was moot, yet they chose to join the majority in making a statement
concerning the relationship of the military and the judiciary.' Although Gilligan v.
Rehnquist dissented in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger. He did not seem to
understand the fairly common concept of an "open" post, id. at 199 n.*, but was clearly
frustrated by the effect it had in limiting the commander's discretion. Rehnquist argued that
"the unique requirements of military morale and security" may justify First Amendment
limitations against civilians "even while normal traffic flow through the area can be tolerated."
Id. at 200-01. Rehnquist does not explain why the need for military morale is unique or how
it is weakened by the presence of leaflets.
225. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion). Frontiero v. Richardson was one of the
earliest cases applying equal protection principles to legal distinctions on the basis of sex. The
petitioner challenged a Department of Defense policy that paid a higher level of compensation
to married male servicemembers (a marriage "bonus") under all circumstances, but to married
female servicemembers only if their spouses were in fact financially dependent on them. See
id. at 679-80. The Court invalidated the policy as a violation of equal protection, finding the
military's asserted need for "administrative convenience" in dependency determinations to be
insufficient. See id. at 690-91. The Court made no mention of a need for judicial deference to
military discretion in the management of its personnel, but the military did not offer any
distinctive military justification for the sex-based policy, other than a general plea of
convenience. Rehnquist was the sole dissenter. See id. at 691 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see
also infra note 352 (discussing Frontiero v. Richardson in greater detail).
226. See Morgan, 413 U.S. at3.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 5-6 (quoting in part from the issue remanded to the district court by the court of
appeals, Morgan v. Rhodes, 456 F.2d 608, 612 (6th Cir. 1972)).
229. See id. at 4, 12 (Douglas, Brennan, Stewart & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) ("For many of
the reasons stated in Part I of the Court's opinion, they are convinced that this case is now
moot.').
230. Blackmun and Powell joined the majority but also filed a concurring opinion. See id.
at 12, 14 (Blackmun & Powell, JJ., concurring) ("This case relates to prospective relief in the
form of judicial surveillance of highly subjective and technical matters involving military
training and command.").
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Morgan concerned the activities of the militia or, in modem vernacular, the National
Guard,"' the constitutional underpinning ofthe case was parallel to the provisions that
control the active military forces. In both instances, the Constitution has set aside a
protected core of military discipline and governance subject to the control of
Congress. 2 A court that assumed the sort of "continuing regulatory jurisdiction! 3
over the Ohio National Guard urged by the petitioners would not only infringe upon,
but would supplant, the Article I governance of core military functions intended by
the Constitution. 4 The Court's choice to forego a supervisory role was the only one
that reasonably could have been made. The idea that a federal district court should
select specific weapons for the Guard, establish standards for their use, and exercise
continuing surveillance of weapons training activities approaches frivolousness.
The majority opinion, however, did not stop there. It took the opportunity to plant
a seed, in the most general terms, that might later grow to discourage judicial review
ofmilitary discretion under a much broader range of circumstances than those at hand.
The contribution of Rehnquist may tip its hand in the Court's citation of the obscure
Orloffv. Willoughby from twenty years before,s as well as in the Court's insistent
protestations of its own incompetence in any matter of a military nature:
Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in
which the courts have less competence. The complex, subtle, and professional
decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military
force are essentially professional militaryjudgments, subject always to civilian
231. See Perpich v. Dep't of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 342-43 (1990) (explaining that the
constitutionally designated militia forces are now known as the National Guard of the various
states).
232. The militia clauses provide as follows:
[The Congress shall have Power]
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for
governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United
States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and
the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by
Congress ....
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 15-16.
233. Morgan, 413 U.S. at 5; see also Laird v. Taturn, 408 U.S. 1, 14, 15 (1972) (stating, in
dicta, thatjudicial evaluation of Army intelligence-gathering activities "would have the federal
courts as virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action";
ruling on the basis that petitioners lacked standing because they failed to allege a "specific
present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm").
234. The Court alternatively relied on the political question doctrine as analyzed in Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Although the majority opinion failed to explain in any specific
sense why Gilligan v. Morgan should be considered a nonjusticiable political question under
Baker v. Carr-it merely quoted a list of possible factors to consider, relevant and irrelevant
alike-the most applicable factor was probably the "lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards forresolving [the question]."Morgan, 413 U.S. at 8 (quoting Baker, 369
U.S. at 217).
235. See Morgan, 413 U.S. at 12 (citing Orloffv. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953)).
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control of the Legislative and Executive Branches. The ultimate responsibility
for these decisions is appropriately vested in branches of the government
which are periodically subject to electoral accountability. 6
The opinion fails to note, however, that militaryjudgments are not beyond judicial
review just because they are militaryjudginents. Only those core military activities
related to internal governance and discipline of the armed forces are deserving of
special deference. Even when the military acts in the interests of maintaining
discipline, moreover, its decisions become judicial questions when they carry
collateral consequences for civilians. The above-quoted language conveniently
disregarded every limitation the Court had crafted for exercise of the military powers
under the Constitution, and it would soon become the most lasting judicial legacy of
the Kent State shootings. In the Court's next Term, it would serve as the foundation
for the final break from the Court's jurisprudence of civilian-military relations.
B. The Battle That Would Win the War: Rehnquist and Parker v. Levy
In the last major Vietnam-era decision of the Supreme Court, Parker v. Levy,"
Rehnquist finally realized the opportunity to transform the prevailing culture war
concerning the military. He authored a majority opinion that would forever change the
constitutional relationship between the military and the judiciary, granting Congress
much greater latitude to use military necessity as a means of shaping the nature of
civilian society. In contrast to the stealth Orloff v. Willoughby, Parker v. Levy has
received a significant degree of scholarly attention." Its notoriety, however, has
always been for its treatment of Vietnam War protest. Rehnquist's opinion has never
been fully studied for its impact on civilian-military relations.
Howard Levy was, in some respects, the "Hawkeye Pierce " 9 of the Vietnam War,
only perhaps even less suited than Hawkeye to the military practice of medicine. He
was a dermatologist drafted in 1965 and assigned to the Army's Fort Jackson in South
Carolina.240 Less than two years later, he was court-martialed and sentenced to three
years at hard labor in a federal prison.24' Levy clashed with the Army because he
236. Id. at 10.
237. 417 U.S. 733 (1974); see also Sec'y of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676 (1974) (per
curiam opinion) (companion case to Parker v. Levy).
238. See, e.g., Robert Batey, Parker v. Levy: A Primer in Judicial Persuasion, 49 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 97 (1999); Robert N. Strassfeld, The Vietnam War on Trial: The Court-Martial of Dr.
Howard B. Levy, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 839; Donald N. Zillman & Edward J. Imwinkelried,
ConstitutionaiRights and Military Necessity: Reflections on a Society Apart, 51 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 397 (1976).
239. Hawkeye Pierce was the lead character on the television show "M*A*S*H," a sensitive
comedy that was set in an Army surgical unit during the Korean War. Hawkeye, a drafted
surgeon, chafed at the military side of his medical duties. "He accepts an order only if it seems
reasonable and not because any authority carries any weight with him whatsoever, and
Hawkeye never salutes." DAVID S. Riss, M*A*S*H: THE EXCLUSIVE, INSIDE STORY OF TV's
MOST POPULAR SHOW 19 (updated ed. 1983) (emphasis in original).
240. Levy, 417 U.S. at 735-36.
241. See id. at 736.
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ardently opposed the war in Vietnam. He aggravated his superiors with his resistance
to doing things "the military way" and found many of the traditional customs and
expectations of an officer's life-saluting, joining the officer's club, and the like-to
be silly."4 The specific court-martial charges filed against Levy were based on various
statements Levy made to Army enlisted personnel concerning his opposition to the
war and the manner in which it was being conducted. According to the court-martial
specification, Levy was alleged to have made statements243 to the following effect:
The United States is wrong in being involved in the Viet Nam War. I would
refuse to go to Viet Nam if ordered to do so. I don't see why any colored
soldier would go to Viet Nam; they should refuse to go to Viet Nam and if
sent should refuse to fight because they are discriminated against and denied
their freedom in the United States, and they are sacrificed and discriminated
against in Viet Nam by being given all the hazardous duty and they are
suffering the majority of the casualties. If I were a colored soldier I would
refuse to go to Viet Nam and if I were a colored soldier and were sent I would
refuse to fight. Special Forces personnel are liars and thieves and killers of
peasants and murderers of women and children .... 2
Levy was prosecuted under two sections of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
that prohibited 1) "conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman" and 2) "disorders
and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline" and "conduct of a nature
to bring discredit upon the armed forces. 245
Parker v. Levy illustrates some of the difficulty that can arise in distinguishing free
speech concerns from disciplinary concerns in a military environment. When the
speaker is a servicemember, does protest constitute dissent protected under the First
Amendment, or does it constitute insubordination punishable as a breach of military
discipline?2' At least under the facts of Parker v. Levy, the answer seems reasonably
to fit within the latter. Dr. Levy's statements concerning the activities of the Special
Forces were more than just the expression of a political viewpoint. His duties as a
242. For accounts ofDr. Levy's civilian background, military experience, and court-martial,
see James Finn, Personal Testimony: Howard Levy, M.D., in CONSCIENCE AND COMMAND:
JUSTICE AND DISCIPLINE IN THE MILITARY 161 (James Finn ed., 1971); ROBERT SHERRILL,
MILITARY JUSTICE IS TO JUSTICE AS MILITARY MUSIC IS TO MUSIC (1970).
243. The extremely stilted nature of the military's specification of the charged offense
suggests that these are not the words Levy actually used.
244. Levy, 417 U.S. at 739 n.5. Robert Strassfeld has argued that Parker v. Levy became a
case about servicemembers' rights only through the Court's evasion of the true substance of
the court-martial. Beneaththe surface, in Strassfeld's view, was a case fundamentally about war
and about race, both Black and Vietnamese. See Strassfeld, supra note 238, at 951-52.
Rehnquist's opinion offered only the "relative coolness of a constitutional debate over two
statutory provisions." Id. at 952.
245. 10 U.S.C. §§ 933-934 (2000).
246. See DonaldN. Zillman, Free Speech and Military Command, 1977 UTAHL. REV. 423,
436 n.49 ("The discipline and order cases of the Vietnam War were often viewed more as
battles over the court's intrusion on command prerogatives rather than as disputes over the
precise first amendment issue involved.").
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military physician required him to provide specialty training to Special Forces
"aidmen," or medics. His objection to this training requirement was at the core of the
statements for which he was court-martialed.24 Dr. Levy argued he would be violating
his medical ethics if he offered specialized information to soldiers who lacked the
medical expertise, or the inclination, to use it for appropriate purposes. From the
Airy's perspective, however, Dr. Levy did not merely speak about his beliefs. He
used his status as a commissioned officer and as a military doctor to speak directly to
subordinates who might be influenced by his beliefs, thereby undermining military
discipline and morale.248
There was nothing surprising about Rehnquist's treatment of this case as one
concerning primarily discipline and not speech. Government employees have never
enjoyed the protection of the First Amendment to speak without limitation while
actually engaged in service to the government.249 The principle applies even more
strictly in the context of authoritarian institutions, such as the public schools, prisons,
police forces, or the military.' Dr. Levy was insubordinate in the performance of his
military duty, and the fact that his insubordination also involved speech, or even was
accomplished by means of speech, did not change that equation. The Court upheld the
convictions, holding that military custom with respect to conduct considered
"unbecoming," "to the prejudice of good order and discipline," or"ofa nature to bring
discredit" was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.2"' IfRehnquist had gone no
247. Dr. Levy was also charged and convicted under Article 90 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 890 (2000), which provided for punishment "as a court-martial
may direct" of any person who "willfully disobeys a lawful command of his superior
commissioned officer." See Levy, 417 U.S. at 737-38 & n.2. The charge arose from Dr. Levy's
alleged refusal to obey the hospital commander's order to train Special Forces personnel. See
id. at 736.
248. See Batey, supra note 238, at 120 (identifying "the very real differences between a
private citizen's criticizing American participation in the Vietnam War and a military officer's
openly urging his subordinates not to follow orders to fight in it").
249. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (upholding the First
Amendment right of a public school teacher to criticize the school board's allocation of funds
by writing a letter to the local newspaper). The Court distinguished the circumstances that
would arise just a few years later in Parker v. Levy:
[Pickering's] statements are in no way directed towards any person with whom
appellant would normally be in contact in the course of his daily work as a
teacher. Thus no question of maintaining either discipline by immediate superiors
or harmony among coworkers is presented here. Appellant's employment
relationships.., are not the kind of close working relationships for which it can
persuasively be claimed that personal loyalty and confidence are necessary to
their proper functioning.
Id. at 569-70. One might reasonably ask why Rehnquist did not decide Parker v. Levy on
the basis of standard First Amendment precedent. See Zillman, supra note 246, at 448-55
(applying Pickering analysis to speech by servicemembers). Reliance on precedent would
have, of course, failed to offer the additional benefit of altering the constitutional scope of
military discretion.
250. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 441 (1999).
251. See Levy, 417 U.S. at 734 n.4, 746, 757-58. "While there may lurk at the fringes of the
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further, grounding the decision in the military's need to exercise discretion within its
core constitutional function of governance and discipline, the case would have had
little lasting significance.
The one understanding that did change in Parker v. Levy, however, fundamentally
altered the Court's precedent of civilian-military relations. Rehnquist reached back to
the Orloffv. Willoughby of his clerkship and rewrote-in fact misrepresented-the
language of that opinion in order to substantiate a presumption ofjudicial deference
to all exercises of military discretion. Rehnquist took a case that had relied on
uncontroversial principles of constitutional separation of powers and transformed it
into one that relied instead on the Vietnam-era cultural division between those who
supported the military and those who did not. In Orloffv. Willoughby, Justice Jackson
had made the relatively simple observation that the military was a "specialized
community governed by a separate discipline," referring to the Article I delegation of
power that permits Congress to make rules for the internal governance of the
military.212 Relnquist cited the authority but changed its language, stating that the
Court "has long recognized that the military is, by necessity, a specialized society
separate from civilian society" and "a society apart from civilian society." 3 Not that
the military's system of disciplinary rules is separate and distinct from the rules that
control in civilian courts, but that military society itself is separate from civilian
society, and that this in and of itself requires civilian courts to forego review of
military decisions.' The words themselves may seem insignificant, standing alone.
This simple assertion in Parker v. Levy, however, would be relied upon repeatedly
over the next generation to establish and extend a cultural divide between
servicemembers and civilian citizens of the United States. It would also facilitate a
trend of court-sanctioned social conservatism, one that would be justified by clairiis
of military necessity.
Rehnquist discovered his "separate society" rationale in the frontier military of the
nineteenth century. He resurrected a pre-World War I (and in two instances, pre-Civil
War) line of authority respecting the constitutional core of military discretion in
matters related to good order and discipline. 5 In each of the cases Rehnquist relied
articles... some possibility that conduct which would be ultimately held to be protected by
the First Amendment could be included within their prohibition, we deem this insufficient to
invalidate either of them at the behest of appellee." Id. at 760-61.
252. See Orloffv. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953).
253. See Levy, 417 U.S. at 743, 744.
254. Robert Batey has noted other instances of misrepresentation of law and fact within
Rehnquist's majority opinion in Parker v. Levy. See Batey, supra note 238, at 109,112-13. For
example, Rehnquist suggested that Dr. Levy was given training on the provisions of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, see Levy, 417 U.S. at 751-52, although there was no
evidence to support such a finding. Batey concluded as follows: "It is likely that the chief
justice would deny that this paragraph was intentionally misleading, but I would doubt any
such disclaimer.... Rehnquist adroitly manages to create an impression of the facts that is
fundamentally false." Batey, supra note 238, at 109.
255. See Levy, 417 U.S. at 743-52 (citing Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897);
United States v. Fletcher, 148 U.S. 84 (1893); In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890); Smith v.
Whitney, 116 U.S. 167 (1886); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857); Martin v. Mott,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827)). Edward Sherman has described Rehnquist's recitation of
2002]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
upon-the most recent decided in 1897-an Article III court had declined to review
the individualized determinations of military tribunals. Each case concerned a
servicemember's conviction by court-martial for violation of one of the "general
articles" at issue in Parker v. Levy, offenses inherently defined by military tradition
and linked by their tendency to disrupt military-discipline and morale. As discussed
in Part I, Article III courts have no authority to review or supervise a court-martial's
enforcement of the military's Article I rules for the government and regulation of the
armed forces. Provided the military acts within the narrow disciplinary scope of this
constitutional grant of power, and does so in a manner that avoids collateral
consequences for civilians, the maintenance of military discipline begins and ends
within the military chain of command. All of this would be unremarkable, except for
the fact that Rehnquist offered these cases in support of the novel idea that the military
is somehow separate from civilian society in a way that is constitutionally significant.
Rehnquist's "separate society" rationale was and is factually and legally
unsupportable. Moreover, it has caused harm to the constitutional balance of civilian-
military relations under the Constitution and, as will be discussed later in Part M,
caused significant harm to the military as well. At one time in our history, service in
the armed forces of the federal government might have been considered a peculiar,
almost monastic profession, with its members living "according to their own customs
in near-isolation from the civilian world."256 However, the days of a geographically
distant, frontier military, one without a presence or relevance in the lives of civilian
citizens, are almost a century in the past. It was dishonest for Rehnquist to suggest that
courts should rely on a perspective of military life that is not only obsolete, but has
been obsolete for generations. As Joseph Bishop noted in 1961, thirteen years before
Parker v. Levy, "if there ever was a time when the Army could rationally be described
as a 'separate community' with a separate system of government, that time is long
past."
Congress would not have enacted the UCMJ in 1950 if not for the near-universal
military service of eligible male citizens during World War II." The shared
precedent in support of his "separate society" rationale as "random quotes from Supreme Court
cases." Edward F. Sherman, Legal Inadequacies and Doctrinal Restraints in Controlling the
Military, 49 IND. L.J. 539, 570 (1974).
256. Duke & Vogel, supra note 37, at 458.
At the outbreak of the Civil War the Army only had a strength of some 16,000,
and these were scattered all over the country and had the primary task of guarding
lines of travel against the Indians. Throughout the period from the close of the
Civil War to the Spanish American War, the Army was employed chiefly as a
constabulary and a police force.
Id. at 458 n. 128; see also SAMUELP. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIERANDTHE STATE: THETHEORY
AND POLITICS OF CIVIL-MILrrARY RELATIONS 226-29 (1957) (describing the isolation of the
military from civilian society in the late 1800s).
257. Bishop, CollateralReview, supra note 15, at 70; see also-Karst, supra note 14, at 569-
72 (criticizing the "separate society" rationale as unsupported in fact); Zillman & Imwinkelried,
supra note 238, at 400 ("Rehnquist ignored several factors highly relevant in assessing the
current validity of claims that the military is a society apart.").
258. See Wiener, Original Practice I, supra note 36, at I I ("At the peak of the World War
11 mobilization, when some 12,300,000 persons were subject to military law-almost as many
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experience of millions of citizens who were then returning to civilian life served to
identify the weaknesses of military justice and motivate Congress to modernize--or
"civilianize"' 9 -those practices. The citizen-soldier underpinning to the substantial
post-World War II reforms of military law should not have been a surprise to any
Justice, having been noted in a number of earlier cases60 It made no sense for
Rehnquist to characterize military service as something so bizarre and so unknowable
as to be beyond the understanding of civilian citizens. Yet this is the fundamental
assumption relied upon in Parker v. Levy.2"'
Rehnquist's majority opinion misstated both law and fact in an apparent effort to
disable the Court from questioning military judgment in any context. Before Parker
v. Levy, the relevant "separateness" between military and civilian concerns was
grounded in constitutional text. It contemplated nothing more than distinctive internal
rules for military discipline that would be administered without the supervision of
as the entire population of the country in 1830-the armed forces handled one third of all
criminal cases tried in the nation.") (footnotes omitted).
259. Edward F. Sherman, The Civilianization of Military Law, 22 ME. L. REv. 3 (1970).
Joseph Bishop had an irreverent and perceptive view on the inevitable cycles of war and
concern for militaryjustice. He wrote, "After every war there are loud and sometimes justified
squawks about the unnecessary roughness ofmartial courts and cops, followed bya tremendous
pother in Congress, followed by a grand general renovation of the Articles of War [now the
UCMJ], followed by profound public apathy until the next emergency." Bishop, Collateral
Review, supra note IS, at 57-58.
Bishop could afford to be irreverent because universal selective service eligibility in effect
at the time ensured that the cycle of periodic concern for civilian-military relations would
continue. In the era of an all-volunteer military, one characterized by the Court as a separate
society, we risk a profound public apathy that is also permanent. Notably, Bishop still
concluded that the best guarantee of fairness in military justice"is the existence of some degree
of power, altogether outside the statutory system of militaryjustice, to enforce such fairness."
Id. at 58.
260. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 37 (1957) ("We recognize that a number of
improvements have been made in militaryjustice .... In large part these ameliorations stem
from the reaction of civilians, who were inducted during the two World Wars, to their
experience with militaryjustice.'); see also Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137,140 (1953) ("These
enactments [the Uniform Code of Military Justice] were prompted by a desire to meet
objections and criticisms lodged against court-martial procedures in the aftermath of World
War II."). See generally Sherman, supra note 259, at 5-8, 28-29 (describing "a continuous
civilianization of militaryjustice, with particular acceleration in the post-World War II period
and the present Vietnam War era") (writing in 1970).
261. Sometimes assumptions fossilize into fact given a sufficient amount of repetition.
Critics of Rehnquist's "separate society" rationale have often objected to its consequences but
seem to concede its fundamental validity, failing to note the judicial sleight of hand that gave
the rationale life. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 250, at 443-49 (summarizing modem
instances of the Supreme Court's deference to the exercise of military discretion); David Cole
& William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment Protection of
Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 319, 341-45 (1994)
(conceding the principle of judicial deference to military judgment but arguing for certain
limitations); Levin, supra note 14, at 1057 (conceding that "separate society" rationale "seems
to be on target about something which, however unpleasant, has long been recognized to be
correct").
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Article III courts. After Parker v. Levy, the relevant separateness departed from
constitutional text and was grounded instead in a nonconstitutional notion of a cultural
and experiential divide between military and civilian lives. None of the Court's earlier
decisions defining the nature of civilian-military relations, however, support
Rehnquist's assumption that jurisdictions with separate rules are by nature separate
societies. In fact, one decision handed downjust two months after Rehnquist's favorite
son of military opinions, Orloffv. Willoughby, demonstrates the very opposite. Burns
v. Wilson,262 one of the many, decisions preserving a core constitutional function
related to military discipline, drew an analogy between military law and state law.
Each constitutes "a jurisprudence which exists separate and apart from the law which
governs in our federal judicial establishment."'263 State law, like military law, is
considered "separate and apart" because federal courts played no role in its
development and only a limited role in supervising its enforcement in state courts. 26
It never would occur to a federal court, however, to find that states therefore constitute
separate societies from the federal government, requiring Article III courts to defer
in all circumstances to decisions made by state governments. The argument is
nonsensical; citizens do not lead "state lives" that are precisely separable from their
"federal lives." Neither do servicemembers lead lives that are separable from their
status as citizens of the United States, and the reforms in military law achieved post-
World War II and pre-Rehnquist are a reflection of that reality.
The factual assumptions of Parker v. Levy are just as thin. Its judicial deference is
grounded, almost proudly, in professions of ignorance.265 In Rehnquist's view, we
could not possibly understand, as judges or as civilians, "the different character of the
military community and.. . the military mission."''  We are reduced to a conclusory
form of trust in the military's judgment, a trust dictated by its grave responsibility "to
fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise."" For example, Rehnquist
offered the military's singular need for unquestioning obedience as a reason why
civilian courts are ill-equipped to question the exercise of military discretion: "Its law
is that of obedience. No question can be left open as to the right to command in the
262. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
263. Id. at 140.
264. See id.; see also Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683,693-99 (1969) (requiring servicemember
to exhaust remedies within military justice system before filing petition for habeas corpus in
civilian federal court; relying on analogous principles governing challenges to jurisdiction of
state courts); Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 131-32 (1950) (same). But see Parisi v.
Davidson, 405 U.S. 34,41-45 (1972) (permitting servicemember to challenge administrative
denial of conscientious objector status in civilian federal court although court-martial for
subsequent failure to obey still pending; demands of comity between two judicial systems did
not control because court-martial was without power to grant requested relief).
265. Federal courts have managed to incorporate the methodologies and research ofvarious
academic disciplines, such as economics, statistics, or the social sciences, without undue
intellectual discomfort. There is something about academic military research, however, that
causes judges to doubt their abilities to understand and instead reach for stereotypes about the
military as a substitute. See Sherman, supra note 255, at 541-43 (describing the Supreme
Court's reluctance to utilize hard information concerning the military, despite its availability).
266. See Levy, 417 U.S. at 758.
267. Id. at 743 (quoting United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 1I, 17 (1955)).
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officer, or the duty of obedience in the soldier."' To ensure the point would not be
overlooked, he repeated his reference to the need for unquestioning obedience twice
more later in the opinion. 9 Rehnquist could not have been more wrong. His
stereotypical characterization of military obedience as blind and fanatical, without
rational or moral context, has not been accepted since Nuremberg.' 0 Military
appellate courts have held that a servicemember "is not an automaton but a 'reasoning
agent' who is under a duty to exercise judgment in obeying the orders of a superior
officer."' Even from a military perspective; therefore, the introduction of
independent judgment within a military environment is not something to be feared.
The most pernicious aspect of Parker v. Levy, however, is its invitation to the
military to consider itself a society apart from--and a society above-its lesser
civilian counterpart." Separatism is never neutral. It necessarily implies lesser and
greater, and Parker v. Levy implied that the military should not be subject to civilian
expectations because civilian expectations inevitably will be beneath the military's.
The military, for example, has "overriding demands of discipline and duty";273 by
implication, civilian society lacks that commitment to discipline and duty.274 The
268. Id. at 744.
269. See id. at 751,758; see also id. at 744 (citing Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19
(1827), which assumes that a "prompt and unhesitating obedience to orders is indispensable"
to the military mission). According to this 1827 view of the moral responsibility of
servicemembers (apparently little or none), soldiers who pause to consider the appropriateness
of orders risk contributing to the victory of hostile forces. See Martin, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at
30.
270. See William George Eckhardt, Nuremberg-Fifty Years: Accountability and
Responsibility, 65 UMKCL. REV. 1 (1996) (evaluating Lieutenant William Calley's war crimes
at My Lai in the context of Nuremberg principles); Sherman, supra note 255, at 571
("[A]bsolute obedience, ifnot laid to rest by Nuremberg and military cases which have upheld
a serviceman's right to question orders for clarification and to disobey them if illegal, has been
rejected in contemporary military teaching.") (footnotes omitted). As early as 1851, the
Supreme Court recognized that illegal military orders must be disobeyed. "[I]t can never be
maintained that a military officer can justify himself for doing an unlawful act, by producing
the order of his superior. The order may palliate, but it cannot justify." Mitchell v. Harmony,
54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 137 (1851).
271. United States v. Kinder, 14 C.M.R. 742,776 (A.F.B.R. 1954); see also United States
v. Calley, 22 C.M.A. 534, 541-44 (1973) (holding that, with respect to the My Lai incident
during the Vietnam War, Lieutenant Calley should have known that an order to kill civilians
was illegal and that obedience to orders was no defense). Servicemembers "must learn to
follow ordersyet retain sufficient autonomy to refuse illegal orders." JAMES H. TONER, TRUE
FAITH AND ALEGIANCE: THE BURDEN OFMILITARY ETHICS 46 (1995) (emphasis in original);
see also MARKJ. OSIEL, OBEYING ORDERs: ATROCITY, MILITARY DISCIPLINE, AND THE LAw OF
WAR 230-246 (1999) (distinguishing between rules and standards in military law, and
recognizing the benefit of encouraging deliberative judgment in servicemembers rather than
unreflective obedience).
272. See Bishop, Collateral Review, supra note 15, at 71 (stating that "separate society"
rationale "tends to make the armed services an enclave of the national polity whose inhabitants
are of other caste than the rest').
273. Levy, 417 U.S. at 744 (citing Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953)).
274. The concurrence in Parker v. Levy highlights this moral dimension of the civilian-
military divide. Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger, oddly enough, argued that military
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military community has a "different character" than that of the civilian comnunity,2"
and Rehnquist's opinion made clear which community had the greater character and
which the lesser. Civilians may be "disrespectful and contemptuous"; 6
servicemembers may not. At every turn, Parker v. Levy left the impression that
civilian expectations-including constitutional expectations-were not pertinent to
the military because they were not worthy of the military.
C. The Generation That Followed Parker v. Levy, and the Collateral
Damage Inflicted by Constitutional Separatism
During the first two decades of Rehnquist's service on the Court, "the idea that
judges have virtually nothing to say about any issue involving the military [grew] like
a weed."'2 In almost any case involving a challenge to the exercise of military
judgment, or to a policy justified on the basis of military necessity, the Court would
offer the standard Orloff v. Willoughby,2" Gilligan v. Morgan,279 or Parker v. Levy290
platitudes as reasons to ratify military choice. Provided the government was able to
tie military judgment in any remotely articulable way to the maintenance of military
law expects more--not just expects differently-in comparison to civilian society. The
distinction is important because it permits the military to characterize disagreement with its
choices on a moral basis:
Relativistic notions of right and wrong, or situation ethics, as some call it, have
achieved in recent times a disturbingly high level of prominence in this country,
both in the guise of law reform, and as a justification of conduct that persons
would normally eschew as immoral or even illegal.
Id. at 765 (Blackmun, J., and Burger, C.J., concurring). The Justices' careless characterization
ofcivilian legal standards as morally inferiorto their military counterparts was sneering in tone.
"The truth is that the moral horizons of the American people are not footloose, or limited solely
by 'the civil code of Tennessee."' Id. I suspect neither realized how far this moral
characterization of military choice would be stretched to immunize the military from
constitutional review.
275. Id. at 758.
276. Id. at 759 (quoting United States v. Priest, 21 C.M.A.'564, 570 (1972)).
277. Karst, supra note 14, at 564; cf. Sherman, supra note 255, at 580 (noting a trend toward
greater judicial involvement in military affairs as the Vietnam War progressed, a trend that
would be halted by Parker v. Levy).
278. 345 U.S. 83, 92 (1953) ("[T]he very essence ofcompusoryservice is the subordination
of the desires and interests of the individual to the needs of the service."); see also id. at 93
("[J'udges are not given the task of running the Army.").
279. 413 U.S. 1 (1973):
[l]t is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts
have less competence. The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the
composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially
professional military judgments, subject always to civilian control of the
Legislative and Executive Branches.
Id. at 10 (emphasis in original).
280. 417 U.S. at 743 ("[Ihe military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from
civilian society."); see also id. at 744 ("[M]ilitary society has been a society apart from civilian
society.").
[Vol. 77:701
REHNQUIST'S VIETNAM
discipline or military efficiency, the Court would defer without substantive
consideration of whether the circumstances fit within the constitutional core of
military discretion. In decision after decision, the Court insisted that it was uniquely
incompetent to evaluate the constitutionality of decisions made by or on behalf of the
military."I In decision after decision, the Court reminded us that the military was a
community separate and apart from the community of civilian citizens it served;. 2 its
higher sense of discipline, duty, and selflessness displaced the constitutional values
that would otherwise control. 3 To question that judicial balance in favor of military
judgment was at best uninformed, at worst unpatriotic, and therefore deference to that
judgment was the only appropriate course.2 It is, after all, "the primary business of
armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars,"2 5 and the gravity of that ultimate
responsibility forgives a host of constitutional slights.
In several cases following Parker v. Levy, the Court did properly defer to
discretionary choice with respect to military affairs. In those cases, the contested issue
fell squarely within the constitutional core of congressional power to make rules for
the governance and regulation of the armed forces. The military exercised judgment
in the interests of maintaining good order and discipline, and its judgment did not
impose collateral consequences on civilians, on civilian society, or on civilian-military
relations. Although the particular results in those cases were controversial, and some
might argue that better military judgment would have been different military
judgment, the choice was one for the military or for Congress to make. Provided the
consequences of an exercise of military discretion are confined to matters of internal
discipline, and absent the most egregious circumstances, civilian courts properly
defer. The Court has approached, but has not yet identified, the point at which judicial
deference in matters of internal military discipline is no longer appropriate.
One of the most controversial aspects of the military disciplinary system is its
disinclination to engage in "discipline by lawsuit." The military takes great care to
protect its command relationships, believing that inappropriate conduct is best
controlled through maintenance of an effective chain of command. In the military's
281. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 448 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J.); see also
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503,507 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.); Chappell v. Wallace, 462
U.S. 296, 302,305 (1983); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57,65 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.).
282. See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 174 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J.); see also
Goldman, 475 U.S. at 506; Chappell, 462 U.S. at 301; Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354
(1980); Middendorfv. Henry, 425 U.S. 25,49 (1976) (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., concurring);
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975).
283. See Solorio, 483 U.S. at 440; see also United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 691
(1987); Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507; Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300; Rostker, 453 U.S. at 66; Glines,
444 U.S. at 354; Henry, 425 U.S. 25,38,43 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.); Councilman, 420 U.S. at
757.
284. See Weiss, 510 U.S. at 177; see also Solorio,483 U.S. at 447-48; Goldman, 475 U.S.
at 507-08; Chappell, 462 U.S. at 301-02; Rostker, 453 U.S. at 64-65; Glines, 444 U.S. at 357;
Henry, 425 U.S. at 43; Councilman, 420 U.S. at 758.
285. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (quoting United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955)); see also Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1975)
(same); Councilman, 420 U.S. at 757 (same); Henry, 425 U.S. at 46 (same); Levy, 417 U.S. at
743 (same).
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view, resolution of grievances or disputes throughout civil lawsuits would weaken the
sense of responsibility the military attempts to instill in its noncommissioned and
commissioned officers at all levels of rank. Problems cannot simply be shipped out
for judicial resolution; military leaders, both junior and senior, accept a professional
responsibility to correct dysfunctional behavior in subordinates to a degree we do not
expect of civilians in comparable supervisory positions. 86
One of the best illustrations of that disciplinary philosophy can be found in
Chappell v. Wallace,"7 a 1983 decision arising out of a military version of a standard
employment discrimination dispute. Five enlisted men had brought suit against eight
of their noncommissioned and commissioned officers, alleging that they had been
assigned to less favorable duty and given poor performance evaluations on the basis
of race. The Court barred their claims, holding that servicemembers could not recover
damages from their superiors for violation of constitutional rights in the course of
military service. The decision was grounded in a concern for the maintenance of
effective superior-subordinate command relationships. Itwouldbe counterproductive
to good order and discipline, for example, if subordinates could evade the normal
military chain of command and frustrate discretionary decisions and orders by seeking
civilian judicial relief.288 The Court concluded that it should not "tamper with the
established relationship between enlisted military personnel and their superior
officers" because that relationship was "at the heart of the necessarily unique structure
of the Military Establishment."289
286. See Diane H. Mazur, The Beginning of the Endfor Women in the Military, 48 FLA. L.
REV. 461, 469 (1996) ("At each level, from the most junior 21-year-old sergeant to the most
senior general, soldiers are responsible for holding their subordinates' feet to the fire until
something is done correctly. If it's not done correctly, the military will find someone else who
can get it done correctly.") (explaining why the military's response to sexual harassment issues
has been ineffective).
287. 462 U.S. 296 (distinguishing Bivens action against federal officials for violation of an
individual's constitutional rights underBivens v. Six Unknown Fed. NarcoticsAgents, 403 U.S.
388 (1971); analogizing instead to limitations on servicemember suits established inFeres v.
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)).
288. See id. at 304. Furthermore, Congress has provided servicemembers with alternative
administrative remedies for redress of grievances. See id. at 302-03. But see Michael I. Spak
& Jonathan P. Tomes, Sexual Harassment in the Military: Time for a Change of Forum?, 47
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 335, 356-58 (1999) (arguing that those administrative remedies are
ineffective in cases of sexual harassment). Professor Spak and Mr. Tomes are both retired
officers in the Army's Judge Advocate General Corps. Id. at 355 nn. 1-2.
289. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300. The need for the capitalization of "Military Establishment"
is left unexplained. Perhaps it is intended to emphasize just how inappropriate it would be for
the Court to engage in review of military judgment, conjuring a picture of the military as the
Great Unknowable, Unquestionable Thing.
The Court similarly overreaches when itjustifies its deference on the basis ofan exaggerated
statement of a servicemember's duty of obedience. It asserts, incorrectly, that "the habit of
immediate compliance with military procedures and orders must be virtually reflex with no
time for debate or reflection." Id. Military ethics require the opposite; a servicemember has an
obligation to disobey an illegal order, which would seem to contemplate at least brief reflection
on the situation, if not occasional debate. See United States v. Kinder, 14 C.M.R. 742, 776
(A.F.B.R. 1954) (stating that servicemembers must exercisejudgment in obeying the orders of
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Some students of the military justice system criticize these limitations on a
servicemember's access to legal redress in civilian courts. This criticism has become
particularly acute in the case of sexual harassment. Some have argued that sexual
harassment should not be addressed solely through the internal disciplinary structure
of the military justice system, and that female servicemembers should be permitted to
bring civilian Title VII claims as well. 9 Some, including Justice Scalia, argue that
Feres v. United States,2 which bars servicemember claims under the Federal Tort
Claims Act for injuries incident to military service, should be overruled.293 On the
issue of whether civilian remedies ought to be available to servicemembers for
intramilitary harms, these differences in judgment raise fair questions but still fall
within a constitutionally protected zone of discretion for the military or for Congress
to exercise. The results in these "internal military discipline" cases, in and of
themselves, do not raise significant concerns for civilian-military relations under the
Constitution. Concerns do arise, however, when the Court uses language that is far
broader thannecessary to resolve the controversy at hand and disregards constitutional
limitations on the scope of its deference to the military.
Two ofRehnquist's post-Parker v. Levy opinions raise this concern. In Middendorf
v. Henry,"' the Court upheld the military's choice to deny court-appointed counsel to
defendants tried by summary court-rnartial, on the basis that the proceeding was not
a "criminal prosecution" for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.295 The Court's
decision was, in practical terms, relatively insignificant. The summary court-martial,
a nonadversarial proceeding, is the least formal form of court-martial the military can
employ. The punishment it can impose is limited to a "teaching" level ofpunishment,
the clear intent being that the defendant be returned to duty as soon as possible.' One
could reasonably argue that denial of appointed counsel was a bad idea or a good
idea," 7 but in the end it was a disciplinary idea, and the military is entitled to a certain
superiors).
290. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
291. See Yxta Maya Murray, Sexual Harassment in the Military, 3 S. CAL REV. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 279,298-301 (1994); see also Spak & Tomes, supra note 288, at 355-69. In
response to the contention that the introduction of civilian lawsuits into a military environment
would negatively affect good order and discipline, Spak and Tomes answer that the effect could
not possibly be more detrimental to discipline than the military's handling of the Tailhook
incident or the McKinney court-martial. Spak & Tomes, supra note 288, at 365.
292. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
293. See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 692-703 (1987) (Scalia, Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting); see also id. at 700-01 & n.* (citing numerous sources
critical of the Feres doctrine).
294. 425 U.S. 25 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.).
295. Id. at 34-38, 48.
296. The most significant punishment that a summary court-martial can impose is
confinement at hard labor for a period not exceeding one month, and then only if the
defendant's rank is within the four lowest enlisted pay grades. See id. at 33 & n.1 1.
297. The level of punishment authorized by means of summary court-martial is very similar
to that authorized by the military's nonjudicial, administrative form of military discipline, the
"Article 15." No right of counsel attaches in an Article 15 proceeding. See supra note 44.
Interestingly, the military's increased utilization of Article 15 proceedings has reduced the
incidence of summary courts-martial correspondingly. See Henry, 425 U.S. at 64 (Marshall &
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discretion in choosing how best to maintain military discipline. The more significant
effect of Rehnquist's opinion was to reinforce the impression that the military is
"above" the need for such technicalities, not just that a military context can create
different requirements for disciplinary procedure.29 The military community was
"tightly regimented"; the civilian community was "diverse." 2 Military personnel are
subject to "overriding demands of discipline and duty"; civilian citizens are not."°
The principle of deference to military judgment in matters related to internal
discipline reached its logical conclusion in Solorio v. United States.3"' Rehnquist's
majority opinion in Solorio finally overruled O'Callahan v. Parker,0 2 the Vietnam-
era decision that had once marked the high point for judicial review of military
judgment. O'Callahan v. Parker had restricted the jurisdiction of courts-martial to
"service-connected" offenses, those having some articulated relationship to military
discipline. 3 In Solorio, Rehnquist substituted a standard that instead focused on the
status of the accused, holding that any offense committed by an individual having the
status of an active-duty servicemember was subject to prosecution by court-martial. 4
The nature of the offense and its specific connection, if any, to the maintenance of
good order and discipline were no longer pertinent jurisdictional concerns. 5 As in
Middendorf v. Henry, reasonable military judgment could disagree as to whether
military discipline is enhanced by an expansive view of court-martial jurisdiction over
servicemember offenses."° Provided the expansive view stops short of collateral
Brennan, JJ., dissenting). Of course, that leaves the question of why the military needs the
summary court-martial. If it is important to the military to impose the stigma of a criminal
conviction, in addition to the "teaching moment" provided by minor forms of discipline, then
perhaps the military should proceed by more formal and adversarial means. See Eugene R.
Fidell, The Summary Court-Martial: A Proposal, 8 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 571 (1971).
298. The dissent read Rehnquist's majority opinion as "a grant of almost total deference to
any Act of Congress dealing with the military." See Henry, 425 U.S. at 69 (Marshall &
Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
299. Id. at 38.
300. Id. at 43 (quoting Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953)).
301. 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
302. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
303. Id. at 272-73; see supra Part I.E.
304.- See Solorio, 483 U.S. at 450-51.
305. Solorio, like O'Callahan, was a prosecution involving sexual misconduct. Id. at 436-
37. The Solorio offense arguably had a greater service connection than the sexual assault of a
civilian in O'Callahan because -the Solorio victim was the minor daughter of a fellow
servicemember. Id. at 437. Rather than finding the offense "service-connected" under the
O'Callahan standard, however, Solorio rejected the standard entirely and substituted a status-
based approach.
306. The dissenting Justices in Solorio raised the persuasive point that a status-based
standard would permit court-martial for offenses that most would agree are beyond the business
of the military, such as tax fraud. Id. at 467 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting). The
dissenters argued that, under the Fifth Amendment's exception for "cases arising in the land
or naval forces," offenses committed by servicemembers. do not "arise" in military service
unless they have some connection to military service. See id. at 453-62; see also Duke &
Vogel, supra note 37, at 457 (arguing that cases do not "arise" in the land or naval forces
unless they are service-connected). But see Nelson & Westbrook, supra note 15, at 27-29
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consequences for civilians, civilian society, or civilian-military relations, however, the
judgment should be made by the military or by Congress.
Where the boundaries of the constitutional core of military discretion lie is unclear.
Would it interfere with the maintenance of internal military discipline to permit suit
by a military veteran who was secretly administered doses of LSD as part of an
undisclosed Army experiment? In United States v. Stanley, 7 the Court held that it
would interfere and should therefore be barred under Feres v. United States,"' even
though this experiment took place outside the petitioner's chain of military command
and had no relation whatsoever to his military duties.3 In the Court's view, any
judicial inquiry into whether military discipline was implicated would inevitably
interfere with military discipline, and so the boundaries of the constitutional grant of
power to govern and regulate the armed forces could not even be tested."' For Justice
O'Connor, who hadjoined Rehnquist in overruling O'Callahan v. Parker, this result
was beyond the pale. Although she agreed in principle that courts should normally
defer to military judgment with respect to internal discipline, Stanley was not a case
about military discipline. She concluded that "conduct of the type alleged in this case
is so far beyond the bounds of human decency that as a matter of law it simply cannot
be considered a part of the military mission.".3 . For O'Connor, there were limits to the
constitutional core ofmilitary activity that would be immune from judicial review. She
believed that conduct that would violate the standards of the Nuremberg military
tribunals could not possibly be insulated from liability under any disciplinary
(criticizing the service-connection test of O'Callahan for its complexity and lack of
predictability).
Some students of military justice argue that even the O'Callahan v. Parker standard of
service-connection is too broad. Michael Spak and Jonathan Tomes have argued that courts-
martial should be abolished, except for offenses committed overseas or in time of war. See
Spak & Tomes, supra note 40, at 534-41. Military offenses, such as absence without leave,
disrespect to an officer, or disobedience of orders, can be resolved through administrative
forms of discipline or by discharge from the military. Id. Nonmilitary offenses should be
prosecuted in civilian courts with all the attendant constitutional protections. 1d.
307. 483 U.S. 669 (1987) (Scalia, J,).
308. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
309. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 682-84.
310. See id. at 682-83. Scalia apparently adopted the "number of constitutional clauses" test
for measuring the scope of Congress's authority to manage the military, but he fails to explain
the origins of this test. Under the "number of constitutional clauses" test, the fact that the
drafters of the Constitution chose to spread out the various military powers across several
clauses within Article 1, Section 8, rather than consolidate them in a single clause, counsels
greater judicial deference to legislative choice than would otherwise be warranted. Scalia
wrote: "What is distinctive here is the specificity ofthat technically superfluous grant of power,
and the insistence (evident from the number of Clauses devoted to the subject) with which the
Constitution confers authority over the Army, Navy, and militia upon the political branches."
Id. at 682.
311. Id. at 709 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 686
(Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (characterizing the Court's decision as "abdication" to
military authority in violation of the Constitution). "But in reality, the Court disregards the
commands of our Constitution, and bows instead to the purported requirements of a different
master, military discipline.. . ." Id. (emphasis in original).
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justification."'
How should we identify constitutional- abuses against civilian-military relations?
Fundamentally, all such abuses share a single feature. In each instance, they cross a
line that limits the collateral consequences of military judgment. Whenever military
judgment imposes consequences on civilian society, or alters the nature of the
relationship between the military and civilian society, then judicial deference is
inappropriate. The pre-Rehnquist understanding of. constitutional civilian-military
relations, which extended back before the Civil War, consistently recognized a narrow
and defined core of military discretion to be exercised under the Article I military
powers. Military choice within its proper sphere was protected; military choice
exceeding its proper sphere was subject to judicial review. Post-Rehnquist, there have
been two particular circumstances, the second more pernicious than the first, in which
judicial deference to the military has been applied in ways abusive of civilian-military
relations under the Constitution. First, courts should not defer to military judgment
when its effect is to isolate the military from civilian society or to protect the military
from disagreement. Second, and much more significant, courts should not defer when
military judgment is employed to establish caste among members of civilian society.
1. Rehnquist's Isolationism
Free speech issues involving the military have undergone a complete factual
reversal over the last generation. It used to be that the military shielded its people
from controversial information out of fear that they would agree with it. For example,
in the Vietnam-era Greer v. Spock,'3" the military rejected the request of a presidential
candidate-one who opposed the war-to speak to servicemembers at Fort Dix during
the 1972 campaign3 "4 Today, the military is more likely to shield its people from
controversial information out of fear that they Will disagree with it. It assumes that
servicemembers will be most comfortable and most amenable to good order and
discipline if they are protected from information with which they disagree. The
military's policy of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is the perfect paradigm of the modem
context for military speech. Provided military personnel do not have to talk about, or
hear about, the reality that gay citizens serve in the military, they are then
312. See id. at 709-10 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
313. 424 U.S. 828 (1976). The opinion notes that Fort Dix policy banned all
"[d]emonstrations, picketing, sit-ins, protest marches, political speeches and similar activities"
on an equal basis, regardless ofviewpoint. Id. at 83 1. The Court, however, ignored the obvious.
Speech at Fort Dix would not constitute a "demonstration" or "picketing" if it agreed with
military or administration policy. Similarly, speech would be "political" only if it challenged
the status quo. Professors Zillman and lmwinkelried raised this point when they argued that the
military's speech-restricting policies would have to be far broader if their purpose was to
maintain political neutrality. For example, incumbent politicians routinely raise issues of
military policy when speaking to servicemembers during visits to military installations. They
do so, however, as representatives ofa congressional committee or, in the case of the President,
as Commander-in-Chief, and not as the partisan politicians targeted by military regulation.
"The equality the Spock majority proposes is illusory and is weighted heavily in favor of
incumbents." Zillman & lmwinkelried, supra note 10, at 803.
314. Spock, 424 U.S. at 831-33.
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theoretically' able to maintain the "high standards of morale, good order and
discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability."
31 6
Rehnquist's characterization of the military as a society apart from civilian society
has served to isolate its personnel and weaken the institution. In combination with the
end of compulsory military service a generation ago, Rehnquist's mission to insulate
the military from civilian influence has left us with a military that is now more apart
from the people than ofthe people. Brown v. Glines,317 a Vietnam-era case that upheld
restrictions on servicemembers' speech, serves to illustrate the transformation, if in
an unusual way. Brown v. Glines was a significant decision in that it continued the
steady erosion of constitutional civilian-military relations during the Rehnquist era,
but the subject of the speech that prompted the controversy was somewhat less than
central to military or foreign policy. Brown v. Glines was about haircuts. Captain
Albert Glines had prepared a petition addressed to the Secretary of Defense, asking
his assistance in "changing the grooming standards of the United States Air Force."318
The petitioner believed that haircut regulations "caused more racial tension, decrease
in morale and retention, and loss of respect for authorities than any other official Air
Force policy."' 19 Upon discovery of the petition, which Glines had circulated without
the required command approval on a single occasion during a flight stopover in Guam,
the Air Force removed Glines from Air Force Reserve flying duty and assigned him
to inactive status.320 The Court made short work of Glines' challenge to his
termination, offering all the usual platitudes of deference to military choice.3
Interestingly, the haircut fracas presented in Brown v. Glines may be more valuable
than its First Amendment discussion in illustrating the way in which the Rehnquist era
has altered civilian-military relations. Odd as it may seem in the context of a present-
day military in which males with shaved-to-the-scalp haircuts are the norm, a
generation ago young military men sported haircuts that were closer to a conservative
business style. Men often devoted an inordinate amount of effort to the evasion of
haircut regulations so they would look more like civilians." These men were not just
315. In practice, it is impossible for gay servicemembers to maintain the level of secrecy
concerning their private lives that "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" requires. The policy requires much
more than a commitment not to tell. It requires gay servicemembers to maintain secrecy, avoid
discovery, and lie as necessary. See Diane H. Mazur, Word Games, War Games, 98 MICH. L.
REv. 1590, 1602 (2000) [hereinafter Mazur, Word Games]; Diane H. Mazur, Sex and Lies:
Rules of Ethics, Rules of Evidence, and Our Conflicted Views on the Significance of Honesty,
14 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 679, 690-94 (2000) [hereinafter Mazur, Sex and
Lies]. See generally Tobias B. Wolff, Compelled Affirmations, Free Speech, and the U.S
Military's Don't Ask, Don't Tell Policy, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1141 (1997).
316. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(14) (2000) (codifying "Don't Ask, Don'tTell" policy) (quoting one
of the fifteen statutory reasons why gay citizens should not serve in the military).
317. 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
318. Id. at 351n.3.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 351.
321. See id. at 354 (noting again that the military was a "society separate from civilian
society" and that military service required "a respect for duty and a discipline without
counterpart in civilian life").
322. See Zillman & Imwinkelried, supra note 238, at 422-27, for a discussion of the
Vietnam-era litigation concerning hair regulations in the armed services. I have seen male
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disaffected victims of the draft, because even the most hardcore ofyoung military men
had haircuts that would not have appeared strange in a professional civilian setting.3"
It was important to servicemembers not to be so obviously different from their civilian
peers, and it remained important long after opposition to the Vietnam War might have
provided some justification for concealing a military identity. Today, in contrast,
military haircuts are often designed to separate a servicemember from civilian society,
to define a servicemember as different and apart. Extremely shaved styles that would
be considered inappropriate for a civilian professional are chosen for just that
reason-they identify a servicemember as not civilian.324
Brown v. Glines solidified an understanding that it was appropriate, even necessary,
to protect a "separate" military and its servicemembers from dissent. It is admittedly
difficult in some circumstances to draw a line between eliminating dissent and
preventing insubordination, but the Court has never considered it necessary to try. If
the military is willing to state, for example, that exposure to particular information
poses "a clear danger to military loyalty, discipline, or morale,"3' the Court will defer
to that judgment without consideration of the greater danger that its deference will
further isolate the military from the civilian society it protects.3' The primary intent
seems to be to protect military personnel from information and not merely to preserve
the responsiveness of command, because the Court equates cases involving speechby
servicemembers with cases involving speechby civilians.327 The military should have
servicemembers comb their hair straight up from the ears and lacquer it in position with hair
gel in an attempt to comply with a regulation that required hair to be off the ears. I have seen
male servicemembers structure an entire day at work in a way that would not require them to
come indoors and remove their hats, which would reveal an excess of hair.
323. Haircuts are difficult to describe without a picture. The recent controversy concerning
former Senator Bob Kerrey's service in Vietnam prompted news organizations to publish
pictures of Kerrey and other members of his Navy SEAL (Sea-Air-Land) special operations
unit, and the pictures provide good illustrations of typical military haircuts of the time. See
Gregory L. Vistica, What Happenedin Thanh Phong, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2001, (Magazine),
at 50, 51-53, 55 (featuring pictures of Kerrey and his Navy. colleagues taken during the
Vietnam War).
324. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expressed a degree of disgust with the behavior of
Captain Glines, although it found the Air Force's restrictions on petitions to be unconstitutional
prior restraints. In describing Glines's motivation for the petition, it sarcastically noted that
"Air Force standards describing maximum hair length offended him." See Glines v. Wade, 586
F.2d 675, 677 (9th Cir. 1978), rev'd, Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. at 348. The Ninth Circuit also
criticized Glines for shaving his head in protest. See id. Ironically, twenty years later, Glines'
act of protest would have produced a perfectly normal military haircut.
325. See Glines, 444 U.S. at 355.
326. See id. at 368 (Brennan, ., dissenting) ("All that the Court offers to palliate these fatal
constitutional infirmities is a series of platitudes about the special nature and overwhelming
importance of military necessity."). Brennan observed, correctly, that "the concept of military
necessity is seductively broad, and has a dangerous plasticity." Id. at 369.
327. In upholding a restriction on servicemember speech in Brown v. Glines, the Court
relied primarily on Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976), which upheld a restriction on civilian
speech in areas of a military post open to the public. See Glines, 444 U.S. at 353-58. During
the Rehnquist era, the Court has progressively backed away from its decision in Flower v.
United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972), the only instance in which it overruled military choice with
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a greater interest in controlling the speech of its own people because that speech
potentially could drift across a line into insubordination, interference with mission
effectiveness, or loss of public trust in the military's ability to operate in a politically
neutral manner. 2' There is no reason, however, tbat the military's interest in
controlling what its people hear should be the same.
Isolationism carries a greater threat to the military and to our constitutional sense
of civilian-military relations than the risks imposed by exchange of views and
information across the civilian-military divide. Isolationism decays the military from
within. Donald Zillman has argued that "the attitude toward free speech in the military
can influence the type of military personnel serving the nation." '3 29 The most
dangerous military, in fact, "may be the one with the 'isolated-garrison' mentality."
330
Rehnquist has relentlessly fostered the isolated-garrison mentality, encouraging
servicemembers to see themselves as separate from civilian society and encouraging
civilian society to view the military in the same divorced fashion. The Court's analysis
of First Amendment issues in a military context has dovetailed perfectly with its
endorsement of constitutional separatism between civilian and military matters,
granting generous deference to the military to control the flow of information to
servicemembers, and even the flow of information between servicemembers. This is
the very circumstance in which courts should not simply defer to military judgment.
When speech restrictions have the effect of isolating the military from civilian society,
thereby impairing the traditional constitutional balance of civilian-military relations,
courts should hold those restrictions to the same standards that would apply in any
non-military governmental context.
On one occasion, earlier in Rehnquist's tenure, the Court revealed a glimpse of
understanding concerning the importance of a shared military-civilian ethic. Although
the moment may now have passed, given the sharp constitutional turn of the last
generation, the moment remains instructive. The decision involved an attempt by
editors of a law review to obtain information from the military for purposes of a study
respectto civilian speech in public areas ofmilitary installations. See United States v. Albertini,
472 U.S. 675 (1985) (upholding the military's decision to bar civilian protest against nuclear
weapons policy during a base "Open House" event; distinguishing Flower and following Greer
v. Spock); see also Spock, 424 U.S. at 834-38.
328. For example, the UCMJ prohibits commissioned officers from using "contemptuous
words against the President." 10 U.S.C. § 888 (2000). See generally John G. Kester, Soldiers
Who Insult the President: An Uneasy Look at Article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1697 (1968). In 1993, duringthe summer of congressional hearings
concerning military service by gay citizens, Air Force Major General [two star] Harold N.
Campbell made public reference to the Commander-in-Chief as "skirt-chasing, .... draft
dodging," and "dope smoking." General Campbell was reprimanded, fined, and forced to retire.
See Michael R. Gordon, General Ousted for Derisive Remarks About President, N.Y. TIMES,
June 19, 1993, at A9.
329. Zillman, supra note 246, at 433.
330. Id. at 444; see also Glines, 444 U.S. at 371 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The forced
absence of peaceful expression only creates the illusion of good order; underlying dissension
remains to flow into the more dangerous channels of incitement and disobedience. In that
sense, military efficiency is only disserved when First Amendment rights are devalued.");
Dienes, supra note 14, at 818 (arguing that restrictions on speech can foster "resentment and
alienation" within the military).
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of military ethics. In Department of the Air Force v. Rose,33' Michael Rose, a New
York University Law Review editor who was also a graduate of the Air Force
Academy and an Air Force officer, sought access under the Freedom of Information
Ace32 to summaries of honor code hearings-with personal references
redacted-conducted at the Air Force Academy. The Air Force had refused Rose's
riquest, arguing that the summaries were exempt from disclosure as matters relating
to internal personnel rules and practices.
In an opinion crafted by Justice Brennan, however, the majority correctly viewed
the controversy as something far more significant than just a bureaucratic personnel
policy. Although Parker v. Lev33 had been decided two years earlier, leaving the
majority to scramble over a barricade ofjudicial deference," Rose seemed to impose
a responsibility on the military that matched the special constitutional immunity
Parker v. Levy had awarded to exercises of military judgment. While the Court
grounded its opinion in statutory interpretation rather than in constitutional obligation,
the Court also recognized that questions of concern to the military cannot be resolved
without attention to the nature of civilian-military relations under the Constitution.
Information concerning honor code practices should have been disclosed, in the
Court's view, because the military's "essential integrity [was] critical to the military's
relationship with its civilian direction.""33 The distinctiveness of the military's system
of discipline gave it a public relevance that could not be outweighed by the military's
factually weak claims of inconvenience or invasion ofprivacy.336 The Court concluded
that "[the implication for the general public of the Academy's administration of
discipline is obvious, particularly so in light of the unique role of the military.
' 337
331. 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
332. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
333. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
334. See Rose, 425 U.S. at 367 (stating that the military "constitutes a specialized
community governed by a separate discipline"). The Rose court quoted Orloffv. Willoughby,
345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953), in its original language instead of the Rehnquist-adjusted format in
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. at 744, which was used to recast the military as a "society apart"
instead of a community with a separate system of discipline.
335. Rose, 425 U.S. at 368.
336. See id. at 389-90 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguingthatredaction was impractical and
that, without redaction, release of the records would constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy). Interestingly, Chief Justice Burger's dissent relied to a greater degree on
notions of military immunity than did Rehnquist's dissent. Burger found the law review's
request for information "highly unusual" and the Air Force Academy's honor system "unique."
Id. at 382 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). He cited Parker v. Levy and Orloff v. Willoughby for
illustrations of the great shame that "allegations of dishonor among commissioned officers"
carry throughout military and civilian society, and he feared that the same stigma would be
visited upon those individuals involved in honor-code proceedings even after redaction of
identifying information. Id. at 383-84. Furthermore, Burger saw no real need for the
information, characterizing the law review's request as nothing more than "willingness to
subject an individual citizen to the risk of possible severe damage to his reputation simply to
permit law students to invade individual privacy to prepare a law journal article." Id. at 384.
337. Id. at 367.
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2. Military Judgment and the Establishment of Caste
This Article began with the narrow constitutional core of civilian-military relations,
and traced the lines carefully drawn by the Court to distinguish matters of internal
military governance and regulation from those military judgments of greater
constitutional significance. Rehnquist blurred those historical lines and created a new
jurisprudence of civilian-military relations under the Constitution in which military
judgment could have far greater influence within civilian society. His principle of
constitutional separatism with respect to the military was in some ways paradoxical.
He characterized the military as a society apart from civilian society, yet that
separateness seemed to operate in only one direction. Rehnquist's constitutional
separatism demanded a healthy judicial deference to military judgment, but it failed
to restrict the collateral consequences that military judgment might impose on civilian
citizens, or on the relationship between military and civilian society. The Court
reinforced this separatist perspective in two ways. It gave the military greater
discretion to insulate its personnel from "nonconforming" civilian information by
restricting civilian speech on public areas ofmilitary property. Less directly, the Court
reinforced its separatist perspective by encouraging the military to view itself not only
as separate, but as above, civilian society. The Court worked to instill a belief that
evolving constitutional expectations were somehow beneath the military, and that the
military's own ethical sense of character and discipline was a more effective measure
in evaluating military judgment.
Rehnquist's transformation of civilian-military relations had its most significant
impact in two Supreme Court decisions of the 1980s. Rostker v. Goldberg3 ' and
Goldman v. Weinberger'9 illustrated the reach ofthe Court's progressively expanding
principle ofjudicial deference to military judgment. Deference to the military had
been recast as a moral principle, not as an understanding grounded in constitutional
structure and text. Historical wariness of the potential collateral consequences of
military judgment had been forgotten as precedent and was re-written to accommodate
the cultural crisis of the Vietnam War era. Under the Rehnquist view of civilian-
military relations, however, the Court was prepared to take another step. In Rostker
v. Goldberg and Goldman v. Weinberger, the Court would do more than just
conveniently disregard the collateral consequences that militaryjudgment imposed on
civilian society. The Court would establish a principle of deference to military
judgment that operated even if claims of military necessity were employed for the
purpose ofimposing collateral consequences on civilians and influencing socialpolicy
within civilian society."0 These two decisions were the two most consequential
decisions concerning constitutional control of the military of the twentieth century,
and Rehnquist authored both.
Rostker v. Goldberg is the better known of the two cases. Rostker involved an equal
protection challenge to Congress's decision to register men, but not women, for a
military draft.' The case, however, offered little in elaboration of the Court's
338. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
339. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
340. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 506-10; see also Rostker, 453 U.S. at 64-83.
341. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 59-63.
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developing principles of equal protection on the basis of sex, because its military
context completely overshadowed its constitutional context. It should be noted at the
outset that Rostker raised an issue without historical parallel before the Court: whether
citizens who wanted to serve in the military (or in this case, register for potential
service) could be rejected nonetheless. The Court's draft-related controversies before
Rostker had always involved citizens seeking to evade compulsory military service,
or seeking to evade the consequences of evading military service. 42 As discussed in
Part I.D, the Court has generally resolved draft issues without needing to resort to any
particular deference to militaryjudgment. The Constitutiongrantedpowerto Congress
to raise arnies by either volunteer or compulsory means, and that conclusion alone
was sometimes sufficient to resolve the matter. 3 If the petitioner raised claims
requiring heightened judicial scrutiny, such as claims grounded in religious freedom,
the Court analyzed them in accordance with prevailing nonmilitary precedent.3" With
the exception of Rostker, interestingly, even the Rehnquist-era Court resolved draft
issues without relying on special deference to the military. 5 Issues related to drafting
civilians would, by definition, have little connection to the core Article I function of
internal military governance and regulation.
342. The Court never had the opportunity to uphold or overturn military policies requiring
racial segregation. The armed services were desegregated by the executive order of President
Truman in 1948. See Karst, supra note 14, at 520; see also F. Michael Higginbotham, Soldiers
for Justice: The Role ofthe Tuskegee Airmen in the Desegregation ofAmerican ArmedForces,
8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 273, 291 (2000). In United States ex rel. Lynn v. Downer, 140
F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1944), the only case contesting the military's policies of segregation, the
petitioner objected to racially separate draft "calls," or "requisitions calling for a specified
number of whites and a specified number of Negroes for induction during a given month and
based on relative racial proportions of the men registered with a local board and subject to call
for induction." Lynn, 140 F.2d at 400. The segregated draft calls were upheld under the
"separate but equal" authority ofPlessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See Lynn, 140 F.2d
at 401.
343. See Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1918) (upholding the
constitutionality of compulsory military service against claims that the draft violated religious
freedoms and constituted involuntary servitude prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment).
344. See, e.g., Gillette v.. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450-52 (1971). Gillette, upheld the
constitutionality of draft laws that denied conscientious-objector status to draftees opposing
only a particular war but not all wars; the distinction was neutral with respect to religious
affiliation or belief. Id.
345. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S.- 598, 608 (1985) (upholding "passive
enforcement" policy with respect to evasion of draft registration, under which only those
nonregistrants who announced their intent not to register to the government, or who were
reported by others, would be investigated and prosecuted; selective prosecution claims should
bejudged "according to ordinary equal protection standards"); see also Pers.Adm'r v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256 (1979) (holding that military veteran's preference in civil service employment
did not violate equal protection despite disparate impact on women; preference was gender-
neutral and not enacted for the purpose of discriminating against women); Johnson v. Robison,
415 U.S. 361 (1974) (rejecting equal protection and free exercise challenges to draft law that
awarded greater educational benefits to veterans of military service than those who performed
alternative civilian service as conscientious objectors; classification was rational and advanced
the secular purpose of assisting readjustment from military life).
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Rosiker would change the equation entirely. Because the claim arose in a military
context, the Court assumed from the outset that standard constitutional principles
would not apply. Writing for the majority, Rehnquist constructed a principle of
judicial deference to matters of military concern that was novel even in comparison
to his deferential language in Parker v. Levy seven years earlier.' In Parker v. Levy,
deference was at least grounded in the Court's traditional understanding of the
constitutional latitude given to the military to exercise discretion within a narrow
range of internal military activity. 47 Rehnquist stated this long-standing principle in
terms that were more general than warranted (and misrepresented precedent in order
to do so), but his Parker v. Levy opinion still preserved a small connection between
deference and the specific nature of the military function to which it applied. In
Rosiker, however, the historical link to the core constitutional function of internal
military discipline disappeared. Deference was required, inRehnquist's view, simply
because the Constitution had expressly granted powers to Congress with respect to the
armed forces. He noted that "Congress explicitly relied upon its constitutional powers
under Art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14," which "'commit[] exclusively to the Congress the
powers to raise and support armies, provide and maintain a Navy, and make rules for
Government and regulation of the land and naval forces."'M' It is curious, however,
thatRehnquistwould propose special deference when Congress acts "under an explicit
constitutional grant of authority,"349 because Congress always acts under an explicit
constitutional grant of authority.3
346. Rehnquist still did, of course, mention all the reliable standards in exhorting deference
to exercises of military discretion. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 65-66 (citing Parker v. Levy, 417
U.S. 733 (1974); see also Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973); Orloffv. Willoughby, 345
U.S. 83 (1953)). The district court had drawn the reasonable distinction between Rostker and
the Kent State decision of Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973), noting that broad questions
of policy in the draft registration system did not implicate day-to-day supervision of military
operations or discipline. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 68-69.
347. See Levy, 417 U.S. at 746-49.
348. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 65 (quoting in part S. REP. NO. 96-826, at 160 (1980), reprinted
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2612,2650).
349. Id. at 70.
350. See U.S. CONST. art. I. IfRehnquist's principle ofjudicial deference is correct, then the
Court should defer on a consistent basis to all exercises of congressional power under Article
1, Section 8, including the exercise of congressional power to regulate commerce among the
several states. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. But see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (second-guessing congressional findings with respect to
commerce-clause-based legislation); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Rehnquist,
C.J.) (same).
The only apparent consistency seems to be that Rehnquist defines Article I powers, and any
principle of judicial deference to those powers, as necessary to uphold claims of military
necessity. In Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987), another Rehnquist majority
opinion, Rehnquist argued that all Article I, Section 8 powers should be read consistently with
one another. Of course, in Solorio the question was whether the grant of power under the
military clauses was as comprehensive as the grant of power under other Section 8 clauses, not
whether the Court's obligation of deference under the various clauses should be the same:
The constitutional grant of power to Congress to regulate the Armed Forces,
Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, appears in the same section as do the provisions granting
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In choosing to relieve women from the responsibility of draft registration, Congress
exercised its constitutional powers to raise and govern the armed forces for the
purpose of maintaining traditional gender relationships within civilian society.
Congress was not subtle in its intent, arguing that registration of women for military
service was inappropriate because it upset our traditional understanding about the role
of women in civilian society. Rehnquist deferred to that congressional purpose,"'
although prevailing equal protection principles would have required the Court to
reject, not defer to, legislative justifications based on 'archaic and overbroad'
generalizations"'3' and "misconceptions concerning the role of females in the home
rather than in the 'marketplace and world of ideas."' 3"
Congress authority, inter alia, to regulate commerce among the several States, to
coin money, and to declare war. On its face there is no indication that the grant
of power in Clause 14 was any less plenary than the grants of other authority to
Congress in the same section.
Id. at 441; see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 224-25 (1944) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (arguing that the constitutional military power used to intern citizens of
Japanese ancestry should be construed as broadly as, for example, the constitutional power
to regulate commerce). Similarly, there is no indication in the text or structure of the
Constitution that judicial deference to congressional action in military matters should be
any different in scope than judicial deference to congressional action in other contexts.
351. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 83.
352. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) (quoting Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S.
498, 508 (1975)).
353. Id. at 199 (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7,15 (1975)). Distinctions on the basis
of sex are subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. "[Cjlassifications
by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives." Id. at 197. As a matter of law, legal distinctions grounded
in stereotypical generalizations about the behavior or character of men and women cannot be
"substantially related" to achievement of an important governmental objective. Id. at 198-99.
As a matter of law, "administrative ease or convenience" cannot constitute an important
governmental objective. Id. at 198. It should go without saying-but, unfortunately, it does
not-that the maintenance or endorsement of stereotypical generalizations about the sexes
cannot itself serve as an important governmental objective.
Two earlier equal protection decisions concerned distinctions on the basis on sex in a
military context. In Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), the Court upheld a naval
promotion system in which female officers were given more time to advance in rank before
involuntary separation under an "up or out" promotion system. The Court concluded that
women were not "similarly situated" in relation to men for purposes of equal protection
analysis, and therefore they could be treated differently than men. In 1975, women were barred
from sea duty and less likely to receive favorable "ticket-punching" duty assignments helpful
for promotion, and so the Navy attempted to level the playing field by extending the maximum
time in grade for women. Id. at 508. Schlesinger v. Ballard echoes Rostker in that, in both
cases, one legal facial classification on the basis of sex-exclusion from combat or combat-
related duty-was used as the justification for imposing another. Apparently, as long as the
classification being challenged is one step removed from an underlying classification that is
based on "archaic and overbroad generalizations" about women, the former is still
constitutionally valid. See generally Diane H. Mazur, Re-Making Distinctions on the Basis of
Sex: Must Gay Women BeAdmittedto the MilitaryEven if Gay Men Are Not?, 58 OHio ST. L.J.
953, 963-67 (1997) (analyzing in more detail the Supreme Court's jurisprudence related to
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Because the context was military and not civilian, however, constitutional expectation
would be turned on its head. It was permissible, in Rehnquist's view, to exclude
women from military obligation on the basis of sex because "'[t]he principle that
women should not intentionally and routinely engage in combat is fundamental, and
enjoys wide support among our [civilian] people.""'35 Although military officials
believed that registration of women would promote military effectiveness, it was
permissible to overrule military judgment based on "the current [civilian] thinking as
to the place of women in the Armed Services.""35 Rather than require the government
to demonstrate a specific military need to exclude women from registration, it was
permissible to reverse the usual standard of constitutional review and ask instead
whether there was a military necessity to include them.35
Congress's purpose should never have been worthy of judicial deference under a
traditional understanding ofconstitutional civilian-military relations, because its effect
was not confined to the maintenance of good order and discipline within the armed
forces. Congress intended, in fact, that the sex-based registration policy would have
its primary effect within civilian society, not within the military. It concluded that
military women).
In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), the Court invalidated a sex-based policy
that may have been found unconstitutional even under rational basis review. Frontiero, 411
U.S. at 691. Sharron Frontiero, an Air Force lieutenant, challenged a Department of Defense
policy under which all married, male servicemembers received extra housing and medical
benefits on behalf oftheir spouses, butmarried, female servicemembers received those benefits
only if they could demonstrate that their husbands were financially dependent on their military
salaries. Id. at 680-81. Frontiero's husband received federal financial aid for college, and so
he was not technically dependent on his wife for his living expenses. Id. at 680 n.4. Therefore,
Frontiero did notqualify for the same salary paid to married men of equal rank. Id. at 679-81.
(The military apparently made no effort to discover how many military wives received college
financial aid or other government benefit that might render them "non-dependent.") The
government argued that the distinction served a purpose of administrative convenience in
identifying spouses who were financially dependent. Id. at 683, 688. Because most wives in
our society were financially dependent on their husbands, it was more efficient to assume that
male servicemembers would meet the test, but require female servicemembers to prove spousal
dependency. Id. at 688-89. Even if one assumes that these benefits were intended as
compensation for a spouse's financial dependence-there was no evidence offered on that
point-the government's position was irrational. ("Because most civilian wives do not work
and are therefore financially dependent, let us apply that assumption to a situation in which the
wife is a salaried professional.') Not surprisingly, Rehnquist was the only Justice to dissent in
Frontiero v. Richardson. Id. at 691 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). I would suggest that actual
dependency was never the justification for additional compensation when the recipients were
always men; it was a standard expectation for married personnel'regardless of their personal
financial circumstances. The policy became one of "dependency" only when women arrived
on the scene.
354. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 77 (1981) (quoting S. REP. No. 96-826, at 157
(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2612,2647).
355. Id. at 71'.
356. Id. at 80 (quoting then-Senator Sam Nunn as stating "there was no military necessity
cited by any witnesses for the registration of females"). Rehnquist obscured the issue of an
appropriate standard of review by declining to state one. Id. at 69-70 (making a mocking
reference to the phrase "levels of scrutiny").
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women should be exempt from the draft because it conflicted with the role that
civilian society wished them to play, and in Rostker v. Goldberg, Rehnquist allowed
Congress to employ its constitutional military powers to enforce that unconstitutional
purpose.3 57 Deference to military-based judgment rises to the level of constitutional
violation when employed as a diversionary tactic to evade constitutional limitation.
The practice is most pernicious, however, when employed to establish or preserve
assumptions of caste among citizens within civilian society. It allows women to be
identified by law as different and lesser citizens, provided Congress justifies
traditional gender roles in terms of military necessity.38 Equal protection under the
Constitution can mean something different and lesser for women, provided Congress
justifies that deprivation in terms of military necessity. This is the legacy of Rostker
v. Goldberg, the decision that legitimized use of military judgment as a judicially
nonreviewable and nonconstitutional means of affecting social policy within civilian
society.
357. Rehnquist assumes, for reasons that are unclear, that the majoritarian oversight of
Congress will be sufficiently protective of individual civil liberties in a military context,
therefore obviating the need for judicial review. In Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 176
(1994), Rehnquist wrote for the majority: "Congress, of course, is subject to the requirements
of the Due Process Clause when legislating in the area of military affairs, and that Clause
provides some measure of protection to defendants in military proceedings." Weiss, 510 U.S.
at 176; see also United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 43 (1955) (Reed, Burton
& Minton, JJ., dissenting) ("If trial of discharged servicemen by courts-martial ... seems harsh
or hurtful to liberty, the door of Congress remains open for amelioration."). Rehnquist's
assumption is particularly unwarranted, and dangerous, in an era in which congressional
military powers have been usedfor thepurpose of evading constitutional limitation.
Rehnquist also assumes, for reasons that are equally unclear, that it is permissible for
Congress to legislate on the basis of stereotypical gender assumptions provided Congress does
so deliberately, and not negligently or accidentally. In justifying the sex-based distinction in
Rosiker v. Goldberg, Rehnquist attempted to distinguish precedent that condemned
discrimination against males as an ...accidental byproduct ofa traditional way ofthinking about
females"' and equally repugnant under the Equal Protection Clause. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 74
(quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment)). Rather than focusing on the substantively important aspect of the statement-that
legal distinctions grounded in stereotype are impermissible-Rehnquist seized on the word
"accidental" and asserted that deliberate reliance on stereotypical assumptions was
constitutional. Id. He reviewed the congressional record, which indicated a deliberate intent
to use the constitutional military power to perpetuate a traditional understanding of gender
roles in society, and then proudly announced that this deliberateness transformed the
unconstitutional into the constitutional. Id. "The foregoing clearly establishes that the decision
to exempt women from registration was not the 'accidental byproduct of a traditional way of
thinking about females."' Id. (quoting Califano, 430 U.S. at 223 (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment)).
358. By excluding women from the draft, Congress "categorically excludes women from a
fundamental civic obligation." Rosiker, 453 U.S. at 86 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting);
see also Linda K. Kerber, "A Constitutional Right to be Treated Like... Ladies": Women,
Civic Obligation and Military Service, 1993 U. CHu. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 95 (providing
historical background to the Rostker controversy and analyzing the case in context of women's
citizenship); Mazur, supra note 222 (arguing for greater feminist support of military service
by women).
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Rostker v. Goldberg was not the first time the Court would brand citizens as
different and lesser under the guise of military necessity, but it was the first time the
Court would do so and not have the decision termed a disaster. 59 In Korematsu v.
United States,360 the Court validated the World War II internment of United States
citizens of Japanese ancestry on the basis of military judgment that persons of their
race posed a threat to the war effort.16 ' Korematsu was an outlier not only in a moral
context, but also in terms of the Court's understanding of civilian-military relations
under the Constitution. The internment policy did not relate to internal governance
and discipline of the armed forces in any way; its consequences were brought to bear
on civilians exclusively. Under prevailing principles defining the scope of deference
to military judgment, the internment policy clearly would not qualify as an exercise
of military discretion protected from substantive judicial review. Following the end
of the war, the Court returned to the same narrow understanding of the constitutionally
protected core of military activity it had observed before Korematsu. It scrutinized
military or congressional decisions made under a banner of military necessity
whenever they exceeded the scope of the military's disciplinary sphere or imposed
consequences on civilians or on civilian society.
Policies such as those at issue inRostker and Korematsu cross the line because they
operate primarily to exclude persons rather than to regulate conduct, although at some
level the policies might be justified tangentially in concerns for discipline. Under the
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, for example, the military argues that if gay citizens
are not excluded from military service, good order and discipline will suffer.3 62 The
military also contends that if it does not exclude women from certain military duties,
such as submarine duty, good order and discipline will be affected. 63 In both
instances, concern for discipline is the red herring. Discipline only suffers, if it does
at all, as a result of the resentment expressed by those denied the opportunity to
exclude persons as they wish. As a matter of law, the military should not be permitted
to justify the exclusion or restriction of persons identified as a group on the basis of
military discipline." Disciplinary concerns are inherently individual, and they always
359. Rostow, supra note 117.
360. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
361. The Court's deference was complete and without question. "There was no testimony
or other evidence in the record as to the facts which governed the judgment of the military in
entering the orders in question. They were not required to support the action they had taken by
producing evidence as to the need for it." Rostow, supra note 117, at 507; see also Hirabayashi
v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding curfew restrictions imposed against persons
of Japanese ancestry on the basis of assertions of military necessity).
362. "The presence in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent
to engage in homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of
morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military
capability." 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(15) (2000) (codifying "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy).
363. See, e.g., Steven Lee Myers, New Debate on Submarine Dutyfor Women, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 1999, at Al (noting the Navy's objection that "putting women side by side with men
in the extraordinarily tight confines of a submarine would disrupt the-crew and compromise its
war-fighting ability").
364. Justice Murphy, dissenting in Korematsu v. United States, observed that deference to
military judgment is least warranted when based on assumptions about groups. 323 U.S. at
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have been, throughout the Court's pre-Rehnquist history ofcivilian-militaryrelations.
Goldman v. Weinberger" was the second Rehnquist-authored decision to use
military judgment as a means of identifying persons as less than worthy to represent
the nation as members of the armed forces. In this instance, caste was imposed on the
basis of religion rather than on the basis of sex, and the opinion demonstrates how
easily an intent to exclude persons can be obscured by justifications grounded in
military discipline. Air Force Captain S. Simcha Goldman was a military clinical
psychologist and an Orthodox Jew.3" He had customarily worn a yarmulke while in
uniform, which was visible while he was working indoors at the base health clinic but
hidden by his military service cap when outdoors.36 Following Goldman's testimony
as a defense witness at a court-martial, however, and prompted by the prosecutor's
complaint concerning his yarmulke, Goldman was ordered to stop wearing it while in
uniform.36 Air Force regulations on personal appearance and the wearing of uniforms
generally prohibit the use of "headgear" indoors. 69 Goldman objected to the
restriction, and in response his commander imposed an administrative form of
punishment called a letter of reprimand, threatened him with court-martial, and
withdrew a previous recommendation to extend his stay of active service.7
Rehnquist, not surprisingly, constructed an opinion that upheld military judgment
against Goldman's claim that the military had infringed upon his right to freely
exercise his religion."' Rehnquist incorporated all the same repetitive references about
separate societies, discipline and duty, the military's moral values, and the
incompetence of courts, all of which compelled judicial deference to military
judgment." As in Rostker, Rehnquist also made the curious argument that judicial
239-40 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Ajudgment does not become a militaryjudgmentjust because
it is made by the military:
A militaryjudgment based upon such racial and sociological considerations is not
entitled to the great weight ordinarily given the judgments based upon strictly
military considerations. Especially this is so when every charge relative to race,
religion, culture, geographic location, and legal and economic status has been
substantially discredited by independent studies made by experts in these matters.
Id. at 239-40 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Murphy's comments would have been just as applicable
in response to the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" ban on military service by gay citizens. The policy
was never based on "strictly military considerations"; it was motivated instead by
"misinformation, half-truths and insinuations" about gay citizens as a group. See id. at 239.
Likewise, in Rostker v. Goldberg, the military's stated need for female inductees was
subordinated to congressional generalizations about appropriate gender roles for women as a
group. 453 U.S. 57 (1981); see also Nanette Dembitz, RacialDiscrimination and the Military
Judgment: The Supreme Court's Korematsu and Endo Decisions, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 175,
205-07 (1945) (noting that no military information or expertise was at issue in Korematsu).
365. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
366. For the facts underlying Captain Goldman's challenge, see Goldman, 475 U.S. at 504-
05.
367. Id. at 505.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 506-10.
372. Id. at 507-508 (citing the standard generalities from Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296
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deference is required whenever Congress acts pursuant to a power specifically
enumerated in Article L"' The most disturbing aspect of Goldman v. Weinberger,
however, was not the specific decision to prohibit Goldman from wearing a yarmulke.
The proper constitutional balance between the military's interest in preserving
uniformity and limiting expressions of individuality, on the one hand, and a
servicemember's interest in following the dictates of religious belief, on the other,
presented a difficult factual question. Justice Stevens raised a fairpoint in concurrence
when he questioned whether a case-by-case evaluation of the obtrusiveness of various
religious accoutrements might interfere more with religious exercise than the
military's bright-line rule against the wearing of any visible religious symbol. 74
Rehnquist, however, saw the question in very simple terms, and his opinion was
dismissive of those who would question military judgment for any reason."' The
military wanted to enforce a headgear policy in a manner that would result in the
exclusion of Orthodox Jews (andprobably others ofvarious non-Christian faiths) from
military service." 6 In justification of that policy, the military was willing to assert that
uniformity of appearance was essential to the maintenance of military discipline.3"
For Rehnquist, that was the end of the story. Judicial deference to military judgment
required the Court to accept the government's stated interest at face value and accord
it priority over competing constitutional concerns, although standard First Amendment
analysis would require otherwise.37 " The Court would not ask the military to explain
why some forms of uniformity were apparently more important than others. It would
not ask the military to explain the factual unsoundness or convenient inconsistency of
its contentions.379 It was enough that the military's actions were taken in the name of
(1983); see also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348
(1980); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738
(1975); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); Orloffv. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953)).
373. Id. at 508 (justifying judicial deference on the basis that "the military authorities have
been charged by the Executive and Legislative Branches with carrying out our Nation's
military policy").
374. Id. at 510 (Stevens, White & Powell, JJ., concurring) (favoring an objective "visibility"
standard and suggesting that under a more subjective, multifactored standard, senior military
officials might find religiously motivated turbans or dreadlocks more obtrusive than
yarmulkes).
375. Id. at 507-10.
376. See id. at 505.
377. Id. at 508.
378. Under Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963), the government is required to specify an important state interest that justifies the
burden imposed on religious exercise.
379. The military's concern for uniformity of appearance is undermined by a degree of
inconsistency and disingenuousness. The majority opinion noted in passing that the Air Force
regulation governing the wearing of uniforms was 190 pages long. See Goldman, 475 U.S. at
508. Rehnquist seemed to rely on its length as evidence of a very specific uniformity, but its
length was dictated much more by the liberal array of uniforms approved for use by Air Force
personnel. For a sampling of the variety of uniforms worn just by members of the Air Force,
see the current version of the regulation, which illustrates service dress (with coat and tie),
jacket-less office attire (with either short or long sleeves), mess dress, semiformal dress, battle
dress, hospital white, and food service styles of uniforms, with maternity options for all of the
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military discipline ormilitary effectiveness, and by virtue ofthat assumption alone and
not the reality of military necessity, Goldman could be effectively excluded fron
military service. "The Court and the military services have presented patriotic
Orthodox Jews with a painful dilemma-the choice between fulfilling a religious
obligation and serving their country."'35 As a final insult, Rehnquist's language would
stigmatize Goldman, by virtue of his nonmajority religious beliefs, as selfish and as
lacking commitment to a higher duty. Rehnquist reminded us all that "[t]he essence
of military service 'is the subordination of the desires and interests of the individual
to the needs of the service.'
391
Not until Goldman v. Weinberger did several members of the .Court fully
understand the enormity of the transformation in civilian-military relations that
Rehnquist had achieved. The same Rehnquist who had derided varying levels of
judicial scrutiny in equal protection cases3'8 had constructed yet another: the "sub-
above. See Dress and Personal Appearance of Air Force Personnel, Air Force Instruction 36-
2903 (June 8, 1998), available at http://afpubs.hq.af.mil/afpubs.stm.
If Captain Goldman had served in the Army, the military's interest in uniformity would have
declined further. The Army has a reputation for its many permutations of uniform styles and
combinations, along with an incredible array of individual badges, insignia, and other
accoutrements to wear on the uniform. See Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and
Insignia, Army Regulation 670-1 (Sept. 1, 1992), availableathttp://www.usapa.army.mil/gils/.
The Army's beret controversy of 2000 provides a recent illustration of the supposed
"uniformity" of Army uniforms. The Army proposed that most of its personnel wear black
berets rather than green headgear such as the traditional wheel-shaped service cap or the flat,
foldable garrison or "flight" cap (at least when they were not wearing an organizational
baseball cap, a Battle Dress Uniform ("BDU") cap, a Desert BDU hat, or a cold-weather cap,
some of the other Army headgear options). See, e.g., Army Rangers Gather to Fight Beret
Order, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2001, at AI0. The only problem was that Army Rangers had
traditionally worn black berets, and they were offended that the run-of-the-mill, non-combat,
and sometimes female members of the Army would wear the same color. Id. The solution was
to continue with the black beret transformation, but allow the Rangers to wear tan berets
instead. Id. Special Forces personnel would continue to wear green berets, and Airborne
personnel would continue to wear maroon berets. See id. Given the Army's difficulty in
managing the variety of berets authorized for its personnel, Goldman's yarmulke seems
unproblematic in comparison.
Furthermore, Rehnquist is disingenuous when he suggests the military requires uniformity
in attire to "encouragefl the subordination of personal preferences and identities in favor of the
overall group mission." Goldman, 475 U.S. at 508. Rehnquist wrote: "Uniforms encourage a
sense of hierarchical unity by tending to eliminate outward individual distinctions except for
those of rank." Id. It would have been more accurate to state that the military encourages the
right kind of"outward individual distinctions." As observed by the dissenters, servicemembers
can wear rings or other jewelry that associate the wearer with a religious denomination or
ethnic organization. Id. at 518 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). The dissenters also could
have added that the military encourages servicemembers to wear "outward individual
distinctions" in the form of ribbons, badges, and other insignia that represent individual
accomplishment and serve to distinguish one servicemember from another, particularly with
respect to combat service.
380. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 524 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
381. Id. at 507 (quoting Orloffv. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 92 (1953)).
382. See supra note 345.
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rational" basis level of review applied to challenges against military judgment.8 3 As
Justices Brennan and Marshall observed, if "the military declares one of its rules
sufficiently important to outweigh a service person's constitutional rights, it seems that
the Court will accept that conclusion, no matter how absurd or unsupported it may
be."3M Deference to military judgment had grown so extreme as to "defy common
sense."3"5 Justice Blacknun noted that the Air Force had failed to articulate even a
"minimally credible explanation" for its decision; in his view, judgments that were not
reasoned judgments were unworthy of respect or deference.386 Finally, Rehnquist had
taken his principle of unquestioning deference to the military too far even for Justice
O'Connor, foreshadowing her dissent to Rehnquist's opinion in United States v.
Stanley387 one year later. O'Connor saw no reason not to evaluate military judgment
under the same constitutional standards applicable to every other government actor.388
She believed that judicial review as applied in a civilian context was "sufficiently
flexible to take into account the special importance of defending our Nation without
abandoning completely the freedoms that make it worth defending."'389 In Goldman
v. Weinberger, however, she concluded that the military had not even reached the
level ofplausibility in asserting that Goldman's religious practice was a threat to good
order and discipline.3
Neither Rostker v. Goldberg nor Goldman v. Weinberger were about military
discipline. They were about military resistance-resistance to constitutional
development, resistance to constitutional civilian-military relations, and resistance to
cultural change. In his recent book on civil liberties in wartime, Rehnquist wrote that
the military is "not entrusted with the protection of anyone's civil liberties., 39 His
statement was made for the purpose of softening the sheer wrongness of Korematsu
v. United States, but it could have been offered to temper Rehnquist's own efforts in
Parker v. Levy, Rostker v. Goldberg, Goldman v. Weinberger, and Solorio v. United
States as well.392 It serves to illustrate just how little Rehnquist understands about the
military and about civilian-military relations, because every member of the armed
forces, whether enlisted or commissioned, takes the following oath of office: "I (full
name) do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United
States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; [and] that I will bear true faith and
allegiance to the same .. .
383. See Goldman, 475 U.S. at 515 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
384. Id.
385. See id. at 516.
386. Id. at 526, 527 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
387. 483 U.S. 669 (1987); see also supra notes 306-11 and accompanying text.
388. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 709 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
389. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 530-31 (O'Connor & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
390. Id. at 532.
391. WILuAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CiviL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 204
(1998).
392. See Alfred C. Yen, Introduction: Praising With Faint Damnation-The Troubling
Rehabilitation of Korematsu, 40 B.C. L. REv. 1, 3 (1998) (criticizing the "detached
indifference" of Rehnquist's commentary on Korematsu).
393. TONER, supra note 271, at vii.
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I. MILITARY RESISTANCE AND THE CONSTITUTION
The most comprehensive treatment of judicial deference to the military in the
context of constitutional civilian-military relations was written by James Hirschhorn
eighteen years ago.394 His analysis was evenhanded in its attempt to balance a concern
for military culture and efficiency with attention to individual constitutional rights,
although his predisposition was fundamentally promilitary.395 Hirschhorn recognized
that the congressional military powers under the Constitution are, and should be,
limited in scope.3" Actions taken in the exercise of military discretion would exceed
constitutional bounds-and would be subject to judicial review-if in practice they
operated to impose collateral consequences on civilians or civilian society:
If benefits and burdens in the armed forces are allocated through an
unconstitutional flaw in the civilian society, the resulting decision lacks both
the institutional and technical credibility it would otherwise have. Moreover,
to the extent that the government's powers over the armed forces are used to
control the civilian political process, they destroy the existence of the free
public consent, which is the foundation of political judgment. In each of these
situations the courts should exercise their heightened standard of review to
confine the broad authority of the political branches to the relation between
the serviceman and the demands of the organization upon him.397
At the same time Hirschhorn identified the potential for misuse of congressional
power to govern and regulate the military, however, he also believed that Congress
could police itselfeffectivelywithout the need for judicial review."' He assumed there
was something inherently self-regulating about congressional power to govern the
military, although congressional powers in general typically receive no similar
dispensation:
Both the structure of Congress and its actual performance... demonstrate that
it can effectively mediate between military claims for subordination and the
principles of individual autonomy that are current in civilian society. As the
representative branch of the government, Congress presumably is competent
to balance the cost and benefit of conflicting policies according to the number
of represented persons who desire diverse goals and the intensity of their
conflicting desires.399
394. Hirschhorn, supra note 14.
395. The observation is not intended as criticism, as I consider this Article fundamentally
promilitary as well. We may differ, however, in our conclusions whether Rehnquist's
development of a "separate society" rationale in support of blanket judicial deference to
congressional judgment has benefited or weakened the military.
396. Hirschhorn, supra note 14, at 248-49.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 244-45 (citing examples of when Congress amended or abolished military
practices considered to be morally suspect, harmful, or ineffective, such as flogging).
399. Id. at 244; see also id. at 212-13 (relying on Congress's "representative character" to
ensure consent of the citizenry to congressional military judgment). Contrary to common
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The reference in this passage to the "actual performance" of Congress suggests how
sensitive the principle ofjudicial deference can be to time and place. In 1984, it was
still possible, for example, to minimize any concern that Congress would abuse its
power to define the parameters of military service for the purpose of perpetuating
traditional notions of gender.4') The United States had just emerged from a decade in
which Congress responded to litigation that challenged the military's restrictions on
the assignment of women by broadening opportunities for women, not by seeking
judicial deference to those limitations."' Times change, however, and a doctrine of
judicial deference to military judgment requires a justification more substantive than
just a general approval of the way military judgment happens to be exercised at the
time.
Seeds of the Rehnquist transformation already in progress could be found in
Hirschhorn's discussion of military discipline in terms of moral superiority. There
maybe no more accurate indicator, in fact, of a constitutional line about to be crossed
than open reliance on a moral justification for its crossing. Hirschhorn wrote that
assumption, the Court has not treated controversies involving war and foreign affairs as
nonjusticiable political questions. See Michael R. Belknap, Constitutional Law as Creative
Problem Solving: Could the Warren Court Have Ended the Vietnam War?, 36 CAL W. L. REV.
99, 111-16 (1999) (contending that the Court's involvement could have expedited resolution
of the Vietnam War).
400. See Hirschhom, supra note 14, at 245, 251 (noting development of congressional
interest in expanding opportunities for military women).
401. See Waldie v. Schlesinger, 509 F.2d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (dismissing motion for
summary judgment and allowing challenge to the male-only admissions policies of the federal
military academies to proceed); see also Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291 (D.D.C. 1978)
(finding the Navy's blanket restriction against sea-going service by women to be
unconstitutional). Congress allowed women to attend the federal military academies beginning
with the entering class of 1976. See Department of Defense Appropriation Act of 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-106, § 803(a), 89 Stat. 531, 537 (1975). Congress eased restrictions on sea duty for
women in 1978, allowing them to serve on "hospital ships, transports, and vessels of a similar
classification not expected to be assigned combat missions." Department of Defense
Appropriation Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-485, § 808, 92 Stat. 1611, 1623 (1978) (statutory
restrictions on sea duty for women repealed entirelyin 1993). In 1980, Congress also abolished
the sex-based officer promotion system upheld as a matter ofjudicial deference in Schlesinger
v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975). See Defense Officer Personnel Management Act, Pub. L. No.
96-513, 94 Stat. 2835 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
Owens v. Brown provides a good illustration of how constitutional claims in a military
context would be analyzed absent Rehnquist's influence. The trial court properly recognized
that a facial challenge to an across-the-board sex-based exclusion was distinguishable from the
claim in Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973), which sought continuingjudicial surveillance
of military weaponry and training. See Owens, 455 F. Supp. at 302. The trial court also
recognized that a purpose to perpetuate traditional gender roles was insufficient, as a matter of
law, tojustify the Navy's sex-based restriction on sea service. Id. In referring to the legislative
history of the restriction, the district court observed that "the sense of the discussion is that
section 6015's bar against assigning females to shipboard dutywas premised on the notion that
duty at sea is part of an essentially masculine tradition." Id. at 306. I have little doubt that the
decision in Owens v. Brown would have been reversed, and the sex-based restriction upheld,
had it reached the Supreme Court.
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"[t]he moral assumptions that underlie military discipline are opposed completely to
those which are embodied in the Bill of Rights," 2 with the implication that the
principles embodied in the Bill of Rights are somehow lacking in moral character. In
the context of the military, it is extremely difficult to dislodge the assumption that the
militaryholds some kind of morality-based exception to constitutionalprinciple. Even
Hirschhom, who clearly understood the constitutional limits of the military powers,
rationalized the exclusion of women from the draft in Rostker v. Goldberg by stating
that America was just not ready to rethink the public role of women to that
extent-and that this "moral" calculation was one for Congress to make. 3 The idea
that the participation of women in one of the fundamental activities of
citizenship-military service-is nothing more than a moral question subject to
majority choice is the single most pernicious consequence ofRehnquist's recasting of
civilian-military relations under the Constitution.
A. Formalism as an Escape From Responsibility
Goldman v. Weinberger has been criticized as representing the Court's
conceptualistic, categorical, and formalistic approach to the assessment ofgovernment
interest in "special exception" contexts such as the military.4' Claims of military
necessity are treated as though they raise uniformly indispensable concerns and are
entitled to uniformly unquestioning deference. There is no lesser and greater as far as
claims of military necessity are concerned; anything that could affect the military does
affect the military, and anything that does affect the military affects it with equal
gravity, automatically presenting an unacceptable risk of loss of life or detriment to
national security. Peacetime is equated with wartime, service within the United States
is equated with service in foreign territory, and the headgear worn by military clinical
psychologists is equated with the exigency of ground combat. There is no "gray area"
subject to judgment; there is not even black and white, which would suggest that
claims of military necessity could be sorted into those with merit and those without,
or those that are rational and those that are not. Every assertion of military necessity
is of one color, without gradation and of equal weight.
The contemporary military suffers from an acute fear of exercising judgment, which
tends to operate in tandem with an acute fear of accepting responsibility."' This
402. Hirschhorn, supra note 14, at 239.
403. In Hirschhom's view, women will be permitted to accept increasing military
responsibility only at a pace the majority finds appropriate for their sex:
Congress's refusal to apply draft registration to women ... reflects in part that a
substantial and vocal segment of the population apparently believed that gender
roles had not changed quite that much. Therefore, it considered that any military
gain from registration would be offset by the legal and political resistance
anticipated from these people.
Id. at 245.
404. See Dienes, supra note 14, at 785; sed also id. at 798-99 (noting that in a military
environment, the usual First Amendment protections "give way to assertions of
nonjusticiability, diminished standards of judicial review and deference to abstract
administrative judgments of necessity, efficiency, and appropriateness of means").
405. 1 have written elsewhere of the endemic fear of responsible judgment with respect to
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observation refers to military judgment in more than just the Rehnquist sense of
military judgment, which would mean only that the military bad manifested its belief
in the truth of a particular assertion. It refers instead to military judgment in the now-
obsolete sense of a true judgment that requires thoughtful and deliberate balance of
competing factual and legal considerations. By eliminating the prospect ofsubstantive
judicial review, Rehnquist has effectively eliminated the need for any branch of
government to engage in responsible constitutional judgment in any matter related to
military affairs. Rehnquist simultaneously has insulated 1) the military, 2) Congress
(when acting on the military's behalf), and 3) the Court itself from their conventional
constitutional responsibility to explain, defend, and justify exercises ofjudgment.4"
This transformation in civilian-military relations has contributed to the evolution of
a contemporary military and a contemporary Congress that irresponsibly substitute
conclusorymoraljudgment for nuanced rational judgment in evaluating constitutional
the control of both consen~sual sexual behavior and sexual misconduct within the military. The
military not only actively avoids its own responsibility, but also fails to expect responsible
behavior on the part of either male or female personnel. See generally Diane H. Mazur,
Women, Responsibility, and the Military, 74 NoTRE DAME L. RV. 1 (1998). See also Mazur,
supra note 148, at 673. This author challenged the military to "overcome its fear of
individualized judgment" as exhibited in the Lt. Kelly Flinn adultery prosecution:
Having failed to explain its actions in [Flinn's] case, the military found itself
without a plausible point of comparison for evaluating comparable offenses,
leading to a painful post-Flinn period in which it lurched from one high-profile
adultery allegation to the next, unable to draw reasoned distinctions. Simplistic
notions of "accountability" and "zero-tolerance" took the place of traditional
military judgment in a failed effort to satisfy civilian concerns. Until the military
overcomes its reluctance to explain its actions, however, its judgment will
continue to be questioned.
Id.
406. In the words of Eugene Rostow, the principle ofjudicial deference to militaryjudgment
"treat[s] the decisions of military officials, unlike those of other government officers, as almost
immune from ordinary rules of public responsibility." Rostow, supra note 117, at 531. "It is
essential to every democratic value in society that official action taken in the name of the war
power be held to standards of responsibility under such circumstances." Id. at 515.
Professor Rostow wrote these words, of course, in response to the lessons learned in
deferring to military judgment in the World War II Japanese internment cases. Congress, the
military, or the courts might defend contemporaryjudicial deference on the basis that it never
could be applied to immunize constitutional violations of equal protection on the basis of race,
but only "lesser" violations. The distinction is unpersuasive. First, Rehnquist's language of
deference to militaryjudgment is certainly broad enough to accommodateclassification on the
basis of race; it is so devoid of anything other than sheer platitude that it could accommodate
constitutional violation of any variety. Second, it is simply too easy to assume that the
constitutional transformation achieved by Rehnquist could not have been employed to
reestablish or perpetuate racial caste because, by the 1970s, facial classifications on the basis
of race were beyond political viability as well as constitutional viability. Cf Bishop, Collateral
Review, supra note 15, at 65 (considering, in 1961, whetherjudicial deference to the internal
operation of the military's court-martial system would permit systematic exclusion of black
servicemembers from court-martial panels; concluding that Congress could not include in the
Uniform Code of Military Justice "a provision plainly inconsistent with the Bill of Rights as
interpreted by the Supreme Court").
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issues involving military service.
The difference reveals itself in scholarly treatments of civilian-military relations
before and after the Rehnquist era. After Rehnquist joined the Court-specifically,
after Rehnquist's 1974 opinion in Parker v. Levy--constitutional issues involving the
military would never again be discussed in isolation from cultural change and moral
qualification. After Rehnquist, the principle ofjudicial deference to claims ofmilitary
necessity would be employed routinely as a means of registering moral judgment on
issues of social controversy and social conservatism within civilian society. Rather
than standing on its own as a constitutional issue historically defined by constitutional
text and intent, the principle of judicial deference in a military context would be
reconstructed as a cultural mandate in opposition to evolving constitutional
expectation in the areas of equal protection, free exercise, and free speech.
It is almost startling to read analyses of constitutional rights in a military context
written before judicial deference became a cultural crusade. The preeminent legal
analysis of constitutional rights in a military context published before the Rehnquist
era was written by Chief Justice Earl Warren in 1962.0" Its most distinctive feature,
read in modem hindsight, is that it contained not a single word of a moralistic tone.
It measured the jurisdictional reach of the constitutional military powers in traditional
terms of internal governance and discipline and not in subjective judgments of the
military's moral superiority. It was sensitive to factual and historical context °8 and
nearly clairvoyant in anticipation of the direction in which Rehnquist would take the
principle of constitutional control of the military. Warren specifically cautioned
against allowing the military to develop as a separate society, although that notion had
not yet entered the Court's jurisprudence of civilian-military relations. "When the
authority of the military has such a sweeping capacity for affecting the lives of our
citizenry, the wisdom of treating the military establishment as an enclave beyond the
reach of civilian courts almost inevitably is drawn into question."' Ironically, Warren
anticipated that civilian courts would soon take a greater role, not a lesser one, in
adjudicating constitutional claims in a military context. When he spoke of judicial
encroachment in matters subject to military discretion, he was referring to the near-
sacrosanct core of internal military discipline, not the bloated form of immunity that
later would be assigned to all military-related judgments during the Rehnquist era.
Warren foresaw, inaccurately as it turned out, that the sheer size and intrusiveness of
the military institution with respect to civilians and civilian society would warrant a
drawback in judicial deference even in matters of internal governance and
discipline." '
Rehnquist's blanket principle of judicial deference to the military provided an
opportunity to act without the restraints of rational explanation or constitutional
limitation, and both Congress and the military that it governs are very well aware of
the latitude the Court has awarded. Congress, in particular, realizes it has been given
407. See Warren, supra note 15.
408. See id. at 193 (distinguishing between wartime and peacetime militaries in assessing
the need forjudicial deference). "There has been time for the Government to be put to the proof
with respect to its claim of necessity; there has been time for reflection; there has been time for
the Government to adjust to any adverse [judicial] decision." Id.
409. Id. at 188.
410. See id. at 187-88.
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the ability to govern the military in a manner that facilitates the shaping of civilian
social policy along traditional moral lines, and it acts with that goal in mind with little
attempt at concealment or misdirection.41 In 1993, for example, Congress enacted
into law previous Department of Defense policy that excluded gay citizens from
military service. In codifying the end product of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" debate,
Congress included within the statute a legislative "finding" that it held sole
constitutional discretion to decide whether gay citizens could enter into or continue
military service:
Section 8 of article I of the Constitution of the United. States commits
exclusively to Congress the powers to raise and support armies, provide and
maintain aNavy, and make rules for the government and regulation of the land
and naval forces. Pursuant to the powers conferred by section 8 of article I of
the Constitution of the United States, it lies within the discretion of the
Congress to establish qualifications for and conditions of service in the armed
forces.412
As brazen as such legislative "findings" may be, they are certainly accurate. Many
have analyzed the constitutional irrationalities of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell,"43 but
under the Rehnquist reconstruction of the relationship between civilian courts and the
military, irrationality is constitutionally sufficient. The most significant factor
preventing reform of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is the existence of this unlimited
judicial deference to military preference." 4 The influence of any contention on the
merits of the question pales in comparison.
Although "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is a product of judicial deference to the
military's preferred social order, it is not the most significant consequence of
Rehnquist's judicial response to the Vietnam War. The constitutional standard of
equal protection that would apply to the military's exclusion of gay citizens absent
special deference may not be a heightened standard and, in any event, the standard is
411. Ellen Oberwetter noted two instances during the 1980 congressional debate concerning
registration of women for the draft in which congressmen reminded each other--on the
record--that they had the latitude to do whatever they wished because the Court could not
second-guess them, even for reasons grounded in the Constitution. See Oberwetter, supra note
14, at 203 n.163. Senator John Warner quoted from a letter written by Robert Bork, then a
professorat Yale Law School, which advised that Congresswas free to exclude women because
"no court could challenge its decision." See id. (citing 126 CoNG. REC. 13,881 (1980)); see
also Registration of Women: Hearings on H.R. 6569 Before the Military Personnel Subcomm.
of the Comm. on Armed Servs., 96th Cong. 25 (1980) ('rhey [the Justices of the Supreme
Court] feel we can classify according to any of these things if it is for the common defense of
this country.').
412. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1), (3) (1994).
413. See supra note 16.
414. Every U.S. Court of Appeals decision upholding the constitutionality of "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" has relied heavily on an assumed obligation ofjudicial deference to the military's
proffered justifications. See, e.g., Ablev. United States, 155 F.3d 628,632-34 (2d Cir. 1998);
Holmes v. California Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1133 (9th Cir. 1997); Richenberg v.
Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 261 (8th Cir. 1996); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 925-27 (4th Cir.
1996) (en banc); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 685-86 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en bane).
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still unclear.4t5 The most clearly identifiable and clearly pernicious consequence of
Rehnquist's elevation of the military's constitutional and moral standing has been its
effect on the status of women as citizens of the United States. In that context, judicial
deference to the military represents the only available majoritarian means of resisting
constitutional precedent concerning equal protection on the basis of sex.
B. Submarines and the Perpetuation of Caste
Facial classifications on the basis of sex, now almost extinct in civilian law, are still
a routine matter within the military. Military duty positions are defined in terms of the
sex of the individual who can be assigned to them, with the majority open to either
men or women and the remainder open only to men.416 Congress periodically has
meted out additional duty assignments to women as it deems appropriate, with
appropriateness measured by consistency with traditional notions of sexual role and
sexual morality as much by the interests of military efficiency. It is quite simple to
blur the two concerns if necessary to achieve a particular result. For example, if
allowing women to depart from traditional gender restrictions could make male
servicemembers (or their wives) uncomfortable or resistant, then Congress can
translate that uncomfortableness or resistance, real or imagined, into a disruption of
military efficiency.
One of the best illustrations of the way in which Congress employs its military
powers to perpetuate traditional notions of sexual morality and of gender stereotype
can be found in its passion for preventing Navy women from serving on submarines.
The Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services ("DACOWITS"),417 a
civilian advisory board to the Secretary of Defense, recently recommended that the
Navy revise its current policy of categorically excluding women from submarines,
regardless ofjob description."' With the single exception of submarines, women are
eligible to serve on all Navy ships.419 More specifically, DACOWITS recommended
415. In invalidating a Colorado constitutional amendment that would have prohibited state
government from providing legal protection to gay citizens, Justice Kennedy wrote that the
Constitution "neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 623 (1996) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)). Colorado failed to demonstrate that the amendment was even rationally related
to any legitimate state purpose. See id. at 632. Romer v. Evans, however, did not directly
overrule Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), which found that the criminalization of
same-sex intimate conduct was constitutionally rational under rational basis review. 478 U.S.
at 196.
416. See MARGARET C. HARRELL & LAURA L. MILLER, NATI'L DEF. RESEARCH INST., NEW
OPPORTUNITIES FOR MILITARY WOMEN: EFFECTS UPON READINESS, COHESION, AND MORALE
12 tbl.2.1 (1997) (stating that 62% of Marine Corps positions are open to women, 67.2% of
Army positions are open to women, 91.2% of Navy positions are open to women, and
essentially all (99.4%) Air Force positions are open to women).
417. See generally DACO WITS, http://www.dtic.mil/dacowits/ (last modified May 8, 2001)
(providing background information on DACOWITS and its function).
418. DACOWITS, HISTORY OF RECOMMENDATIONS FALL CONFERENCE 2000, at
http:llwww.dtic.mil/daeowits/ (last modified June 1I, 2001).
419. U.S. NAVY, WOMEN IN THE NAVY-ACTIVE DUTY [INCLUDING TARS] ASSIGNMENTS
AS OF I I JANUARY 2002, at
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that initial assignments ofwomen begin with female officers on larger Tridentballistic
missile submarines.42 The integration of officers would be much less difficult
logistically because of the more private berthing arrangements given to officers in
general. Additionally, DACOWITS recommended that the Navy make design
modifications to smaller attack submarines now under construction to accommodate
mixed-sex crews in the future.42' Any future retrofitting would be much more
expensive, and DACOWITS believed it was unlikely that the Navy would continue
to exclude women for the 40-year life of these new submarines.4 2
Assignment of women to submarines is a controversial issue within the Navy, but
there have been small indications of movement in that direction. In the summer of
2000, female future officers in the Reserve Officer Training Corps ("ROTC")
received short training assignments aboard submarines.4" Also, two summers ago,
then-Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig, broached the subject of integrating the
submarine service--dejure segregated by sex and de facto segregated by race-in a
much-publicized speech to the submarine community. Speaking in reference to those
who serve aboard submarines, Danzig said, "The most Narcissus-like thing about
creating something in your own image, about being in love with your own image, is
the continued and continuous existence of this segment of the Navy as a white male
preserve."'424 The day the Navy would open the last closed door to its female personnel
seemed to be approaching. Submarine service required higher intellectual and
psychological standards for its personnel, and the Navy would continue to have
difficulty filling duty assignments unless those slots were opened to the fourteen
percent of Navy personnel who were women.42
Congress, however, was determined not to allow women aboard submarines, even
if the Navy were to conclude that integration would benefit military efficiency. It
enacted a statute that prohibited the Navy from exercising its discretion to assign
women to submarines unless Congress first had the opportunity to bar them by law:
No change in the Department of the Navy policy limiting service on
submarines to males ... may take effect until (1) the Secretary of Defense
submits to Congress written notice of the proposed change; and 2) a period of
30 days of continuous session of Congress (excluding any day on which either
House of Congress is not in session) expires following the date on which
notice is received.426
The same restrictions would apply to any expenditure of funds by the Navy for the
http://www.chinfo.navy.miVnavpalib/people/women/winfactl.html (last visited May 13,2002).
420. See DACOWITS, HISTORY OF RECOMMENDATIONS FALL CONFERENCE 2000, at
http://www.dtic.mil/dacowits/ (last modified June 11, 2001).
421. See id.
422. DACOWITS, FALLCoNFERENcE2000 ISSUE BOOK, http://www.dtic.mil/dacowits/ (last
modified May 14, 2001).
423. See Rowan Scarborough, Panel Asks Navy to Put Female Officers in Subs; Military
Memo Says Move 'Very Costly', WASH. TIMES, May 4,2000, at Al.
424. Myers, supra note 363, at Al.
425. See id.
426. 10 U.S.C. § 6035(a) (1994).
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purpose of reconfiguring any existing submarine or designing any new submarine to
accommodate the service of women.4"
The magic of the Rehnquist principle of judicial deference to the military, in
Congress's view, is that facial classifications on the basis of sex can be justified by
any reason or by no reason. They can be justified openly on the basis of congressional
desire to preserve stereotypical gender roles or to enforce traditional notions ofsexual
morality for women. One can mine potential congressional justifications simply by
reading the Washington Times, a major Washington, D.C. newspaper known for its
advocacy of a military that is socially conservative, morality driven, and limited in its
roles for women.428 Unlike other nonmilitary contexts for equal protection litigation,
it makes no difference that the military interests proffered to justify the exclusion of
women may be without factual basis or irrelevant, arising from sources that are
uninformed, biased, or lacking in credibility. If the military is willing to assert a belief
in its truth, any assertion is sufficient to uphold a particular military judgment under
Rehnquist's principle of deference, regardless of its degree of reliance on traditional
gender stereotypes. In order to justify the exclusion of Navy women from submarines,
therefore, Congress could potentially proffer any of the following government
interests: 1) women require separate, private berthing and bathrooms, which would
be prohibitively expensive to provide and would displace operational equipment; 2)
women would become pregnant and require airlift to shore, and their fetuses might be
harmed by a submarine's toxic gases; 3) submarines are too confined for women, who
need fresh air, sunshine, and views; 4) it is inappropriate for men and women to share
berthing or bathrooms in rotating shifts; 5) the presence of women will create sexual
tension and jealousy among the crew and degrade unit cohesion; 6) submarine service
is too psychologically stressful for Women; 7) the wives of male submariners would
object; and 8) any decision to utilize women would only be made "as a final sop" to
"radical feminist supporters.
427. Id. § 6035(b). More recently, twenty-seven members of the House Armed Services
Committee sent a letter to the Secretary of Defense expressing their concern that the Army was
considering an expansion of assignments available to women. Rowan Scarborough, Panel
Queries Army's Plans for Women; Fears Change in Combat Rules, WASH. TIMEs, July 5,
2001, at Al."The congressmen's suspicions were heightened when the Army submitted
documents to DACOWITS this spring that a review of regulations concerning female soldiers
is currently being staffed." Id.
428. See Krista E. Wiegand & David L. Paletz, The Elite Media and the Military-Civilian
Culture Gap, 27 ARMED FORCES & SOC'Y 183, 192-93 (2001) (describing the Washington
Times, which bills itself as "America's Newspaper," as disproportionately devoted to issues of
sex and scandal, but determined to preserve an atmosphere of social conservatism within the
military). "[The Washington Times's] general viewwas that military values arevital and should
be preserved. The military culture is rightly conservative, observing high standards, morals, and
values; any further trend to make the military more like civilian culture would be detrimental
to the institution's very existence." Id. at 193.
429. Thesejustifications were taken from Elaine Donnelly, Stealth Attackon Silent Service,
WASH. TIMES, June 8,2000, at A18;Myers, supra note 363; Rowan Scarborough, Panel Eyes
Notification on Integration of Subs; Opponents Fear Administrative Decree, WASH. TIMES,
May 11, 2000, at A4 [hereinafter Scarborough, Panel Eyes]; Rowan Scarborough, Lawmaker
Moves to Bar Women from Subs; Wants Congress to Decide Matter, WASH. TIMES, May 5,
2000, at AI [hereinafter Scarborough, Lawmaker Moves]; Scarborough, supra note 423. The
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Each of the foregoing "justifications" for excluding women fromsubmarines in fact
has been offered by congressmen, by military officials, or by those advocating greater
restrictions on military service by women. Not one of them is related to the merits of
performance of military duty;430 all of them are related in some way to traditional
expectations of sexual morality for women or to "archaic and overbroad
generalizations""43 concerning the capabilities of women. Under Rehnquist's
transformation of constitutional control of the military, hobyever, they are sufficient
to justify facial classifications on the basis of sex. The fact that these assertions may
be "absurd or unsupported" '432 or completely implausible 33 has been rendered
irrelevant to the question of equal protection under law. It is impossible to define any
limit to the judicial deference given to a congressional belief that facial sex
classifications are necessary for military effectiveness. The line clearly extends
beyond absurdity: two summers ago Army special forces personnel argued that
women should not be permitted to serve as combat medics because, among other
reasons, their duties would require them to see men naked.43" '
Rehnquist, and the Justices who have joined him, 35 have never considered the
damage they inflict upon women as a class by allowing our constitutional past to be
statement at the end of the paragraph, made by Rep. Roscoe Bartlett of Maryland, was
prompted by the fear that the Clinton administration might permit the Navy to assign women
to submarine duty while Congress was out of session. See Scarborough, Lawmaker Moves,
supra.
430. See J. Michael Brower, The Enemy [Below] ... the Brass Above, PROCEEDINGS, June
2000, at 33, 33 (explaining the irrationality of excluding women from submarine duty, with
particular reference to justifications based on physical modesty and sexual morality). "Privacy
issues are managed by discipline rather than by reconstructing submarine space; men and
women make do with the available room." Id. Proceedings is a publication of the United States
Naval Institute.
431. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975).
432. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 515 (1986) (Brennan & Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting) (criticizing Rehnquist's unquestioning deference to the military's refusal to
consider Goldman's request to wear a yarmulke).
433. See id. at 532 (O'Connor & Marshall, dissenting) (also criticizing Rehnquist's
unquestioning deference).
434. See Rowan Scarborough, Women Proposed for Green Berets; Army Doctor Suggests
Training Them as Combat Medics, WASH. TIMES, June 6, 2000, at Al. But cf United States
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 544 (1996) (noting that, more than a century ago, medicine was
viewed as an inappropriate field for women). One might also assume that ninety-three years
after Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), which upheld limitations on the working hours
of women on the basis of the infamous "Brandeis brief," employers would no longer attempt
to justify their exclusion of women by arguing that the work was too stressful for them to
withstand. In the context of the military, however, one would be wrong.
435. Justice Stevens, surprisingly, has not only voted to uphold an expansive view of
deference to the military on two occasions, see Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983), and
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), but has also dissented on two occasions, see United
States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987) and Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980). Justice
Scalia authored Stanley and joined Rehnquist in Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
Justice O'Connor voted to uphold deference in Solorio and Chappell v. Wallace, but dissented
in Stanley and Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). The remaining Justices have not
yet had an opportunity to rule on Rehnquist's principle ofjudicial deference to the military.
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resurrected in a military context. Rehnquist's crippling form ofjudicial deference to
the military peimits Congress to perpetuate notions of gender caste in ways that are
otherwise considered untouchable. For example, the lack of separate, private berthing
and bathroom arrangements in military facilities is assumed to constitute a sufficient
justification for the exclusion of women.436 The assumption, however, is grounded in
nothing more than traditional expectations of what is "appropriate" behavior for
women or an "appropriate" level of mixing between the sexes. It has no necessary
relation to a purpose of military effectiveness, and the military's desire to perpetuate
a traditional sense of physical modesty and sexual interaction cannot substitute as an
important, or even legitimate, government purpose sufficient to justify the exclusion
of women.3 7 The military can, of course, enforce standards of discipline related to
physical modesty and sexual interaction, applicable to both men and women, but it
cannot draw facial classifications on the basis of sex that are grounded in
generalizations about how men and women do, or should, behave.
The judicial latitude that Congress and the military now have to govern on the basis
of classifications that would otherwise violate the Equal Protection Clause also
expresses itself in ways that are less direct. Military culture has become more
polarized in its conception of gender over the last generation, a trend that is
counterintuitive in a military that has generally expanded the opportunities available
to women during that time. Ostentatious masculinity and ostentatious femininity are
not inherent components of military culture, but instead have developed in parallel
fashion to Rehnquist's separation ofthe military from constitutional restraint. That the
two trends would operate in tandem should not be surprising; a military-and a
Congress-permitted to ignore constitutional expectation with respect to the equal
protection of women will naturally develop a more polarized assumption of gender
roles.
Two examples of the less-direct ways in which Rehnquist's influence has found
436. Judge Richard Posner has stated that he "would be very surprised to learn that any
Justice of the Supreme Court believes that the maintenance of sex-segregated public restrooms
violates the Constitution." Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 15 (1998). He made that statement in the context of arguing that, contrary to the
Court's decision in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), the Constitution did not
require the admission ofwomen to the Virginia Military Institute ("VMI"). Posner insisted that
he was "not arguing that because single-sex restrooms are lawful, VMI should be entitled to
exclude women." Id. at 15 n.39. However, there seems to be no reason to mention the
presumed constitutionality of single-sex restrooms, other than its presumed significance to the
exclusion of women.
It has been noted that sex-segregated restrooms are distinguishable from race-segregated
restrooms, in that the former are not stigmatizing to women. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence,
The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 317, 351-52 (1987). What this observation neglects to recognize is that sex-segregated
restrooms can be stigmatizing to women if the absence of a separate restroom can be used to
justify the exclusion of women from a particular activity.
437. But see Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,325 n.6 (1977) (upholding, in Title VII
action, exclusion ofwomen fromprison guard duties; noting that guards were required to patrol
men's dormitories, restrooms, and showers on a regular basis). "The employee's very
womanhood would thus directly undermine her capacity to provide the security that is the
essence of a correctional counselor's responsibility." Id. at 336.
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expression in gendered aspects of military culture involve haircuts and uniforms. As
discussed earlier in this Article, styles of military haircuts for men have evolved as a
means of expressing "separateness" from civilian society.438 A generation ago, most
military men would have cut their hair in a way that minimized any distinction from
civilian peers. Today, the typical male servicemember shaves or "buzzes" his head in
an extreme style that, ifnotperceived immediately as military, could be mistaken only
for a haircut sported by some of the most culturally extreme members of civilian
society. That transformation has had consequences for women as well. During the
period the Virginia Military Institute ("VMI")439 prepared for the admission of
women, the nature of cadet haircuts was one of the most sensitive issues to resolve."
The concern was that women might never fully assimilate with their male classmates
because of VMI's reluctance to require women to shave their heads in the male default
style. What most people neglected to grasp, however, was that the issue arose only as
a result of a gendered evolution over the last twenty-five years in what it meant to
have "military hair"; it had nothing to do with the VMI's historical tradition."' When
both military men and military women wore their hair in a more androgynous style,
the difference in their appearance was fairly small. Today, the cultural expectation is
that military women will wear their hair long but "put up" while on duty,442 a style that
438. See supra note 323 and accompanying text.
439. VMI is a civilian university that engages in an adversative or "military" style of
education, but it is not part of the military. See generally.Dianne Avery, Institutional Myths,
Historical Narratives and Social Science Evidence: Reading the "Record" in the Virginia
Military Institute Case, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 189 (1996). The VMI controversy
did, however, raise the same squeamishness about the idea of women in military service that
affects cases concerning the military itself. Interestingly, in arguing against the admission of
women to VMI, Richard Posner noted the Rehnquist principle ofjudicial deference to the
military. Posner contended that "if the national government decided to reduce the percentage
of women in the armed forces, it is unthinkable that the Court would stand in its way." Posner,
supra note 436, at 16. Posner believed that if VMI had been a component of the armed forces,
rather than just a "military-style" civilian university, the Court never would have rejected its
petition to remain all-male. See id. at 16-17. There are two ways to examine this distinction.
I would suggest instead that the only reason United States v. Virginia raised such vehement
protest from Justice Scalia was because the case pushed all the emotional buttons related to
military service by women. See 518 U.S. at 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Otherwise; it would
have been a relatively uncontroversial case concerning single-sex higher education. See
generally Mazur, supra note 222 at 78-79 (contending that United States v. Virginia is
fundamentally a case about military service, not single-sex education).
440. See LAURAFAIRCHIDBRODIE, BREAKINGOUT:VMIANDTHECOMINGOFWOMEN 126-
32(2000).
441. See id. at 128-29 (noting that shaved heads for new VMI cadets hadfirst appeared in
the 1980s). Some administrators noted that "if the men's hairwas longer, male and female rats
[new cadets] might be able to wear similar styles." Id. at 129. The final resolution was for
women to receive "buzz cuts" that were closer to the contemporary shaved style than to the pre-
1980s men's cuts. See id. at 220-23 (including photographs).
442. Compare the more androgynous 1970s hairstyles of a group of female naval aviators
with the "glamour shot" of the 1990s female naval aviator with long flowing hair pictured in
JEAN ZIMMERMAN, TAmSPIN: WOMEN AT WAR IN THE WAKE OFTALHOOK (1995) (fourth and
eighth pages of photographs bound between pages 208 and 209); see also CAROLBARKALOW
& ANDREARAAB, INTHE MEN'S HOUSE: AN INSIDEACCOUNTOFLIFE IN THE ARMYBY ONEOF
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during the Vietnam generation would have been considered oddly formal. These
changes in the outward appearance of servicemembers might seem superficial and
insignificant, but they are not. What is critically important about this otherwise
frivolous discourse is the reality that polarization in haircuts between men and women
can be used as a way of enforcing "difference" and as a way of perpetuating the
assumption that women cannot fit the standard template of a servicemember.
Uniforms have become more ostentatiously masculine or "combat-identified" as
well. A generation ago, for example, Air Force personnel who performed field duties,
such as aircraft maintenance, wore simple, green utility uniforms called fatigues.
Today, however, dignified fatigues have been replaced by a camouflage-printed
"Battle Dress Uniform" designed to look more like the uniforms worn by personnel
in the Army and the Marine Corps." Theonly possible reason for substituting a new
utility uniform would be its "combat-identified" flair, because there would be little
need for camouflaged stealth on a gray concrete flightline.' Evolution in military
uniforms, however, just like evolution in military hairstyles, can be a symptom of a
larger trend. In an effort to accentuate the "difference" from civilian society that the
Court has endorsed, we see stereotypical attempts to make the military seem more
"military." In an effort to accentuate the "difference" between male and female
servicemembers that the Court has endorsed, we see an evolution in cultural style that
polarizes the gendered appearance of servicemembers. Those same gendered
differences are then employed to justify why the presence of women is so destabilizing
to the status quo, although the status quo itself is an artificial construction.
It is anything but a coincidence that the same twenty-five-year era following the end
of the Vietnam War has brought about a new constitutional principle of all-
encompassing deference to military judgment, an increase in the distance between
military and civilian society, a deterioration of equal protection in a military context,
and a polarization ofgendered roles in military personnel. These trends did not occur
in isolation from one another. Rehnquist's "sub-rational basis""' 5 standard of review
with respect to matters of military concern has permitted Congress to use its
constitutional military powers for purposes that are not legitimate government
purposes.4" They have been applied to preserve the traditional place of women in
WEST POINT'S FIRST FEMALE GRADUATES (1990) (second page ofphotographs bound between
pages 126 and 127) (picturing the much longer styles of men's hair and the much shorter styles
of women's hair prevalent in the "plebe" or freshman class at the United States Military
Academy at West Point in 1976).
443. See Dress and Personal Appearance of Air Force Personnel, Air Force Instruction 36-
2903 (June 8, 1998), available at http://afpubs.hq.af.mil/afpubs.stm.
444. Furthermore, the endless pockets provided by a Battle Dress Uniform just tempt
flightline personnel to carry things in their pockets that can fall and be ingested in aircraft
engines. For that matter, long hair that can never be protected completely by headgear can be
a potential liability around aircraft and aircraft-maintenance machinery as well.
445. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503,515 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
446. Cf Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,632 (1996) (holding that Colorado's imposition of
a "broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group" is not a legitimate
government purpose). Congress's latitude to use its constitutional military powers for the
purpose of perpetuating traditional notions of gender might also be viewed as a similarly broad
and undifferentiated disability on women.
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society, to characterize women primarily i" terms of their sexuality, and to establish
a fundamentalist, morality-driven understanding of the limits of constitutional
protection.4 ' Judicial deference to militarypolicymaking has shielded Congress from
even an expectation of rationality, and its performance has degenerated to meet that
expectation.44'
CONCLUSION: CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL IN AN ERA OF A
POLITICALLY PARTISAN MILITARY
A growing body ofpolitical science research indicates that the military has become
less politically representative of civilian society and more politically partisan over the
last twenty-five years. Popularly referred to as the "civil-military gap," this developing
divide between civilian society and the military has become one of the primary topics
of research within the academic study of military affairs." 9 Its core findings reveal a
strong ideological and partisan drift among military officers in favor ofthe Republican
Party, a change far greater in degree than any parallel trend of increasing social
conservatism within civilian society!" The civil-military gap may be a
counterintuitive development from the perspective ofnonveteran civilians; most may
447. For additional examples, see 10 U.S.C. § 1093 (1994) (prohibiting the use of
Department of Defense funds or medical facilities to perform abortions, including abortions
forservicewomen); MilitaryfHonor and DecencyAct, 10 U.S.C. § 2489(a) (1994) (prohibiting
the sale of sexually explicit materials in military exchanges).
448. The most intellectually embarrassing law review article ever published might be a short
piece written by former Senator Sam Nunn ofGeorgia for the purpose ofjustifying "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" (interestingly, without ever mentioning "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"). See Sam Nunn,
The Fundamental Principles of the Supreme Court's Jurisprudence in Military Cases, 29
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 557 (1994). The article illustrates the sheer smugness of a Congress that
realizes it can act without limitation under its constitutional military powers. "The principles
of judicial deference developed by the Supreme Court recognize the fact that over the years
Congress has acted responsibly in addressing the constitutional rights of military personnel."
Id. at 566.
449. The journal of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Armed
Forces and Society, published a recent symposium issue containing several research studies
investigating the civil-military gap. See Symposium, Media and Education in the U.S. Civil-
Military Gap, 27 ARMED FORCES AND SOC'Y 177 (2001). The research studies in this issue
werejust asampling of those sponsored by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies ("TISS"),
an interdisciplinary research consortium of Duke University, the University ofNorth Carolina,
and North Carolina State University and the primary source of research on civil-military gap
issues. See also SOLDIERS AND CivILANs (Peter D. Feaver & Richard H. Kohn eds., 2001)
(compiling additional civil-military gap research); Symposium, Media and Educati6n in the
U.S. Civil-Military Gap, 27 ARMED FORCES AND Soc'Y 375-462 (1998);
http://www.poli'duke.edu/civmil/index.html (containing general information on TISS).
450. See Ole R. Holsti, A Widening Gap Between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society?:
Some Evidence, 1976-1996, INT'L SECURITY, Winter 1998/99, at 5; see also Mazur, Word
Games, supra note 315, at 1609 (discussing Holsti research in the context of "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell"); Mazur, supra note 222, at 67-69 (discussing Holsti research in the context of a feminist
obligation for military service); Adam Clymer, Sharp Divergence Found in Views of Military
and Civilians, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1999, at A20; Thomas E. Ricks, Military lsBecomingMore
Conservative, Study Says, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 1997, at A20.
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assume that the modem military has always been consistently more conservative than
the civilian society it protects. The end of the draft-era military a generation ago,
however, has contributed to fundamental change in the composition of our military
forces. The all-volunteer, self-selected military has become increasingly less
representative in a political sense since the Vietnam War ended, and the trend is even
more significant when one considers that the last generation has seen a tremendous
increase in the number of military women at higher ranks. Over the last thirty years,
we have lost the draft-era officers and enlisted men that made the military a force of
the people rather than a force apart from the people, and we have gained a Justice of
the Supreme Court determined to magnify that cultural division.
The cultural and political division revealed in the civil-military gap research
inescapably relates to Relnquist's principle ofjudicial deference to militaryjudgment.
In one sense, they are causally related. Rehnquist's introduction of the factually
unsupported rationale of the military as a "separate society" exacerbated the
disadvantages of a transition from a draft to a volunteer military. It encouraged the
military to identify its "difference" in terms ofresistance to constitutional expectation,
which predictably led to self-selection of those who would join the military for similar
constitutionally resistant reasons.45' Paradoxically, Rehnquist was determined to
eliminate the only factual predicate that could make judicial deference to the military
minimally rational. The wisdom of judicial deference, if it exists at all, depends
critically on the "militia ideal" of universal service by citizen-soldiers.45 When
members of civilian society feel they have a personal stake in the exercise of military
discretion, judicial review of military policy becomes somewhat less necessary.
Majoritarian control does not even begin to make sense unless participatory,
"republican" forms of protection against military overreaching are also available.
Majoritarian control of military decisions that impose collateral consequences on
451. Military separatism can also impose disadvantages in the opposite direction. A
generalized respect for, but lack of familiarity with, the military institution can tempt civilians
to seek military solutions to difficult civilian problems, which can lead to a creeping societal
militarism. See Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian
Control of the Military, 29 WAKE FOREST L. RaV. 341, 386-90 (1994). "As the military's
responsibilities become increasingly open-ended, the potential exists for the military to assume
it has the right, and even the obligation, to intervene in a wide range of activities when it
perceives it can advance a broadly defined notion ofthe national interest." Id. at 389 (emphasis
in original).
452. Kirstin Dodge described the exchange of experience between military and civilian
concerns that the model of the citizen-soldier provides and, conversely, that the model of a
sepaiate society inevitably prevents:
Citizen-soldiers who come together temporarily to train or fight in the nation's
defense circulate in and out of the military, bringing their opinions from civilian
life to their military service. Their military experience likewise shapes their
contributions to debates about military needs, treatment of servicemembers, and
the like. Everyone sees herself as potentially in need of protection by the military,
as potentially called upon to guard the country, and as potentially subject to
military regulation.
Dodge, supra note 14, at 28; see also GARY HART, THE MINUTEMAN: RESTORING AN ARMY OF
THE PEOPLE (1998) (recommending a return to universal military service in the National Guard
or Reserve).
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civilians or civilian society makes no sense whatsoever if, as is the case in Rehnquist's
world, the military is disconnected by command of the Supreme Court from the
society it is sworn to serve.
Rehnquist's reliance on the asserted moral superiority of military values in
comparison to civilian constitutional values has also contributed to a rising contempt
for civilian society within the military. As one retired Gulf War admiral stated, "More
and more, enlisted as well as officers are beginning to feel that they are special, better
than the society they serve. This is not healthy in an armed forces serving
democracy."453 That contempt expresses itself in terms of morality and social
conservatism and, most alarmingly, in terms of political partisanship. A military that
once prided itself on an ethic of political neutrality has drifted toward open and active
identification with one political party, but seemingly for a very narrow purpose-the
maintenance of cultural separateness and cultural resistance. To the military, the civil-
military gap can only be a positive development, because it is consistent with a
military purpose not just to defend civilian society, but to define it.454
This Article began with a discussion of Greer v. Spock,4 5  and it will end with one
as well. The opinion rested fundamentally on the assumption of a politically neutral
military. There was a level of comfort in restricting the political involvement of
servicemembers only because the constitutional need for servicemembers to remain
politically neutral was of greater importance. The result was "consistent with the
American constitutional tradition of a politically neutral military under civilian
control." '456 Over the last generation, however, Rehnquist has turned this principle on
its head. In Greer v. Spock, First Amendment values were displaced narrowly in the
service of a greater constitutional good--civilian control of the military-that could
be achieved only through maintenance of political neutrality. Today, in contrast, the
Court's identification of the military as pointedly not neutral, but as separate, morally
superior, and politically partisan, is offered as a reason why the military should not be
subject to constitutional limitation at all. Judicial deference to the military can never
be constitutionally effective when the military is politically partisan, or when the
military is used for politically partisan purposes. Rehnquist's transformation of our
constitutional understanding of civilian-military relations has achieved, with uncanny
precision, the worst possible combination of constitutional anomalies. He has
encouraged the military to see itself as politically partisan, enabled Congress to use
the military for politically partisan purposes, and then awarded an all-encompassing
judicial deference that insulates -both from serious review. This is how, thirty years
later, Rehnquist finally won the Vietnam War.
453. RICKS, supra note 222, at 276. Thomas Ricks, now a reporter on military issues with
the Washington Post, has investigated and written extensively on the nonacademic side ofcivil-
military gap issues. See, e.g., id. at 274-97; Thomas E. Ricks, The Widening Gap Between the
Military and Society, ATLATIc MONTHLY, July 1997, at 66. Ricks has also written a
fascinating fictional account of the danger that the contemporary civil-military gap could pose
for national security. See THOMAS E. RICKS, A SOLDIER's DUTY (2001).
454. See RCKS, supra note 222, at 286 (noting the concerns of Richard Kohn, see supra
notes 59, 448, one of the top scholars of civilian-military relations).
455. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
456. Id. at 839.
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